Kirkon vai valtion kirjat? : Uskontokuntasidonnaisuuden ongelma Suomen väestökirjanpidossa 1839-1904

The Population Register – run by the Church or the state? The problem posed by the obligation to belong to a religious community in the registration of births and deaths in Finland between 1839 and 1904 The Lutheran Church of Finland is the nation’s largest church; approximately 82 per cent of Finns were members in 2007. The Church ran an official register of its members until 1999, when the state then undertook this task. The registration of births and deaths by the Church has a long history dating back to the 17th century, when Bishop Johannes Gezelius Sr. decreed that all parish members would have to be recorded in parish registers. These registers were used to control how well parish members knew the Christian doctrine and, gradually, also if they were literate. Additionally, the Church attempted to ensure by means of the parish registers that parish members went to Holy Communion annually. Since everyone was a member of the Lutheran Church, the state also took advantage of the parish registers and used them for the purposes of tax collection and conscription. The main research theme of “The Population Register – run by the Church or the state?” goes back to these times. The actual research period covers the years of 1839–1904. At that time Finland was under Russian rule, although autonomous. In the late 19th century the press and different associations in Finland began to engage in public debate, and the country started moving from a submissive society to a civic one. The identity of the Lutheran Church also became more prominent when the Church Act and the General Synod were realised in 1869. A few years earlier, municipal and parish administrations had been separated, but the general registration of births and deaths was left to the Church to see to. In compliance with the constitution of the country, all the inhabitants in principle still had to be Lutheran. In practice, the situation was different. The religious and ideological realms diversified, and the Lutheran concept of religion was no longer acceptable to everyone. The conflict was reflected in the registration of births and deaths, which was linked to the Lutheran Church and its parish registers. Nobody was allowed to leave the Church, there was no civil register, and the Lutheran Church did not consent to record unbaptized children in the parish registers. Therefore such children were left without civil rights. Thus the obligation to belong to a religious community had become a problem in the registration of births and deaths. The Lutheran clergy also appealed to the 1723 privileges, according to which they had been exempted from the drawing up of additional population registers. In 1889 Finland passed the Dissenters Act. By virtue of this act the Baptists and the Methodists left the state Church, but this was not the case with the members of the free churches. The freethinkers had to retain their church membership, as the law did not apply to them. This meant that the unbaptized children of the members of the free churches or those of freethinkers were still not entered in any registers. The children were not able to go to school, work for the state or legally marry. Neither were they able to inherit property, as they did not legally exist. The system of parish registers was created when everyone was required to be a member of the Lutheran Church, but it did not work when liberal attitudes eventually penetrated the sphere of religion, too. The government´s measures to solve the problem were slow and cautious, partly because Finland was part of Russia, partly because there were only about 100 unbaptized children. As the problem group was small and the state´s resources were limited, no general civil register was established. The state accepted the fact that in spite of the problems, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the congregations of dissenters were the only official establishments to run populations registers in the country, and for social purposes, too. In 1900 the Diet of Finland finally approved a limited civil register, which unbaptized children and unregistered foreigners would be recorded in. Due to political reasons the civil register did not come into existence until 1917, after the actual research period.

Vähemmistövaltiokirkon synty : Ortodoksisen kirkkokunnan ja valtion suhteiden muotoutuminen Suomessa 1917-1922

The Birth of the Minority State Church Development of the legal relationship between the state of Finland and the Finnish Orthodox Church 1917 1922 Mika Nokelainen, University of Helsinki, Finland. The present research seeks to explain how the legal relationship developed between the state of Finland and the Orthodox Church of Finland. The main focus is on three statutes: 1) the Statute of the Orthodox Church in Finland as stated by Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi s cabinet in November 1918, 2) The Republican Constitution of July 1919 and 3) The Freedom of Religion Act of 1923. This study examines how different political goals influenced the three statutes mentioned above. Another important factor that is taken into account is the attitude of the Lutheran Church of Finland, the church of the national majority, towards the Orthodox minority and its judicial position in the country. Finland became independent in December 1917, in the aftermath of the November Revolution in Russia. The Orthodox Church already had hundreds of years of history in Finland. In the 19th century, several statutes by emperors of Russia had made the Orthodox Church an official state church of Finland. Due to the long history of the Orthodox Church in Finland, Prime Minister Paasikivi s cabinet made the decision to support the church in the spring of 1918. Furthermore, the cabinet s goal to occupy East Karelia increased its willingness to support the church. The Finnish-national Orthodox Church was needed to educate the East-Karelians. A new statute on the Orthodox Church in Finland came into force in November 1918, reorganising the administration, economy and legal relationship between the church and state in Finland. With this statue, the cabinet gained some authority over the church. Sections of this statute made possible, for example, the cabinet s interference in the internal affairs of the church. The Republican Constitution of 1919 included the principle of freedom of religion. The state, which previously had been Lutheran, now became non-denominational. However, the Republican Constitution explicitly mentioned the Lutheran as well as the Orthodox Church, which indirectly confirmed the position of the Orthodox Church as the second state church of Finland. This position was finally confirmed by the Freedom of Religion Act in 1923. In general, the Lutheran Church of Finland did not resist the judicial position of the Orthodox Church. However, some Lutherans regarded the Orthodox Church with suspicion because of its intimate connection with Russia.

E. G. Gulinin ekumeeninen työ ja ajattelu

This study explores ecumenical activity of professor and bishop E. G. Gulin (1893 1975). Gulin was one of the key figures in the Finland s Evangelical Lutheran Church during the twentieth century. He was also one of the leading persons who imported ecumenical influences from abroad. However, unlike other churches, the Church of Finland did not recognise his importance. For example, in the 1950s Gulin was seen by the Anglicans as a future archbishop for the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. Gulin s career as an ecumenist can be divided to three parts. Between 1917 and 1929, Gulin learned ecumenical working methods in Finland s World Student Christian Federation. He had a background in the revivalist movement, and his parents supported him in his studies. The Evangelical Lutheran Church did not originally play a major role for Gulin, although he was a member. Between 1930 and 1944, Gulin had more and more responsibility as a leading ecumenist in Finland. He became a member of Finland s ecumenical board, Yleiskirkollinen toimikunta. During the Second World War Gulin tried to solicit assistance for Finland s war effort at theological conferences, where Finnish theologians often discussed cooperation among Christians. A third period started in 1945, when Gulin became the bishop of Tampere. His new status in the Evangelical Lutheran Church placed him in a challenging position in ecumenical questions. He had responsibility for inter-church aid in Finland. He also participated in the World Council of Churches (WCC) assemblies in Evanston in 1954 and in New Delhi in 1961. Gulin s role was quite insignificant in those meetings. Closely related to Gulin s texts about ecumenism is kokemus, experience. Gulin wrote about his ecumenical experience or ekumeeninen kokemus. He believed that it was vital for the churches to appreciate their own experiences, since experience was the basis for further development. Yet Gulin mentioned very little about Christian dogma. The main reason seems to have been that he did not believe that a union between churches could be built on dogma.

Suomen ja Liettuan kielen nominaalimuodoista : vertaileva näkökulma

Tämän maisterintutkielman tutkimusalueena on liettuan kielioppi. Liettua on yksi vanhakantaisimmista yhä puhuttavista indoeurooppalaisista kielistä, joiden balttilaiseen ryhmään kuuluu sen ohella enää ainoastaan latvia. Liettuan kieli on Suomessa varsin tuntematon, vaikka valtaosa sen puhujista asuu täältä verrattain lyhyen matkan päässä. Siitä ei tätä kirjoitettaessa ole ilmestynyt suomen kielellä juuri muuta oppimateriaalia kuin yksi suppeahko asiointisanasto ja pieni sanakirja. Mitään varsinaista oppikirjaa tai kielioppia ei ole kirjoitettu. Tämän työn yhtenä tarkoituksena onkin siten paikata kielen melkoista suomeksi painetun oppimateriaalin puutetta. Työn varsinaiseksi tutkimuskohteeksi on otettu osa suomen ja liettuan kielten verbijärjestelmästä – nominaalimuodot ja niiden käyttö. Nominaalimuodoilla tarkoitetaan ei-finiittisiä verbimuotoja, jotka eivät voi yksinään esiintyä lauseen predikaattina ja joita käytetään nimensä mukaisesti nominien tavoin. Työssä luodaan ensinnä verrattain laaja katsaus suomen kielen infinitiiveihin ja partisiippeihin, minkä jälkeen siirrytään perusteellisesti tarkastelemaan liettuan kielen tärkeimpiä nominaalimuotoja: infinitiiviä, partisiippia, puolipartisiippia, adverbiaalipartisiippia ja supiinia. Tarkastelun pääpaino kohdistuu partisiippeihin. Yhtenä työn tavoitteista on esitellä, mitä eri nominaalimuotoja kielissä esiintyy, miten ne muodostetaan ja mihin tarkoituksiin niitä käytetään. Tämän lisäksi työhön sisältyy vertaileva näkökulma: siinä halutaan selvittää, millaisia tärkeimpiä yhtäläisyyksiä ja eroja kielten nominaalimuotojen välillä esiintyy. Käytetty lähestymistapa on siten kontrastiivinen eli kielten synkroniseen vertailuun perustuva. Kielten nominaalimuotojen välisten erojen ja yhteisten piirteiden valaisemiseksi työhön on sisällytetty molemmilla kielillä runsaasti esimerkkejä ja muotojen muodostamissääntöjä kuvaavia taulukoita. Suomen kielen osalta työn tärkeimpinä lähteinä ovat Nykysuomen käsikirja ja Iso suomen kielioppi. Liettuan verbimuotoja kuvaavat taulukot ja lisäksi monet esimerkkilauseista perustuvat puolestaan Liettuan kielen instituutin julkaisemaan teokseen Dabartinės lietuvių kalbos gramatika. Työn loppuosassa on laajahko liettuankielinen tiivistelmä, joka tekee työstä käyttökelpoisen myös liettuaa äidinkielenään puhuvalle, suomen kielestä kiinnostuneelle henkilölle. Tehtyjen vertailujen tärkeimpinä johtopäätöksinä voidaan todeta, että suomen kielen nominaalimuodoista infinitiivien käyttöalue on liettuan infinitiivin sovellusaluetta laajempi. Erityisesti suomen toisen ja kolmannen infinitiivimuodon eri käyttötarkoituksia kohti löytyy liettuan kielestä useita eri nominaalimuotoja. Sen sijaan suomen I ja II partisiippi sekä liettuan partisiippi ovat verrattain usein käyttötavoiltaan toisiaan muistuttavia. Avainsanat: liettuan kieli, verbit, nominaalimuodot, vertaileva kielentutkimus

Salaiset aseveljet : Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933-1944

Salaiset aseveljet deals with the relations and co-operation between Finnish and German security police authorities, the Finnish valtiollinen poliisi and the German Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) and its predecessors. The timeframe for the research stretches from the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 to the end of German-Finnish co-belligerency in 1944. The Finnish Security Police was founded in 1919 to protect the young Finnish Republic from the Communists both in Finland and in Soviet Russia. Professional ties to German colleagues were maintained during the 1920 s, and quickly re-established after the Nazis rose to power in Germany. Typical forms of co-operation concentrated on the fight against both domestic and international Communism, a concern particularly acute in Finland because of her exposed position as a neighbour to the Soviet Union. The common enemy proved to be a powerful unifying concept. During the 1930 s the forms of co-operation developed from regular and routine exchanges of information into personal acquaintancies between the Finnish Security Police top personnel and the highest SS-leadership. The critical period of German-Finnish security police co-operation began in 1941, as Finland joined the German assault on the Soviet Union. Together with the Finnish Security Police, the RSHA set up a previously unknown special unit, the Einsatzkommando Finnland, entrusted with the destruction of the perceived ideological and racial enemies on the northernmost part of the German Eastern Front. Joint actions in northern Finland led also members of the Finnish Security Police to become participants in mass murders of Communists and Jews. Post-war criminal investigations into war crimes cases involving former security police personnel were invariably stymied because of the absence of usually both the suspects and the evidence. In my research I have sought to combine the evidence gathered through an exhaustive study of Finnish Security Police archival material with a wide selection of foreign sources. Important new evidence has been gathered from archives in Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the United States. Piece by piece, it has become possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the ultimately fateful relationship of the Finnish Security Police to its mighty German colleague.

Lähellä, mutta niin kaukana : Tutkimus naisten muuttoliikkeestä Suomen ja uudelleen itsenäistyneen Viron välillä

Immigration is one of the most topical international issues of our time. Worldwide, the number of immigrants has doubled over the last twenty years, and migration patterns have become so diversified that they now constitute a kind of “chaos”. The number and significance of women as migrants has also increased, which is earning women growing attention among scholars. This study looks at the migration of women, in particular mothers of small children, in both directions between Finland and Estonia, following the latter’s re- independence. The data consists of in-depth interviews conducted in 2005 with 24 Finnish and 24 Estonian immigrant women. The focus was on the women’s expectations and experiences of their new country of residence, acculturation – i.e. adjusting to a new environment, social networks in the country of origin and the new country, and models of motherhood following immigration. The primary research question was formulated as follows: Which factors have influenced the formation of female immigrants’ social ties, thus contributing to the formation of motherhood strategies and afecting internal family dynamics in the new country? The research consists of four previously published independent articles as well as a summary chapter. The study’s findings indicate that Finnish and Estonian women migrated for diferent reasons and at diferent times, and that their migration patterns also difered. Estonian migration occurred mainly in the 1990s, and most immigrants intended to return later to their country of origin. Regardless of the reason for migrating that they gave to immigration officials, other key reasons often included the desire for a more stable living environment and better income. Only four of the Estonian women had immigrated together with an Estonian husband, while two- thirds came because of marriage to a Finnish man. Most of the Finnish women, on the other hand, migrated after 2000 and either came with their family as a result of a spouse’s job transfer, or came by themselves to further their studies. In most cases, the migration was a temporary solution intended to promote one’s own or one’s spouse’s career advancement. Because the reasons for migrating were diferent between Finnish and Estonian women, their expectations of the new country and their status in it were also diferent. In terms of both social and economic standing, the position of Finnish immigrants was categorically better. The reason for migrating had an impact on one’s orientation toward the receiving society. Estonian women and Finns who migrated for marriage or edu cational reasons became immediately active in forming institutional and social ties in the new society. Conversely, the women had migrated because of work had little contact with Estonian society, and their social networks consisted of other Finnish immigrants. Furthermore, they maintained strong institutional and social ties to Finland and therefore felt no need to anchor themselves to Estonian society. The Finnish and Estonian women who were better integrated into the receiving country also maintained strong social ties to their country of origin. Women who became integrated into the receiving country as a result of giving birth to children utilized various services directed at families with children. In part, such services conveyed to the women the conceptions that were prevalent in the surrounding society concerning the treatment of children and the expectations on mothers, both of which difer to some extent in Finland and Estonia. had an impact on strategies of motherhood, internal family dynamics, and gender Regardless of the reason for migrating, or the country of origin, immigration equality. Most Estonian women had to do without the child-care help provided by relatives; before immigrating, some women had even had daily child-care assistance from family members. However, Estonian women who were married to Finns did receive help from the spouse and sometimes also the spouse’s relatives. Conversely, Finnish women who had immigrated because of a spouse’s job transfer were faced with the opposite situation, in which they bore the main responsibility for domestic work and child care. They were, however, in a position to pay for domestic help. Hence, the women who had integrated into a new society had to construct their own perceptions of motherhood by reconciling the motherhood models of both the cause of a spouse’s job transfer found that being a stay-at-home mother challenged previously self-evident behaviors. Receiving country and the country of origin, whereas women who had migrated because of a spouse’s job transfer found that being a stay-at-home mother challenged previously self-evident behaviors.

Taajuushuutokaupan tehokkuus - Toteutuminen Suomen ja Ruotsin 2,6 GHz:n huutokaupoissa

Tutkielmassa arvioidaan taajuushuutokauppojen taloudellista tehokkuutta. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan erityisesti huutokaupan allokatiivista tehokkuutta ja sen toteutumista kahdessa huutokauppatapauksessa. Työn metodeina on historiallinen tarkastelu taajuushuutokauppojen kehityshistoriasta, toimialatarkastelu teletoimialasta, peliteoreettinen analyysi monen kohteen huutokaupan taloudellisesta tehokkuudesta sekä huutokaupassa asetettujen huutojen suuruuksien sekä määrien analysointi Suomen ja Ruotsin 2,6 GHz:n huutokauppojen osalta. Historiallisen tarkastelun tuloksena esitetään, että huutokaupat ovat taloudellisesti tehokkaampi menetelmä kuin muut taajuusjakomenetelmät: arpajaiset, hallinnollinen arviointi tai ns. ”first come first serve” –menetelmä. Matemaattisen analyysin avulla määritellään tarkasti huutokaupan tehokkuus monen kohteen huutokaupassa ja miten huutokauppamekanismilla voidaan ohjata huutokauppa tehokkaaseen lopputulemaan. 2,6 GHz:n Suomen ja Ruotsin huutokauppojen osalta johtopäätöksinä esitetään, että Ruotsin huutokaupassa todennäköisesti saavutettiin tehokas lopputulema. Suomen huutokaupan osalta esitetään, että huutokaupan taloudelliset mekanismit eivät välttämättä ohjanneet huutokauppaa tehokkaaseen lopputulemaan. Suurimpana syynä Suomen huutokaupan mahdollisesti tehottomaan lopputulemaan voitaneen pitää huutokaupassa ilmennyttä, osittain mekanismista johtunutta, vähäistä kysyntää.

Idänkaupan loppu - Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen erityinen kauppasuhde ja Suomen kauppapolitiikan odotushorisontti sen purkautuessa 1988–1991

Suomen kylmän sodan aikaisesta kaupankäynnistä sosialististen maiden kanssa poliittisesti ja taloudellisesti merkittävintä oli kahdenvälinen kauppasuhde Neuvostoliiton kanssa. Tässä tutkielmassa määrittelen idänkaupan Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton väliseksi erityissuhteeksi, jota luonnehti käsitys molempien toisilleen myöntämästä erityisasemasta, kaupan tason poliittinen merkitys, jatkuvuuden korostaminen sekä clearing-järjestelmä. Neuvostoliiton hajotessa vuonna 1991 myös idänkauppa loppui. Tässä tutkielmassa argumentoin kuitenkin, ettei idänkaupan loppuminen ollut suoranaisesti seurausta Neuvostoliiton hajoamisesta. Kehityskulut, jotka johtivat idänkaupan loppumiseen, olivat murtaneet perustan kahdenvälisen kaupan erityissuhteelta jo ennen kuin Neuvostoliitto lopetti olemassaolonsa. Tarkastelen kaupan erityissuhteen purkautumista vuosina 1988–1991. Keskeisiä tapahtumia idänkaupan loppuvaiheessa oli clearing-järjestelmän uudistaminen vuonna 1988, viimeisen clearingpohjaisen runkosopimuksen allekirjoittaminen 1989, clearing-järjestelmän lopettaminen vuonna 1990 sekä Neuvostoliiton hajoaminen 1991. Keskityn kauppapolitiikan valmistelutason toimintaan. Tärkeimmän lähdeaineiston muodostavat ulkoministeriön kauppapoliittisen osaston ja Suomen Pankin idänkaupan osaston arkistoaineisto. Tutkimuskysymys on kaksiosainen. Ensinnäkin tutkin Suomen kauppapolitiikan toimijoiden näkemyksiä idänkaupan tulevaisuudesta. Käsittelen sitä, miltä idänkaupan tulevaisuus näytti silloin, kun se oli loppumassa. Vaikka idänkaupan loppuminen näyttää jälkikäteen suoraviivaiselta, se ei ollut sitä tapahtumahetkellä. Käytän apunani Reinhart Koselleckin käsitteitä odotushorisontista (horizon of expectations) ja kokemusavaruudesta (space of experience). Toiseksi pyrin piirtämään kuvan siitä idänkaupasta, joka loppui. Tarkastelen idänkauppaa sille ominaisten piirteiden kautta selvittääkseni, mitkä idänkaupan ominaisuudet vaikuttivat sen loppumiseen. Tutkielman perusteella Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen kauppasuhteen erityisyyden purkaantuminen johtui ensisijaisesti muutoksista Neuvostoliitossa, mutta myös Suomen ja kansainvälisen ympäristön poliittisilla ja taloudellisilla muutoksilla oli merkitystä. Idänkaupan järjestelmä loppui, koska se ei sopeutunut muuttuvaan maailmaan. Idänkaupan ilmiöön liittyneiden vahvojen epämuodollisten instituutioiden ansiota oli, että erityissuhde jatkui niin pitkään.

Lyhykäinen suomen ja wenäjän kielinen sanakirja = Finskìe i russkìe razgovory

Nimiösivulla myös: Wenäläisten sanain lukeminen selitetty suomalaisilla puustawilla.

Järjestö jäänmurtajana : Suomen merimiesunioni työmarkkinaosapuolena ja suomalaisten laivatyöntekijöiden turvallisuuden vankentajana 1944-1980

Like an Icebreaker: The Finnish Seamen s Union as collective bargaining maverick and champion of sailors social safety 1944-1980. The Finnish Seamen's Union (FSU), which was established on a national basis in 1920, was one of the first Finnish trade unions to succeed in collective bargaining. In the early 1930s, the gains made in the late 1920s were lost, due to politically based internal rivalries, the Great Depression, and a disastrous strike. Unexpectedly the FSU survived and went on promoting the well-being of its members even during World War II. After the war the FSU was in an exceptionally favorable position to exploit the introduction of coordinated capitalism, which was based on social partnership between unions, employers and government. Torpedoes, mines and confiscations had caused severe losses to the Finnish merchant marine. Both ship-owners and government alike understood the crucial importance of using the remaining national shipping capacity effectively. The FSU could no longer be crushed, and so, in 1945, the union was allowed to turn all ocean-going Finnish ships into closed shops. The FSU also had another source of power. After the sailors of the Finnish icebreaker fleet also joined its ranks, the FSU could, in effect, block Finnish foreign trade in wintertime. From the late 1940s to the 1960s the union started and won numerous icebreaker strikes. Finnish seamen were thus granted special pension rights, reductions on income taxes and import duties, and other social privileges. The FSU could neither be controlled by union federations nor intimidated by employers or governments. The successful union and its tactically clever chairperson, Niilo Välläri, were continuously but erroneously accused of syndicalism. Välläri did not aim for socialism but wanted the Finnish seamen to get all the social benefits that capitalism could possibly offer. Välläri s policy was successfully followed by the FSU until the late 1980s when Finnish ship-owners were allowed to flag their vessels outside the national registry. Since then the FSU has been on the defensive and has yielded to pay cuts. The FSU members have not lost their social benefits, but they are under constant fear of losing their jobs to cheap foreign labor.

Suomi ja Euroopan kirkollinen jälleenrakentaminen 1945-1948

The international aid that the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland received between 1945 and 1948 is the topic of this historical study, in which the process of reconstruction of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland is examined in a European context. The key questions are related not only to the achievements of the reconstruction programs but also to the purposes and objectives of the donating churches. The study pays particular attention to the changes in the ecclesiastical, political and economic fields after the Second World War and asks how the tense political atmosphere of a divided world affected the reconstruction programs of the churches. It is possible to distinguish three periods within the European church reconstruction process. To begin with, the year 1945 was, in general, the year of organization. Many churches had started planning reconstruction work already during the war, but only after the conflict in Europe had ceased did they have a chance to renew contacts, assess the damage and begin operations. The years 1946 and 1947 were the main years of the work. Large reconstruction organizations from American churches donated money, food, clothes and vitamins worth millions of dollars to the European churches. The work started to diminish as early as 1948, partly because Marshall Plan aid and the rising standard of living had reduced the need for material assistance in many countries and partly because other problems overshadowed the reconstruction work of the World Council of Churches: for example, most WCC resources at this time were directed to refugee programs and to Third World churhces. The most important donors from the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland's point of view were the American Section of the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches and the Churches of Denmark, Sweden and England. The amount of money and value of goods received by the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland totaled approximately 2.5 million dollars, from which about 60 per cent came from the Lutheran churches of America. The importance of the Lutheran World Federation was even greater because of the productive financial arrangements that increased the American Lutheran funds. In addition the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland imported hundreds of tons of tax-free coffee and sold this to Finns. The money gained was used mostly to rebuild destroyed church buildings and to support the work of different ecclesiastical organizations. Smaller amounts were used for scholarship programs, youth work, and supporting sick and disabled church workers.

Meillä ei ole ikuisia ystäviä eikä ikuisia vihollisia. Ikuisia ovat meidän omat etumme. : Suomen suhteet Kiinan kansantasavaltaan 1949 - 1989

"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.