Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.

Una rassegna di teoremi ergodici. Dal teorema ergodico di Birkhoff Khinchin al teorema ergodico quantistico di von Neumann.

La tesi tratta dei teoremi ergodici più importanti scoperti dalla fine dell'800 ad oggi.

Von Neumann: non solo architetto

Opera biografica su John von Neumann che punta a considerare tutti i suoi contributi alla comunità scientifica (come logico, matematico, fisico, economista) oltre a quelli più noti come informatico.

Klein Irmchen, ein Kinderliederbuch von Christian Morgenstern [Rezension]

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Non-uniqueness through duality in the von Neumann growth models

Duality can be viewed as the soul of each von Neumann growth model. This is not at all surprising because von Neumann (1955), a mathematical genius, extensively studied quantum mechanics which involves a “dual nature” (electromagnetic waves and discrete corpuscules or light quanta). This may have had some influence on developing his own economic duality concept. The main object of this paper is to restore the spirit of economic duality in the investigations of the multiple von Neumann equilibria. By means of the (ir)reducibility taxonomy in Móczár (1995) the author transforms the primal canonical decomposition given by Bromek (1974) in the von Neumann growth model into the synergistic primal and dual canonical decomposition. This enables us to obtain all the information about the steadily maintainable states of growth sustained by the compatible price-constellations at each distinct expansion factor.

Reducible von Neumann models and uniqueness

This paper can be regarded as a result of basic research on the technological characteristics of the von Neumann models and their consequences. It introduces a new taxonomy of reducible technologies, explores their key distinguishing features, and specifies which ones ensure the uniqueness of von Neumann equilibrium. A comprehensive comparison is also given between the familiar (in)decomposability ideas and the reducibility concepts suggested here. All these are carried out with a modern approach. Simultaneously, the reader may also acquire a complete picture of and guidance on the fundamental von Neumann models here.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear.We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under thisuncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternativevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extensionof the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy(without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendationsof the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, thenwe prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possibledisappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implicationsfor intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.