Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building
Data(s) |
03/02/2012
03/02/2012
01/03/2008
|
---|---|
Resumo |
In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses. |
Identificador |
1988-088X http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6683 RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200803 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II |
Relação |
DFAEII 2008.03 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #housing subsidies #imperfect competition #price of houses |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |