Theodicy : the solution to the problem of evil, or part of the problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

God: Savior, Butcher, Or Oblivious Artist? The Theodicy Of Alfred North Whitehead

This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead's attempt to solve the traditional problem of evil. Whitehead's conception of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is understood in relationship to the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the traditional dilemma. Whitehead is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge, it can be shown that this is an implication of Whitehead’s approach. Moreover, Whitehead’s theodicy fails to address radical moral evil in its concrete dimension in respect to real human suffering. As a result, Whitehead’s theodicy is not relevant to Christian theology. My paper is divided into two parts. I will first briefly discuss the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional solutions proposed to resolve it. The reminder of the paper will demonstrate why Whitehead’s theodicy addresses the traditional problem of evil only at the expense of theological irrelevancy.

The justification of God : lectures for war-time on a Christian theodicy /

Mode of access: Internet.

A theodicy, or, Vindication of the divine glory, as manifested in the constitution and government of the moral world /

Includes bibliographical references.

Evil Gods and Reckless Saviours : Adaptation and Appropriation in Late Twentieth Century Jesus-Novels

Late twentieth century Jesus-novels search after a completely new picture of Jesus. Novels written for instance by Norman Mailer, José Saramago, Michèle Roberts, Marianne Fredriksson, and Ki Longfellow provide an inversive revision of the canonic Gospels. They read the New Testament in terms of the present age. In their adaptation the story turns often into a critique of the whole Christian history. The investigated contrast-novels end up with an appropriation that is based on prototypical rewriting. They aim at the rehabilitation of Judas, and some of them make Mary Magdalane the key figure of Christianity. Saramago describes God as a blood thirsty tyrant, and Mailer makes God combat with the Devil in a manichean sense as with an equal. Such ideas are familiar both from poststructuralist philosophy and post-metaphysical death-of-God theology. The main result of the intertextual analysis is that these scholars have adopted Nietzschean ideas in their writing. Quite unlike earlier Jesus-novels, these more recent novels present a revision that produces discontinuity with the original source text, the New Testament. The intertextual strategy is based on contradiction. The reader wittnesses contesting and challenging, the authors attack Biblical beliefs and attempt to dissolve Christian doctrines. An attack on Biblical slave morality and violent concept of God deprives Jesus of his Jewish Messianic identity, makes Old Testament law a contradiction of life, calls sacrificial soteriology a violent pattern supporting oppression, and presents God as a cruel monster who enslaves people under his commandments and wishes their death. The new Jesus-figure contests Mosaic Law, despises orthodox Judaism, abandons Jewish customs and even questions Old Testament monotheism. In result, the novels intentionally transfer Jesus out of Judaism. Furthermore, Jewish faith appears in a negative light. Such an intertextual move is not open anti-Semitism but it cannot avoid attacking Jewish worship. Why? One reason that explains these attitudes is that Western culture still carries anti-Judaic attitudes beneath the surface covered with sentiments of equality and tolerance. Despite the evident post-holocaust consciousness present in the novels, they actually adopt an arrogant and ironical refutation of Jewish beliefs and Old Testament faith. In these novels, Jesus is made a complete opposite and antithesis to Judaism. Key words: Jesus-novel, intertextuality, adaptation, slave morality, Nietzsche, theodicy, patriarchy.

Sobre o conceito de desenvolvimento: da imagem de ocidente ao imaginário ocidental

Esta dissertação trata da construção sociológica do conceito de desenvolvimento, caracterizando-o como imaginário social, temporalidade explícita e auto-atribuída do socialhistórico (nos termos de Cornelius Castoriadis). Este imaginário é um conjunto entrelaçado de significações articuladas cosmologicamente e tributárias de uma teologia, mesmo em suas simbologias e concepções secularizadas. Essa cosmologia se sobrepõe a uma concepção de natureza humana distinta e a uma ontologia ocidental dualista. Neste quadro, o desenvolvimento aparece como conceito central da cosmologia ocidental e da ciência social, que orquestra essas significações no imaginário imprimindo a necessidade de uma ordenação de elementos com vistas a uma finalidade paramétrica ou valorativa, uma versão de teodicéia complementada por uma governamentalidade elementos formados pelo encontro da tradição bíblica com o pensamento grego. O desenvolvimento é a expressão paradigmática do imaginário social ocidental. Ao traçar suas características principais, explorando um pouco de suas origens, o conceito de desenvolvimento é reconstruído como um instrumento analítico para permitir a comparação entre as diversas concepções particulares e específicas de desenvolvimento encontradas no pensamento social e na política contemporânea.

Beyond Myth: in Search of Archaic Greek Theology

The author examines several passages from Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns for content appropriate for religious instruction, a function both traditionally attributed to those works (by Herodotus) and denied them (at the earliest, by Xenophanes). The issues cover theodicy, the nature of deities and their honours, the efficacy of prayer and the meaning of sacrifices and food offering.

The Divine Action Project, 1988–2003

This article explores the state of the art in theories of special divine action by means of a study of the Divine Action Project (DAP) co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley. The basic aim is to introduce the DAP and to summarize its results, especially as these were compiled in the final “capstone” meeting of the DAP, and drawing on the published output of the project where possible. The subsidiary aim is to evaluate criticisms of theories of special divine action developed within the DAP.

La disculpation platonicienne : étude sur la signification et l'évolution du concept de faute involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon

La présente étude se propose de dégager les significations successives qu’emprunte le fameux paradoxe socratique du mal involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon. Pour ce faire, notre propos se déclinera en trois principaux développements : 1) le premier consistera à clarifier le sens que recouvraient les catégories du volontaire et de l’involontaire dans l’Antiquité, de manière à éviter toute confusion anachronique avec les acceptions modernes de ces mêmes notions ; 2) le second tâchera de mettre au jour le postulat anthropologique qui fonde chez Platon l’idée qu’aucun homme ne saurait agir méchamment de son plein gré ; 3) le troisième exposera à tour de rôle les trois grands dispositifs de disculpation qu’élabore Platon dans son œuvre : les dispositifs de l’âme ignorante, de l’âme renversée et de l’âme malade. Nous montrerons ainsi comment Platon, à rebours de la théodicée chrétienne classique, cherche à blanchir l’homme de toute implication morale véritable dans la genèse causale de ses « mauvaises » actions.

Confronting the horror of natural evil: An exchange between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis

In this exchange, Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis discuss the problem of natural evil in the light of the recent Asian tsunami disaster. The exchange begins with an extract from a newspaper article written by Coghlan on the tsunami, followed by three rounds of replies and counter-replies, and ending with some final comments from Trakakis. While critical of any attempt to show that human life is good overall despite its natural evils, Coghlan argues that instances of natural evil, even horrific ones, can be justified as the unavoidable by-product of a natural system on which human life and culture depends. Trakakis, however, rejects this view, counselling instead a degree of skepticism about our ability to construct a plausible theodicy for horrific evil.

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.

Does hard determinism render the problem of evil even harder?

Hard determinism, in theological dress, holds that there is no human free will since God is the sufficient active cause of everything that happens in creation. It is surprising that, in the ever-growing literature on the problem of evil, very little attention has been paid to theodicies that adopt a hard determinist outlook. It is commonly assumed that without free will the theodical project is a non-starter. I challenge this long-held assumption by, firstly, developing a cumulative-style theodicy from within a hard determinist framework, and secondly, comparing the merits of such a theodicy with two libertarian rivals, specifically, Molinism and open theism. The hard determinist model of divine providence is, I argue, in no worse shape than the principal models developed by libertarians.

A just judgement? Considerations on Ronald Srigley’s Camus’ Critique of Modernity

This paper responds critically to Ronald Srigley’s groundbreaking 2011 study Albert Camus’ Critique of Modernity. Srigley’s book reasserts Camus’ credentials as a deeply serious thinker, whose literary and philosophical oeuvre was dedicated to rethinking modernity on the basis of critical reassessments of theWest’s entire premodern heritage. Yet we challenge whether Camus was ever, even in his final writings, so uncompromisingly anti-modern as Srigley contends. Srigley’s attempt to present Camus as committed to a return to the Greeks, on the basis of a total critique of modernity as deleteriously post-Christian, forces him to occlude important distinctions in Camus’ thought: those between unity and totality, rebellion and revolution. By contrast, we compare Camus’ defence of modern rebellion with Blumenberg’s argument in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age: finding justification for this rebellion in the deep problem faced by Christian theology of resolving the ‘problem of evil’. Finally, we suggest that Srigley overplays the extent of Camus’ ‘Hellenic’ critique of the Christian heritage (notably its ethical commitment to protecting the weak), in contrast to Christian theodicy and eschatology, which serve to rationalize avoidable suffering.