Exploring Game Performance in the National Basketball Association Using Player Tracking Data

Recent player tracking technology provides new information about basketball game performance. The aim of this study was to (i) compare the game performances of all-star and non all-star basketball players from the National Basketball Association (NBA), and (ii) describe the different basketball game performance profiles based on the different game roles. Archival data were obtained from all 2013-2014 regular season games (n = 1230). The variables analyzed included the points per game, minutes played and the game actions recorded by the player tracking system. To accomplish the first aim, the performance per minute of play was analyzed using a descriptive discriminant analysis to identify which variables best predict the all-star and non all-star playing categories. The all-star players showed slower velocities in defense and performed better in elbow touches, defensive rebounds, close touches, close points and pull-up points, possibly due to optimized attention processes that are key for perceiving the required appropriate environmental information. The second aim was addressed using a k-means cluster analysis, with the aim of creating maximal different performance profile groupings. Afterwards, a descriptive discriminant analysis identified which variables best predict the different playing clusters. The results identified different playing profile of performers, particularly related to the game roles of scoring, passing, defensive and all-round game behavior. Coaching staffs may apply this information to different players, while accounting for individual differences and functional variability, to optimize practice planning and, consequently, the game performances of individuals and teams.

Number of Players and Relative Pitch Area per Player: Comparing Their Influence on Heart Rate and Physical Demands in Under-12 and Under-13 Football Players

The aim of the present study is to analyse the influence of different large-sided games (LSGs) on the physical and physiological variables in under-12s (U12) and -13s (U13) soccer players. The effects of the combination of different number of players per team, 7, 9, and 11 (P7, P9, and P11, respectively) with three relative pitch areas, 100, 200, and 300 m(2) (A100, A200, and A300, respectively), were analysed in this study. The variables analysed were: 1) global indicator such as total distance (TD); work:rest ratio (W:R); player-load (PL) and maximal speed (V-max); 2) heart rate (HR) mean and time spent in different intensity zones of HR (<75%, 75-84%, 84-90% and >90%), and; 3) five absolute (<8, 8-13, 13-16 and >16 Km h(-1)) and three relative speed categories (<40%, 40-60% and >60% V-max). The results support the theory that a change in format (player number and pitch dimensions) affects no similarly in the two players categories. Although it can seem that U13 players are more demanded in this kind of LSG, when the work load is assessed from a relative point of view, great pitch dimensions and/or high number of player per team are involved in the training task to the U12 players. The results of this study could alert to the coaches to avoid some types of LSGs for the U12 players such as:P11 played in A100, A200 or A300, P9 played in A200 or A300 and P7 played in A300 due to that U13>U12 in several physical and physiological variables (W:R, time spent in 84-90% HRmax, distance in 8-13 and 13-16 Km h(-1) and time spent in 40-60% V-max). These results may help youth soccer coaches to plan the progressive introduction of LSGs so that task demands are adapted to the physiological and physical development of participants.

A Model of Evolutionay Drift

Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed behaviour.

Automatismos y racionalidad en la toma de decisiones para sustituir a un deportista en momentos decisivos

[ES] Cada vez más el deporte-espectáculo se está abriendo paso como objeto de estudio en los centros de investigación avanzada, como consecuencia de la necesidad de gestionar los altos presupuestos de las entidades deportivas.

Particularidades de China para el desarrollo empresarial: reflexión a partir de casos de estudio

[ES] China ha irrumpido como actor principal del escenario global al haber protagonizado, durante las tres últimas décadas, un proceso de transformación económica y social de gran magnitud. Ahora bien, vender productos –sobre todo, del sector de alimentación– de origen occidental en China es, con diferencia, el reto más complicado al que deben enfrentarse las compañías de deciden entrar a operar en este mercado.

Asymmetric flow networks

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.

Automatización de los recorridos del robot en un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos

Automatización de los recorridos del robot en un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos. Se muestran los resultados obtenidos en las simulaciones con Player/Stage de un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos, donde la localización se realiza mediante los estadísticos de INCA.

Cine Digital y sus Contenedores. Herramientas de Software libre basadas en las Especificaciones DCI

El Cine Digital es aquel que utiliza la tecnología digital para grabar, distribuir y proyectar películas. En los años 90, el cine comenzó un proceso de transición, del soporte fílmico a la tecnología digital. Pero el salto definitivo se dio con las grandes superproducciones de principios del 2000. Con este cambio de era y debido a la rápida difusión del digital y la proliferación de formatos se creo el DCI (Digital Cinema Initiative), para cambiar el modo en que las personas consumen cine. Trabajando junto con los miembros del comité SMPTE (Organización americana encargada de crear los estándares de la industria audiovisual formada por ingenieros, técnicos y fabricantes) publicó un sistema de especificaciones que han adoptado las mayores productoras estadounidenses. Mediante este acuerdo, aseguraban la calidad técnica de las producciones, la compatibilidad entre sistemas y como no, su hegemonía particular. Entre las especificaciones técnicas que suscribieron que son la base actual del DCI figuran la resolución de fotograma, el espacio de color, la compresión de imagen, la encriptación y el método de empaquetado de archivos. Y hoy en día son un estándar en la masterización, distribución y en la proyección final en las salas de cine. Una de las grandes esperanzas que hay puestas en la tecnología digital es la democratización en el mundo del cine y la supuesta abolición de las barreras económicas a la hora de realizar películas, dado lo barato que puede resultar la grabación digital y la posibilidad de pasar el material a video y editarlo en un ordenador domestico. Independientemente de los sistemas de edición que se utilicen, el formato de archivo o incluso el códec usado, los servidores de cine digital solo aceptan un tipo de archivo llamado DCP (Digital Cinema Package). Hay que aclarar que el DCP es abierto, documentado y que esta basado en los estándares SMPTE. Por lo tanto, existen en el mercado actual herramientas de software libre que permiten crear un DCP válido según las normas del DCI y compatible con los actuales servidores de cine digital. El propósito de este proyecto principalmente es documentar desde un punto de vista técnico la creación de un archivo DCP y analizar las diferentes herramientas existentes en el mercado para poder realizarlo: tanto las de uso comercial, como las de software libre. Como base se partirá de las aplicaciones creadas por la empresa alemana Fraunhofer (EasyDCP Creator, Player) - es el software utilizado en el estudio REC - y de otras herramientas más rudimentarias y escritas en C++ como (asdcplib) de Cinecert.

Automatización de los recorridos del robot en un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos

Automatización de los recorridos del robot en un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos. Se muestran los resultados obtenidos en las simulaciones con Player/Stage de un sistema de exploración basado en comportamientos, donde la localización se realiza mediante los estadísticos de INCA.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap

We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In the model introduced and studied here a link can be created unilaterally. When it is only supported by one of the two players the fl ow through the link suffers a certain decay, but when it is supported by both the fl ow runs without friction. When the decay in links supported by only one player is maximal (i.e. there is no flow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky 's connections model without decay, while when flow in such links is perfect we have Bala and Goyal' s two-way flow model. We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise stability for the intermediate models. Efficiency and dynamics are also examined.

From bilateral two-way to unilateral one-way flow link-formation

Documento de trabajo