An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution
Data(s) |
25/01/2012
25/01/2012
01/12/2003
|
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Resumo |
We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach. |
Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6497 RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200310 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Relação |
Ikerlanak 2003.10 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #international environmental agreements #absorbing sets solution |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |