On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.

Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms

This study supports the proposition that managerial welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns experienced by bidder firms, from the time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are positively relaterd to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior management of the bidder. The results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management.

Omistus, kontrolli ja päämies-agentti- ongelmat osakeyhtiössä

Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää osakeyhtiön määräysvaltasuhteet ja miten päämies-agentti- ongelmat vaikeuttavat määräysvallan käyttöä. Tutkimusmetodi on lainopillinen ja lähestyminen aiheeseen tapahtuu sekä yhtiöoikeudellisesta, että oikeustaloustieteellisestä näkökulmasta. Aineistona tutkielmassa käytetään lähinnä voimassa olevaa lainsäädäntöä ja oikeuskirjallisuutta. Päämies-agentti- ongelmalla tarkoitetaan osakeyhtiössä määräysvallan osittaista luisumista omistajalta (päämies) yritysjohdolle (agentti) tai vähemmistöomistajalta (päämies) kontrolloivalle omistajalle (agentti). Tärkeimpiä ongelman lähteitä ovat epäsymmetrinen informaatio ja intressiristiriidat yhtiön johdon ja omistajien välillä tai toisaalta yhtiötä lähellä olevien omistajien ja muiden omistajien välillä. Epäsymmetrinen informaatio luo osaltaan puitteet agenttitahojen opportunistiselle käyttäytymiselle. Ratkaisuja päämies-agentti- ongelmiin ovat ennen kaikkea päämiestahoja suojaava lainsäädäntö ja ulkoiset yritysjohtajien käyttäytymistä ohjaavat keinot, kuten erilaiset kannustinjärjestelmät ja hyvät hallintotavat. Kontrolloivien omistajien käyttäytymistä on puolestaan vaikea ohjata ja erilaisilla määräysvaltaa keskittävillä omistusrakenteilla onkin taipumus voimistaa päämies-agentti- ongelmien vaikutusta. Erityisiä tilanteita osaltaan luovat myös luonteiltaan erilaiset omistajatahot, kuten institutionaaliset omistajat.

Osakeyhtiölain mukaiset edellytykset valtio-omistajan tahdon toteuttamiseen yhtiön johdossa

Tutkielman tavoitteena on kuvata valtio-omistajan vaikutusmahdollisuudet ja vaikuttamiskeinot valtioenemmistöisen osakeyhtiön hallintoon voimassa olevan osakeyhtiölain mukaisesti. Tutkielmassa paneudutaan osakeyhtiön johdon tehtävien ja velvollisuuksien lisäksi valtion rooliin ja asemaan yhtiön omistajana sekä selvitetään valtion omistajavallan jakautumista valtiollisten toimijoiden välillä. Tutkimusmetodina on käytetty oikeusdogmatiikkaa. Tutkielman pääasiallisena lähdeaineistona on voimassa oleva lainsäädäntö valmisteluaineistoineen. Lisäksi lähteinä on käytetty kotimaista oikeuskirjallisuutta, viranomaisten ohjeistuksia ja kannanottoja sekä ajankohtaisia asiantuntija-artikkeleita. Osakeyhtiö on nykyisin tyypillisin yritysmuoto liiketoiminnan harjoittamiseen myös valtion omistamana. Valtio omistaa merkittävästi osakkeita hyvin erityyppisissä yhtiöissä ja hyvin erisuuruisin osuuksin. Enemmistöosakkeenomistajuus tuo käytännössä valtiolle päätösvallan yhtiökokouksessa yhtiön merkittävistä ja laajakantoisista asioista strategisista linjauksista ja hallituksen jäsenten valinnasta päätettäessä. Jo yhtiötä perustettaessa valtio enemmistöosakkaana voi määrätä yhtiöjärjestyksessä melko vapaasti yhtiön tarkoituksesta ja hallinnon järjestämisestä. Hallitus ja toimitusjohtaja toimivat omistajan tahdon ja yhtiön tarkoituksen mukaisesti, mutta kuitenkin itsenäisesti yhtiön edun parhaaksi. Valtio-omistajuus ei tarkoita osakeyhtiön hallinnon ja toiminnan erilaisuutta muihin yhtiöihin nähden, vaan yhtiö toimii hyvän hallintotavan mukaisesti liiketoimintaperiaattein, johon myös valtion omistajaohjauksella pyritään.

Ensino de Física para pessoas surdas: o processo educacional do surdo no ensino médio e suas relações no ambiente escolar

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

The influence of financial participation and participation in decision-making on employee job attitudes

This study investigates the direct and indirect effects of financial participation (FP) and participation in decision-making (PDM) on employee job attitudes. The central premise is that both financial participation and participation in decision-making have effects on job attitudes, such as integration, involvement and commitment, perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, satisfaction and motivation. After reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, developed by Long (1978a) and Florkowski ( 1989), a new model was constructed to consider a combined effects of both FP and PDM, herein referred to as employee participation (EP). The underpinning of the model is based on the assumption that both ( a) the combination of financial participation and participation in decision-making ('employee participation'), and (b) participation in decision-making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes. The test of the new model showed that employee participation does not produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes, than does participation in decision-making on its own. The data were gathered from a questionnaire study administered in a large British retail organization that operates two types of ownership schemes - profit-sharing and SAYE schemes.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Home-ownership for future generations

This paper constructs a housing market model to analyse conditions for different generations of households in the UK. Previous policy work has suggested that baby-boomers have benefitted at the expense of younger generations. The model relies on a form of financial accelerator in which existing homeowners reinvest a proportion of the capital gains on moving home. The model is extended to look at homeownership probabilities. It also explains why an increasing share of mortgages has gone to existing owners, despite market liberalisation and securitisation. In addition, the model contributes to the explanation of volatility.

Ownership, control and corporate valuation of Brazilian companies

We study the direct and indirect ownership structure of Brazilian corporations and their market value and risk by the end of 1996 and 1998. Ownership is quite concentrated with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that indirect control structures may be used to concentrate control even more rather than to keep control of the company with a smaller share of total capital. The greater the concentration of voting rights then less the value of the fmn should be due to potential expropriation ofrninority shareholders. We fmd evidence that when there is a majority shareholder and when indirect ownership structures are used without the loss of control, corporate valuations are greater when control is dilluted through the indirect ownership structure. This evidence is consistent with the existence of private benefits of control that can be translated as potential minority shareholder expropriation.

The Owner Share scheduler for a distributed system

In large distributed systems, where shared resources are owned by distinct entities, there is a need to reflect resource ownership in resource allocation. An appropriate resource management system should guarantee that resource's owners have access to a share of resources proportional to the share they provide. In order to achieve that some policies can be used for revoking access to resources currently used by other users. In this paper, a scheduling policy based in the concept of distributed ownership is introduced called Owner Share Enforcement Policy (OSEP). OSEP goal is to guarantee that owner do not have their jobs postponed for longer periods of time. We evaluate the results achieved with the application of this policy using metrics that describe policy violation, loss of capacity, policy cost and user satisfaction in environments with and without job checkpointing. We also evaluate and compare the OSEP policy with the Fair-Share policy, and from these results it is possible to capture the trade-offs from different ways to achieve fairness based on the user satisfaction. © 2009 IEEE.

Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.