Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game
| Data(s) |
25/01/2012
25/01/2012
01/06/2005
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core. |
| Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6489 RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200517 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Ikerlanak 2005.17 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
