A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market

We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant which are to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Operator (OMEL) from May 2001 to December 2003. Our results indicate that the prediction of the model holds.

Imperfect Competition

Para quien es de utilidad: •Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A continuación se presenta la Tª de juegos no cooperativos y se muestra su utilidad para analizar diferentes fenómenos económicos caracterizados por la interdependencia estratégica. Finalmente, se estudian diferentes modelos de competencia oligopolística y la estabilidad de los acuerdos colusivos.

On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act

Documento de trabajo

Modelling Lipid Competition Dynamics in Heterogeneous Protocell Populations

Recent experimental work in the field of synthetic protocell biology has shown that prebiotic vesicles are able to 'steal' lipids from each other. This phenomenon is driven purely by asymmetries in the physical state or composition of the vesicle membranes, and, when lipid resource is limited, translates directly into competition amongst the vesicles. Such a scenario is interesting from an origins of life perspective because a rudimentary form of cell-level selection emerges. To sharpen intuition about possible mechanisms underlying this behaviour, experimental work must be complemented with theoretical modelling. The aim of this paper is to provide a coarse-grain mathematical model of protocell lipid competition. Our model is capable of reproducing, often quantitatively, results from core experimental papers that reported distinct types vesicle competition. Additionally, we make some predictions untested in the lab, and develop a general numerical method for quickly solving the equilibrium point of a model vesicle population.

Sportsmanship rating scale in tennis competition with young players

World Conference on Psychology and Sociology 2012

Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Vertical Differentiation and Entry Deterrence: A Reconsideration

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. We consider contexts without quality costs and also contexts with convex fixed quality costs.