The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms

Peer reviewed

Econometric models of Finnish non-industrial private forest owners' timber supply and timber stock

This dissertation examines the short- and long-run impacts of timber prices and other factors affecting NIPF owners' timber harvesting and timber stocking decisions. The utility-based Faustmann model provides testable hypotheses of the exogenous variables retained in the timber supply analysis. The timber stock function, derived from a two-period biomass harvesting model, is estimated using a two-step GMM estimator based on balanced panel data from 1983 to 1991. Timber supply functions are estimated using a Tobit model adjusted for heteroscedasticity and nonnormality of errors based on panel data from 1994 to 1998. Results show that if specification analysis of the Tobit model is ignored, inconsistency and biasedness can have a marked effect on parameter estimates. The empirical results show that owner's age is the single most important factor determining timber stock; timber price is the single most important factor in harvesting decision. The results of the timber supply estimations can be interpreted using utility-based Faustmann model of a forest owner who values a growing timber in situ.

Non-industrial private forest landowners’ choices of timber management strategies and potential allowable cut.

In the study, the potential allowable cut in the district of Pohjois-Savo - based on the non-industrial private forest landowners' (NIPF) choices of timber management strategies - was clarified. Alternative timber management strategies were generated, and the choices and factors affecting the choices of timber management strategies by NIPF landowners were studied. The choices of timber management strategies were solved by maximizing the utility functions of the NIPF landowners. The parameters of the utility functions were estimated using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The level of the potential allowable cut was compared to the cutting budgets based on the 7th and 8th National Forest Inventories (NFI7 and NFI8), to the combining of private forestry plans, and to the realized drain from non-industrial private forests. The potential allowable cut was calculated using the same MELA system as has been used in the calculation of the national cutting budget. The data consisted of the NIPF holdings (from the TASO planning system) that had been inventoried compartmentwise and had forestry plans made during the years 1984-1992. The NIPF landowners' choices of timber management strategies were clarified by a two-phase mail inquiry. The most preferred strategy obtained was "sustainability" (chosen by 62 % of landowners). The second in order of preference was "finance" (17 %) and the third was "saving" (11 %). "No cuttings", and "maximum cuttings" were the least preferred (9 % and 1 %, resp.). The factors promoting the choices of strategies with intensive cuttings were a) "farmer as forest owner" and "owning fields", b) "increase in the size of the forest holding", c) agriculture and forestry orientation in production, d) "decreasing short term stumpage earning expectations", e) "increasing intensity of future cuttings", and f) "choice of forest taxation system based on site productivity". The potential allowable cut defined in the study was 20 % higher than the average of the realized drain during the years 1988-1993, which in turn, was at the same level as the cutting budget based on the combining of forestry plans in eastern Finland. Respectively, the potential allowable cut defined in the study was 12 % lower than the NFI8-based greatest sustained allowable cut for the 1990s. Using the method presented in this study, timber management strategies can be clarified for non-industrial private forest landowners in different parts of Finland. Based on the choices of timber managemet strategies, regular cutting budgets can be calculated more realistically than before.

Non-industrial private forest landowners’ choices of timber management strategies.

The factors affecting the non-industrial, private forest landowners' (hereafter referred to using the acronym NIPF) strategic decisions in management planning are studied. A genetic algorithm is used to induce a set of rules predicting potential cut of the landowners' choices of preferred timber management strategies. The rules are based on variables describing the characteristics of the landowners and their forest holdings. The predictive ability of a genetic algorithm is compared to linear regression analysis using identical data sets. The data are cross-validated seven times applying both genetic algorithm and regression analyses in order to examine the data-sensitivity and robustness of the generated models. The optimal rule set derived from genetic algorithm analyses included the following variables: mean initial volume, landowner's positive price expectations for the next eight years, landowner being classified as farmer, and preference for the recreational use of forest property. When tested with previously unseen test data, the optimal rule set resulted in a relative root mean square error of 0.40. In the regression analyses, the optimal regression equation consisted of the following variables: mean initial volume, proportion of forestry income, intention to cut extensively in future, and positive price expectations for the next two years. The R2 of the optimal regression equation was 0.34 and the relative root mean square error obtained from the test data was 0.38. In both models, mean initial volume and positive stumpage price expectations were entered as significant predictors of potential cut of preferred timber management strategy. When tested with the complete data set of 201 observations, both the optimal rule set and the optimal regression model achieved the same level of accuracy.

Effects of forestry extension on the use of allowable cut in non-industrial private forests.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Public and private technical assistance programs for non-industrial private forest landowners in the southern United States.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Optimal choice between even- and uneven-aged forestry: the case of non-industrial private forest owners

An infinite-horizon discrete time model with multiple size-class structures using a transition matrix is built to assess optimal harvesting schedules in the context of Non-Industrial Private Forest (NIPF) owners. Three model specifications accounting for forest income, financial return on an asset and amenity valuations are considered. Numerical simulations suggest uneven-aged forest management where a rational forest owner adapts her or his forest policy by influencing the regeneration of trees or adjusting consumption dynamics depending on subjective time preference and market return rate dynamics on the financial asset. Moreover she or he does not value significantly non-market benefits captured by amenity valuations relatively to forest income.

The asset/liability structure of the Philippine banks and non-bank financial institutions in 2000s : a preliminary study for financial access analyses

Based on the consolidated statements data of the universal/commercial banks (UKbank) and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking licenses, this paper presents a keen necessity of obtaining data in detail on both sides (assets and liabilities) of their financial conditions and further analyses. Those would bring more adequate assessments on the Philippine financial system, especially with regard to each financial subsector's financing/lending preferences and behavior. The paper also presents a possibility that the skewed locational and operational distribution exists in the non-UKbank financial subsectors. It suggests there may be a significant deviation from the authorities' (the BSP, SEC and others) intended/anticipated financial system in the banking/non-bank financial institutions' real operations.

Bank versus non-bank credit in the United States, Europe and China. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2012/07, 5 June 2013

In the wake of recent crisis developments in the US and Europe, non-bank credit channels have often been portrayed as 'shadow banking' and have been considered primarily through the lens of the risks they may pose to financial stability. However, the debate about financial system structures remains immature, in large part due to lack of reliable and comparable data. The available evidence actually points towards a correlation between the development of non-bank credit and higher resilience against systemic risk, at least in developed economies. Policy should aim at better statistical information, and at strengthening the infrastructure for the gradual development of sustainable nonbank credit provision.

A model of private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (ofmoney) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then the optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and note destruction (redemption) by members of the banking sector.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

A importância económica e social dos seguros de vida

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Gestão das Instituições Financeiras

Corporate Governance in European Banks: Essays on Bank Ownership

Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.