Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions

In Somalia the central government collapsed in 1991 and since then state failure became a widespread phenomenon and one of the greatest political and humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Thus, the main objective of this research is to answer the following question: What went wrong? Most of the existing literature on the political economy of conflict starts from the assumption that state in Africa is predatory by nature. Unlike these studies, the present research, although it uses predation theory, starts from the social contract approach of state definition. Therefore, rather than contemplating actions and policies of the rulers alone, this approach allows us to deliberately bring the role of the society – as citizens – and other players into the analyses. In Chapter 1, after introducing the study, a simple principal-agent model will be developed to check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. I also identify three main actors in the process of state failure in Somalia: the Somali state, Somali society and the superpowers. In Chapter 2, so as to understand the incentives, preferences and constraints of each player in the state failure game, I in some depth analyse the evolution and structure of three central informal institutions: identity based patronage system of leadership, political tribalism, and the Cold War. These three institutions are considered as the rules of the game in the Somali state failure. Chapter 3 summarises the successive civilian governments’ achievements and failures (1960-69) concerning the main national goals, national unification and socio-economic development. Chapter 4 shows that the military regime, although it assumed power through extralegal means, served to some extent the developmental interest of the citizens in the first five years of its rule. Chapter 5 shows the process, and the factors involved, of the military regime’s self-transformation from being an agent for the developmental interests of the society to a predatory state that not only undermines the interests of the society but that also destroys the state itself. Chapter 6 addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The chapter shows how the regime’s merciless reactions to political ventures by power-seeking opposition leaders shattered the entire country and wrecked the state institutions. Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarising the main findings: due to the incentive structures generated by the informal institutions, the formal state institutions fell apart.

Vulnerability, trade, financial flows and state failure in small island developing states

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are very different to other developing countries. Relative to GDP they have the highest levels of foreign trade and aid receipts of all developing countries. Remittances from abroad are a far more important source of income for SIDS, and some depend very heavily on export revenues. The quality of governance varies tremendously among SIDS, they are over-represented among countries classified as fragile states and many are prone to state failure. These and other factors combine to make SIDS highly vulnerable to external economic shocks. Achieving development in SIDS is as a consequence an especially complex task that requires an understanding of the roles played by aid, trade, remittances and governance in these countries. This paper looks at these issues, along with providing various stylised facts about SIDS. In so doing it serves as a background and broad contextual setting for the papers that follow in this Special Issue on 'Fragility and Development in Small Island Developing States'.

Giving a state a bad name? Kyrgyzstan and the risk of state failure

The article discusses the possible state failure of Kyrgyzstan and the implications of the label of a failed sate. A brief history of the events that have led to failed state status include the Tulip Revolution in 2005, political protests, presidential election protests, and ethnic violence. The response of the U.S., the European Union, and Russia to the events and the national interests of labeling the state as failed are discussed. It is suggested that instead of establishing security other countries have labeled Kyrgyzstan as a failed state which has led to a lack of political legitimacy, an expansion of neoliberalism, and has dangerous implications for the success of the country.

‘State failure’ and the extraterritorial use of force in self-defence against non-state actors

The thesis is first and foremost the examination of the notion and consequences of ‘state failure’ in international law. The disputes surrounding criteria for creation and recognition of states pertain to efforts to analyse legal and factual issues unravelling throughout the continuing existence of states, as best evidenced by the ‘state failure’ phenomenon. It is argued that although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective governments. The second part of this thesis focuses on the examinations of the legal consequences of the continuing existence of failed states in the context of jus ad bellum. Since the creation of the United Nations the ability of states to resort to armed force without violating what might be considered as the single most important norm of international law, has been considerably limited. State failure and increasing importance of non-state actors has become a greatly topical issue within recent years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal developments within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement to statehood. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is whether the implicit and explicit invocation of the state failure provides sufficient legal basis for the intervention in self-defence against non-state actors in located in failed states. It has been argued that state failure has a profound impact, the extent of which is yet to be fully explored, on the modern landscape of peace and security.

'Foreign' Terror? London Bombings, Resistance and the Failing State

The British government's response to the London bombings sought to make the terror of that day foreign, even though it appeared largely domestic. This helped construct it as unusual, contingent, part of the uncontrollable ‘otherness’ of the ‘foreign’. However, it also drew the response into the arena of British foreign policy, where the ‘failing state’ has been the dominant conceptualisation of insecurity and terrorism, especially since September 11th. When the bombings are examined through the ‘failing state’ disturbing and important problems are uncovered. Primarily, the ‘failing state’ discourse deconstructs under the influence of the terrorism in London, revealing that Britain itself is a ‘failing state’ by its own description and producing a generalisation of state ‘failure’. It thereby reveals several possible sites for responding to and resisting the government's representation.

State fragility and international development co-operation

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face.

State Fragility and International Development Cooperation

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face.

Organized crime in Oceania

Oceania has a relatively low level of crime prevalence yet in the smaller and under-developed PICs we have shown that transnational crime has become increasingly common. A risk contained but potentially dangerous if state failure or fragility undermines law enforcement capacities. We predict that as the pace of globalization quickens and the demand for raw materials and resources grows some parts of the Pacific will be prone to criminal enterprises run by both indigenous and foreign crime groups. Australia and New Zealand will remain attractors of illicit goods notably ATS but will in turn be source countries for diminishing fish stock such as beche de mere and abalone as well forest timber. Finally the role of states such as Australia and New Zealand in helping to maintain law enforcement capacities throughout the region will be crucial if organized crime in Oceania is to be kept in check while demand for illicit resources grow.

Transnational organized crime in Oceania

Oceania has a relatively low level of crime prevalence yet in the smaller and under-developed PICs we have shown that transnational crime has become increasingly common. A risk contained but potentially dangerous if state failure or fragility undermines law enforcement capacities. We predict that as the pace of globalization quickens and the demand for raw materials and resources grows some parts of the Pacific will be prone to criminal enterprises run by both indigenous and foreign crime groups. Australia and New Zealand will remain attractors of illicit goods notably ATS but will in turn be source countries for diminishing fish stock such as beche de mere and abalone as well forest timber. Finally the role of states such as Australia and New Zealand in helping to maintain law enforcement capacities throughout the region will be crucial if organized crime in Oceania is to be kept in check while demand for illicit resources grow.

Regulating the Ocean: Piracy and Protection along the East African Coast

From 2008-2012, a dramatic upsurge in incidents of maritime piracy in the Western Indian Ocean led to renewed global attention to this region: including the deployment of multi national naval patrols, attempts to prosecute suspected pirates, and the development of financial interdiction systems to track and stop the flow of piracy ransoms. Largely seen as the maritime ripple effect of anarchy on land, piracy has been slotted into narratives of state failure and problems of governance and criminality in this region.

This view fails to account for a number of factors that were crucial in making possible the unprecedented rise of Somali piracy and its contemporary transformation. Instead of an emphasis on failed states and crises of governance, my dissertation approaches maritime piracy within a historical and regional configuration of actors and relationships that precede this round of piracy and will outlive it. The story I tell in this work begins before the contemporary upsurge of piracy and closes with a foretaste of the itineraries beyond piracy that are being crafted along the East African coast.

Beginning in the world of port cities in the long nineteenth century, my dissertation locates piracy and the relationship between trade, plunder, and state formation within worlds of exchange, including European incursions into this oceanic space. Scholars of long distance trade have emphasized the sociality engendered through commerce and the centrality of idioms of trust and kinship in structuring mercantile relationships across oceanic divides. To complement this scholarship, my work brings into view the idiom of protection: as a claim to surety, a form of tax, and a moral claim to authority in trans-regional commerce.

To build this theory of protection, my work combines archival sources with a sustained ethnographic engagement in coastal East Africa, including the pirate ports of Northern Somalia, and focuses on the interaction between land-based pastoral economies and maritime trade. This connection between land and sea calls attention to two distinct visions of the ocean: one built around trade and mobility and the other built on the ocean as a space of extraction and sovereignty. Moving between historical encounters over trade and piracy and the development of a national maritime economy during the height of the Somali state, I link the contemporary upsurge of maritime piracy to the confluence of these two conceptualizations of the ocean and the ideas of capture, exchange, and redistribution embedded within them.

The second section of my dissertation reframes piracy as an economy of protection and a form of labor implicated within other legal and illegal economies in the Indian Ocean. Based on extensive field research, including interviews with self-identified pirates, I emphasize the forms of labor, value, and risk that characterize piracy as an economy of protection. The final section of my dissertation focuses on the diverse international, regional, and local responses to maritime piracy. This section locates the response to piracy within a post-Cold War and post-9/11 global order and longer attempts to regulate and assuage the risks of maritime trade. Through an ethnographic focus on maritime insurance markets, navies, and private security contractors, I analyze the centrality of protection as a calculation of risk and profit in the contemporary economy of counter-piracy.

Through this focus on longer histories of trade, empire, and regulation my dissertation reframes maritime piracy as an economy of protection straddling boundaries of land and sea, legality and illegality, law and economy, and history and anthropology.

La debilidad del Estado como factor explicativo de los conflictos armados en África subsahariana en el período de la pos Guerra Fría

La presente disertación aborda la correlación circular entre la debilidad estatal y el surgimiento de los actores armados que postulan autores como Robert Rotberg o William Reno, para el análisis de los conflictos armados en África Subsahariana en el período de la pos Guerra Fría. Durante este período, en esta región diferentes conflictos estallaron —entre esos Liberia, Sierra Leona, Somalia, Ruanda o Sudán— además de ser una de las partes del mundo que sufre por el elevado nivel de precariedad estatal. Este trabajo desarrolla entonces ambos aspectos de dicha correlación circular, a saber la incidencia de la debilidad estatal en el surgimiento de los grupos armados y, en segundo lugar, el fomento de la debilidad por parte de los grupos armados ¬–denominados por varios autores como señores de la Guerra–. Por último, esta disertación sugiere unas limitaciones al alcance explicativo de la relación interactiva entre la debilidad del Estado y los actores armados, para finalmente discutir el postulado planteado por algunos autores como Béatrice Hibou o Roland Marchal, que propone que la existencia de grupos armados pueden llevar al redespliegue del poder estatal en el largo plazo.

Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru

Este artículo es una versión reducida del original publicado en la Revista Current History, Vol. 105, No. 688, febrero, 2006, pp. 79-86. La revista Desafíos ha decidido publicar apartes por considerarlo de interés para la discusión sobre los efectos y resultados de la política de erradicación de cultivos ilícitos en Colombia. – This article is an abbreviated reproduction of the article published in the Current History Journal, Vol. 105, Nr. 688, Februrary, 2006, pp. 79-86. Desafíos Journal decided to publish parts of it due to the consideration of its interest for the discussion on consequences and results of the eradication policy of ilegal crops in Colombia.An anti-narcotics policy that ignores the social consequences of drug crops eradication only manages to further radicalize and isolate the population in areas in which lawlessness and potential terrorist activity thrive. It also strengthens the bond between disaffected social groups and guerrilla organizations in these areas. Washington cannot continue to be blind to the fact that the three current US policies on counterterrorism, anti-narcotics, and democratization in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, are not working in harmony. Paradoxically, the eradication of drug crops —the core of Peru’s US-sponsored anti-narcotics policy— enlarges pockets of poverty and fuels anger against the government. It also perpetuates the proverbial quagmire of alienation in which terrorism breeds. Instead of strengthening the State, drug eradication, particularly in the way it is currently carried out in the Andean countries, increases the risk of State failure.-----El efecto de una política antinarcóticos que ignora las consecuencias de la erradicación de cultivos de coca es radicalizar y aislar aún más la población en aquellas zonas donde prosperan la anarquía y el terrorismo. Además, fortalece los lazos entre los descontentos sociales y los grupos guerrilleros en esas mismas áreas. Washington no puede seguir ciega al hecho de que las tres políticas actuales de Estados Unidos —antiterrorismo, antinarcóticos y democratización en el Perú y otras regiones en América Latina— no están funcionando armónicamente. Resulta paradójico que la erradicación de cultivos de coca -eje de la política antinarcóticos peruana respaldada por Estados Unidos- ensanche las bolsas de miseria y aliente la ira contra el gobierno, además de perpetuar los proverbiales miasmas de marginación en las que se engendra el terrorismo. En vez de fortalecer al Estado, la erradicación de cultivos de coca, tal y como se está llevando a cabo en los países andinos, incrementa las posibilidades de su fracaso.

Securitización en el desierto: Una respuesta al terrorismo en Malí y en Níger, 2009 - 2013.

Este es un estudio sobre las dinámicas de seguridad en Malí durante el periodo de 2009 a 2013. La investigación busca explicar de qué manera se ha dado un proceso de securitización de los grupos insurgentes frente a la amenaza generada por la proliferación de grupos armados no estatales en el territorio comprendido entre Malí y Níger. Se toma a Níger con el ánimo de ver la existencia de un subcomplejo regional de seguridad entre este país y Malí. De esta manera se afirma que el aumento de las actividades insurgentes y terroristas en la zona compuesta por Malí y Níger se da por la proliferación de actores armados no estatales, entre los cuales se encuentran los grupos seculares e insurgentes Tuareg, las agrupaciones islamistas fundamentalistas y los grupos que se componen entre rebeldes Tuareg, criminales e islamistas, éstos actores han afectado la percepción que tiene Malí sobre su seguridad.