32 resultados para Personal epistemology
Resumo:
The aim of this study is to explore by systematic textual analysis the crucial conceptions of constructive alignment and to reconstruct the concept of constructive alignment and examine the relation between conceptual relationships in John Biggs’s texts. In this study, I have also analyzed the presuppositions of the concept of constructive alignment and its possible implications. The research material includes Biggs’s (1996b; 2003) article entitled Enhancing Teaching through Constructive Alignment and book entitled Teaching for Quality Learning at University. The primary purpose of the systematic textual analysis is to reconstruct concepts and gain access to a new or more profound understanding of the concepts. The main purpose of the constructive alignment is to design a teaching system that supports and encourages students to adopt a deep approach learning. At the center of the constructive alignment are two concepts: constructivism in learning and alignment in teaching. A tension was detected between these concepts. Biggs assumes that students’ learning activities are primed by the teaching. Because of this it is not important what the teacher does. At the same time he emphasizes that teaching interacts with learning. The teacher’s task is to support student’s appropriate learning activities. On the basis of the analysis, I conclude these conceptions are not mutually exclusive. Interaction between teaching and learning has an effect on student’s learning activities. The most essential benefit of the model of constructive alignment is that Biggs brings together and considers teaching at the same level with learning. A weakness of Biggs’s model relates to the theoretical basis and positions of the concept of constructive alignment. There are some conflicts between conceptions of epistemology in Biggs’s texts. In addition, Biggs writes about constructivism also as conceptions of epistemology, but doesn’t consider implications of that position or what follows or doesn’t follow from that commitment. On the basis of the analysis, I suggest that constructivism refers in Biggs’s texts rather to constructivism in learning than philosophical constructivism. In light of this study, constructive alignment doesn´t lead to philosophical constructivism. That’s why constructive alignment stays out of idealism. Biggs’s way of thinking about teachers possibility to confronting students’ misconceptions and evaluate and assess students’ constructions support a realist purpose in terms of philosophical stance. Realism does not drift toward general problems of relativism, like lack of criteria for assessing or evaluate these constructions.
Resumo:
The present study addressed the epistemology of teachers’ practical knowledge. Drawing from the literature, teachers’ practical knowledge is defined as all teachers’ cognitions (e.g., beliefs, values, motives, procedural knowing, and declarative knowledge) that guide their practice of teaching. The teachers’ reasoning that lies behind their practical knowledge is addressed to gain insight into its epistemic nature. I studied six class teachers’ practical knowledge; they teach in the metropolitan region of Helsinki. Relying on the assumptions of the phenomenographic inquiry, I collected and analyzed the data. I analyzed the data in two stages where the first stage involved an abductive procedure, and the second stage an inductive procedure for interpretation, and thus developed the system of categories. In the end, a quantitative analysis nested into the qualitative findings to study the patterns of the teachers’’ reasoning. The results indicated that teachers justified their practical knowledge based on morality and efficiency of action; efficiency of action was found to be presented in two different ways: authentic efficiency and naïve efficiency. The epistemic weight of morality was embedded in what I call “moral care”. The core intention of teachers in the moral care was the commitment that they felt about the “whole character” of students. From this perspective the “dignity” and the moral character of the students should not replaced for any other “instrumental price”. “Caring pedagogy” was the epistemic value of teachers’ reasoning in the authentic efficiency. The central idea in the caring pedagogy was teachers’ intentions to improve the “intellectual properties” of “all or most” of the students using “flexible” and “diverse” pedagogies. However, “regulating pedagogy” was the epistemic condition of practice in the cases corresponding to naïve efficiency. Teachers argued that an effective practical knowledge should regulate and manage the classroom activities, but the targets of the practical knowledge were mainly other “issues “or a certain percentage of the students. In these cases, the teachers’ arguments were mainly based on the notion of “what worked” regardless of reflecting on “what did not work”. Drawing from the theoretical background and the data, teachers’ practical knowledge calls for “praxial knowledge” when they used the epistemic conditions of “caring pedagogy” and “moral care”. It however calls for “practicable” epistemic status when teachers use the epistemic condition of regulating pedagogy. As such, praxial knowledge with the dimensions of caring pedagogy and moral care represents the “normative” perspective on teachers’ practical knowledge, and thus reflects a higher epistemic status in comparison to “practicable” knowledge, which represents a “descriptive” perception toward teachers’ practical knowledge and teaching.
Resumo:
What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.
Resumo:
Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility. Joseph Ben-David's, Roger Sperry's and Knut Erik Tranøy's Views of Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility The aim of the study was to investigate, whether or not there is any connection between Jewish sociologist Joseph Ben-David's, American neuroscientist Roger Sperry's and Norwegian philosopher Knut Erik Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility. The sources of information were their writings concerning this topic. Ben-David has a classical view of science. He thinks that the Mertonian norms of scientific activity, first written in 1942, are still valid in modern science. With the help of these norms Ben-David defends the view that science is morally neutral. Ben-David thinks that a scientist has a limited social responsibility. A scientist only reports on the new results, but he is not responsible for applying the results. In any case Ben-David's ideas are no longer valid. Sperry has a scientistic view of science. According to Sperry, science is the source of moral norms and also the best guide for moral action. The methods of natural sciences "show" how to solve moral problems. A scientist's personal views of science and social responsibility are not important. However Sperry's view is very problematic on the ethical side. Tranøy stresses the scientist's social responsibility. A scientist has common norms with the society from with he or she comes. This is why a scientist has the right, and also the responsibility, to discuss social and ethical questions between science and society. Tranøy's view has some ethical and practical problems, but it is valid in principle. Finally, Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of both science and the scientist's social responsibility have a connection: the view of science corresponds to the certain view of scientist's social responsibility. The result of this study is: Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's view of science have an ethical starting point as its fundamental presupposition, which include certain views of scientific knowledge, good and the scientist's ethical responsibilities. The connection between Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility means that their views of epistemology, meta-ethics and the scientist's ethical responsibilities have a connection to their views of the scientist's social responsibility. The results of this study can help the scientific community to organize the social responsibility of a scientist and deepen the conversation concerning the scientist's social responsibility.
Resumo:
The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.
Resumo:
This study analyses personal relationships linking research to sociological theory on the questions of the social bond and on the self as social. From the viewpoint of disruptive life events and experiences, such as loss, divorce and illness, it aims at understanding how selves are bound to their significant others as those specific people ‘close or otherwise important’ to them. Who form the configurations of significant others? How do different bonds respond in disruptions and how do relational processes unfold? How is the embeddedness of selves manifested in the processes of bonding, on the one hand, and in the relational formation of the self, on the other? The bonds are analyzed from an anti-categorical viewpoint based on personal citations of significance as opposed to given relationship categories, such as ‘family’ or ‘friendship’ – the two kinds of relationships that in fact are most frequently significant. The study draws from analysis of the personal narratives of 37 Finnish women and men (in all 80 interviews) and their entire configurations of those specific people who they cite as ‘close or otherwise important’. The analysis stresses the subjective experiences, while also investigating the actualized relational processes and configurations of all personal relationships with certain relationship histories embedded in micro-level structures. The research is based on four empirical sub-studies of personal relationships and a summary discussing the questions of the self and social bond. Discussion draws from G. H. Mead, C. Cooley, N. Elias, T. Scheff, G. Simmel and the contributors of ‘relational sociology’. Sub-studies analyse bonds to others from the viewpoint of biographical disruption and re-configuration of significant others, estranged family bonds, peer support and the formation of the most intimate relationships into exclusive and inclusive configurations. All analyses examine the dialectics of the social and the personal, asking how different structuring mechanisms and personal experiences and negotiations together contribute to the unfolding of the bonds. The summary elaborates personal relationships as social bonds embedded in wider webs of interdependent people and social settings that are laden with cultural expectations. Regarding the question of the relational self, the study proposes both bonding and individuality as significant. They are seen as interdependent phases of the relationality of the self. Bonding anchors the self to its significant relationships, in which individuality is manifested, for example, in contrasting and differentiating dynamics, but also in active attempts to connect with others. Individuality is not a fixed quality of the self, but a fluid and interdependent phase of the relational self. More specifically, it appears in three formats in the flux of relational processes: as a sense of unique self (via cultivation of subjective experiences), as agency and as (a search for) relative autonomy. The study includes an epilogue addressing the ambivalence between the social expectation of individuality in society and the bonded reality of selves.
Resumo:
The study in its entirety focused on factors related to adolescents decisions concerning drug use. The term drug use is taken here to include the use of tobacco products, alcohol, narcotics, and other addictive substances. First, the reasons given for drug use (attributions) were investigated. Secondly, the influence of personal goals, the beliefs involved in decision making, psychosocial adjustment including body image and involvement with peers, and parental relationships on drug use were studied. Two cohorts participated in the study. In 1984, a questionnaire on reasons for drug use was administered to a sample of adolescents aged 14-16 (N=396). A further questionnaire was administered to another sample of adolescents aged 14-16 (N=488) in 1999. The results for both cohorts were analyzed in Articles I and II. In Articles III and IV further analysis was carried out on the second cohort (N=488). The research report presented here provides a synthesis of all four articles, together with material from a further analysis. In a comparison of the two cohorts it was found that the attributions for drug use had changed considerably over the intervening fifteen-year period. In relation to alcohol and narcotics use an increase was found in reasons involving inner subjective experiences, with mention of the good feeling and fun resulting from alcohol and narcotics use. In addition, the goals of alcohol consumption were increasingly perceived as drinking to get drunk, and for its own sake. The attributions for the adolescents own smoking behavior were quite different from the attributions for smoking by others. The attributions were only weakly influenced by the participants gender or by their smoking habits, either in 1984 or 1999. In relation to participants own smoking, the later questionnaire elicited more mention of inner subjective experiences involving "good feeling. In relation to the perceived reasons for other people s smoking, it elicited more responses connected with the notion of "belonging. In the second sample, the results indicated that the levels of body satisfaction among adolescent girls are lower than those among adolescent boys. Overall, dissatisfaction with one's physical appearance seemed to relate to drug use. Girls were also found to engage in more discussions than boys; this applied to (i) discussion with peers (concerning both intimate and general matters), and (ii) discussion with parents (concerning general matters). However, more than a quarter of the boys (out of the entire population) reported only low intimacy with both parents and peers. If both drinking and smoking were considered, it seemed that girls in particular who reported drinking and smoking also reported high intimacy with parents and peers. Boys who reported drinking and smoking reported only medium intimacy with parents and peers. In addition, having an intimate relationship with one's peers was associated with a greater tendency to drink purely in order to get drunk. Overall, the results seemed to suggest that drug use is connected with a close relationship with peers and (surprisingly) with a close relationship with parents. Nevertheless, there were also indications that to some extent peer relationships can also protect adolescents from smoking and alcohol use. The results, which underline the complexity of adolescent drug use, are taken up in the Discussion section. It may be that body image and/or other identity factors play a more prominent role in all drug use than has previously been acknowledged. It does appear that in the course of planning support campaigns for adolescents at risk of drug use, we should focus more closely on individuals and their inner world. More research on this field is clearly needed, and therefore some ideas for future research are also presented.
Resumo:
The doctoral dissertation Critic Einari J. Vehmas and Modern Art deals with one of the central figures of the Finnish art scene and his work as an art critic, art museum curator and cultural critic. The main body of research material consists of the writings of Einari J. Vehmas (1902 1980) from 1937 to the late 1960s. Vehmas wrote art reviews for magazines, and from the year 1945 he was a regular art critic for one of the major newspapers in Finland. Vehmas was heavily inclined towards French literature and visual arts. Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire influenced his views on the nature of art from the late 1920s onwards. Vehmas is commonly regarded as the most influential art critic of post-war Finland. His writings have been referred to and cited in numerous research papers on Finnish 20th-century art. A lesser known aspect of his work is his position as the deputy director of the Ateneum Art Museum, the Finnish national gallery. Through his art museum work, his opinions also shaped the canon of modern art considered particularly Finnish following the second world war. The main emphasis of the dissertation is on studying Vehmas s writings, but it also illustrates the diversity of his involvement in Finnish cultural life through biographical documents. The long chronological span of the dissertation emphasises how certain central themes accumulate in Vehmas s writings. The aim of the dissertation is also to show how strongly certain philosophical and theoretical concepts from the early 20th century, specifically Wassily Kandinsky s principle of inner necessity and Henri Bergson s epistemology highlighting intuition and instinct, continued to influence the Finnish art discourse even in the early 1960s, in part thanks to the writings of Vehmas. Throughout his production, Vehmas contemplated the state and future of modern art and humanity. Vehmas used a colourful, vitalistic rhetoric to emphasise the role of modern art as a building block of culture and humanity. At the same time, however, he was a cultural pessimist whose art views became infused with anxiety, a sense of loss, and a desire to turn his back on the world.
Resumo:
The present study focused on the associations between the personal experiences of intergroup contact, perceived social norms and the outgroup attitudes of Finnish majority and Russian-speaking minority youth living in Finland. The theoretical background of the study was derived from Allport s (1954) theory of intergroup contact (i.e., the contact hypothesis), social psychological research on normative influences on outgroup attitudes (e.g., Rutland, 2004; Stangor and Leary, 2006) and developmental psychological research on the formation of explicit (deliberate) and implicit (automatically activated) outgroup attitudes in adolescence (e.g., Barrett, 2007; Killen, McGlothlin and Henning, 2008). The main objective of the study was to shed light on the role of perceived social norms in the formation of outgroup attitudes among adolescents. First, the study showed that perceived normative pressure to hold positive attitudes towards immigrants regulated the relationship between the explicit and implicit expression of outgroup attitudes among majority youth. Second, perceived social norms concerning outgroup attitudes (i.e., the perceived outgroup attitudes of parents and peers) affected the relationship between intergroup contact and explicit outgroup attitudes depending on gender and group status. Positive social norms seem to be especially important for majority boys, who need both pleasant contact experiences and normative support to develop outgroup attitudes that are as positive as girls attitudes. The role of social norms is accentuated also among minority youth, who, contrary to majority youth with their more powerful and independent status position, need to reflect upon their attitudes and experiences of negative intergroup encounters in relation to the experiences and attitudes of their ingroup members. Third, the results are indicative of the independent effects of social norms and intergroup anxiety on outgroup attitudes: the effect of perceived social norms on the outgroup attitudes of youth seems to be at least as strong as the effect of intergroup anxiety. Finally, it was shown that youth evaluate intergroup contact from the viewpoint of their ingroup and society as a whole, not just based on their own experiences. In conclusion, the outgroup attitudes of youth are formed in a close relationship with their social environment. On the basis of this study, the importance of perceived social norms for research on intergroup contact effects among youth cannot be overlooked. Positive normative influences have the potential to break the strong link between rare and/or negative personal contact experiences and negative outgroup attitudes, and norms also influence the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude expression.
Resumo:
In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodological sources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’. We illustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’.
Resumo:
The successful interaction between leaders and their followers is central to the overall functioning of a company. The increasingly multinational nature of modern business and the resulting multicultural and increasingly heterogeneous workforce imposes specific challenges to the development of high-quality work relationships. The Western multinational companies that have started operations in China are facing these challenges. This study examines the quality of leader-follower relationships between Western expatriate leaders and their Chinese followers as well as between Chinese leaders and their Chinese followers in Western-owned subsidiaries in China. The focus is on the influence of personal, interpersonal and behavioural factors (personality, values, cultural knowledge, perceived and actual similarity, interactional justice, and follower performance) and the work-related implications of these relationships (job attitudes and organisational citizenship behaviour). One interesting finding of this study is that Chinese followers have higher perceptions of their Western than their Chinese leaders. The results also indicate that Chinese and Western leaders’ perceptions of their followers are not influenced favourably by the same follower characteristics. In a similar vein, Chinese followers value different traits in Western versus Chinese leaders. These results, as well as the numerous more specific findings of the study, have practical implications for international human resource management and areas such as selection, placement and training. Due to the different effect of personal and interpersonal factors across groups, it is difficult to achieve the “perfect match” between leader and follower characteristics that simultaneously contribute to high-quality relationships for Chinese and Western leaders as well as for followers. However, the results indicate that the ability of organisations to enhance the quality of leader-follower relations by selecting and matching people with suitable characteristics may provide an effective means for organisations to increase positive job attitudes and hence influence work-related outcomes.
Resumo:
In this article, I propose to analyze narrative theory from an epistemological standpoint. To do so, I will draw upon both Genettian narratology and what I would call, following Shigeyuki Kuroda, “non-communicational” theories of fictional narrative. In spite of their very unequal popularity, I consider these theories as objective, or, in other words, as debatable and ripe for rational analyses; one can choose between them. The article is made up of three parts. The first part concerns the object of narrative theory, or the narrative as a constructed object, both in narratology (where narrative is likened to a narrative discourse) and in non-communicational narrative theories (where fictional narrative and discourse are mutually exclusive categories). The second part takes up the question of how the claims of these theories do or do not lend themselves to falsification. In particular, Gérard Genette’s claim that “every narrative is, explicitly or not, ‘in the first person’”, will be considered, through the lens of Ann Banfield’s theory of free indirect style. In the third part the reductionism of narrative theory will be dealt with. This leads to a reflection on the role of narrative theory in the analysis of fictional narratives.