Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games


Autoria(s): Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Rafels, Carles
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat de Barcelona

Data(s)

05/09/2011

Resumo

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2445/19402

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa

Direitos

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena, et al., 2010

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Econometria #Teoria de jocs #Econometrics #Game theory
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper