Un episodio de “estilización” de la política antirrepublicana: la fiesta de San Francisco Javier de 1931 en Pamplona

[ES] Estudio de caso (Fiesta de S. Francisco en Pamplona, Navarra) del modo en que la derecha conservadora española (Bloque de Derechas) y los radicales (carlistas) emplearon densos elementos identificadores (“identidad”) de lo local (Navarra-España) y católica para generar actitudes y adhesiones políticas antirrepublicanas.

Cartas enviadas por Javier Aizarna Azula a Justo Garate en 1991

3 cartas (mecanografiadas) ; entre 220x160mm y 210x125mm. Ubicación: Caja 1 - Carpeta 13

Carta enviada por Javier Altamira a Justo Garate en 1960

1 carta (mecanografiada) ; 228x234mm. Ubicación: Caja 1 - Carpeta 24

Petrarca

Juan F. Alcina, Emilio Blanco, Pedro M. Cátedra, Javier Cercas, José María Micó, Rafael Ramos e Íñigo Ruiz Arzálluz con textos de Eugenio Asensio, Juan Benet, Fernando Lázaro Carreter y José-Carlos Mainer

Certificado energético de la vivienda de Javier Hurtado y propuestas de mejora.

[ES]A raíz de la situación energética actual y con el fin de mejorar, hace dos año entraba en vigor en España la ley que obliga a realizar una certificación energética de las viviendas que se vendan o alquilen. De este modo se contribuye a los objetivos marcados por la UE para el año 2020. El proyecto está dividido en tres apartados principales. El primero, y el mas extenso, consiste en realizar la certificación de la vivienda. En segundo lugar, se detectaran los punto mas conflictivos, energéticamente hablando, de la vivienda y se estudiaran posibles mejoras. Finalmente se realizara un estudio económico de las mismas.

Certificado del Delegado del Gobierno de Euzkadi en Bayona, Javier de Gortazar, expedido a Luis Ruiz de Aguirre, en el que se hace constar que forma parte del personal del Departamento de Agricultura del Gobierno de Euzkadi

Fecha: 1-9-1937 / Unidad de ínstalación: Carpeta Rectorado - F-3 / Nº de hojas: 1. Mecanografiado y firma manuscrita

Linguistic Polarization and Conflict in the Basque Country

This paper investigates the relationship between linguistic polarization and conflict in the Basque Country. During the 40 years of Franco’s dictatorship the use of the Basque language was banned. Therefore, there may be some linguistic roots underlying the conflict in the Basque Country. We show that at the municipality level, linguistic polarization reduces the level of conflict. This finding is robust to various ways of measuring linguistic and ideological polarization and the inclusion of other covariates. In addition, we find that a high level of the stock of human capital is beneficial for reducing conflict intensity.

Methods for Measuring Aggregate Costs of Conflict

This paper reviews the methods for measuring the economic cost of conflict. Estimating the economic costs of conflict requires a counterfactual calculation, which makes this a very difficult task. Social researchers have resorted to different estimation methods depending on the particular effect in question. The method used in each case depends on the units being analyzed (firms, sectors, regions or countries), the outcome variable under study (aggregate output, market valuation of firms, market shares, etc.) and data availability (a single cross-section, time series or panel data). This paper reviews existing methods used in the literature to assess the economic impact of conflict: cost accounting, cross-section methods, time series methods, panel data methods, gravity models, event studies, natural experiments and comparative case studies. The paper ends with a discussion of cost estimates and directions for further research.

On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

Reproducción de la carta remitida por el Subprefecto de Bayona a J. Gortazar.

Fecha: 22-12-1944 (>1970 reproducción) / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 25 - Expediente 23-8 / Nº de pág.: 1 (mecanografiada)

Diseño y cálculo de una instalación de bombeo

Duración (en horas): De 41 a 50 horas Nivel educativo: Grado

Optimal Correction for Guessing in Multiple-Choice Tests

Building on Item Response Theory we introduce students’ optimal behavior in multiple-choice tests. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high, because although correction for guessing discriminates against risk-averse subjects, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that the penalty prevents. This result obtains when knowledge is binary or partial, under different normalizations of the score, when risk aversion is related to knowledge and when there is a pass-fail break point. We also find that the mean degree of difficulty should be close to the mean level of knowledge and that the variance of difficulty should be high.

A Measure of Gender Wage Discrimination at Quantiles

Revised: 2006-05.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Population Economics, 2007, vol. 18, issue 1, pp. 165-179.