Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion
| Data(s) |
26/01/2012
26/01/2012
01/01/2003
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models. |
| Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6503 RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200302 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Ikerlanak 2003.02 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #coalitional games #egalitarian criteria #prenucleolus #Shapley value |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
