Vertical Differentiation and Entry Deterrence: A Reconsideration


Autoria(s): Beloki, Lander; Usategui Díaz de Otalora, José María
Data(s)

06/02/2012

06/02/2012

01/01/2005

Resumo

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. We consider contexts without quality costs and also contexts with convex fixed quality costs.

Identificador

1988-088X

http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6744

RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200506

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Relação

DFAEII 2005.06

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Palavras-Chave #vertical differentiation #market coverage #entry deterrence #quality competition
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper