An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Revised 2006-06

[R_Lumbreras_CastilloMonjes] Documentación geométrica del Castro de los Monjes. Lumbreras, La Rioja

[ES] En lo alto del cerro se encuentra un sistema de cuatro recintos amurallados de piedra en seco que se disponen sobre un espolón rocoso de forma triangular de unos 150 metros de longitud y 100 metros de base.

Traducciones al español de canciones de los Beatles (1963–1996)

460 pgs.