Individual and household willingness to pay for public goods

The issue of whether willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits generated by a public good should be elicited on an individual or on a household basis is addressed. Differences between individual and household WTP may arise when members of the household are mutually altruistic. It is shown that, for general specifications of altruism, household WTP is less than the sum of household members' individual WTP. Implications for the choice between household and individual measures of WTP are considered, and issues in the elicitation of household WTP are addressed.

"Cheap and nasty": German goods, socialism, and the 1876 Philadelphia world fair

At the World Fair in Philadelphia in 1876, the German goods on display were described as cheap and nasty, setting off a vigorous debate about the state of German industry. Social democrats attacked policies of increasing competitiveness of German exports through keeping wages low, and claimed that the quality of the goods produced by socialist workers was higher than those produced by others. An analysis of the debate shows the extent to which social democrats not only resorted to arguments stressing the national interest, but also the extent to which nominally Marxist socialists in this period were still attached to traditional artisanal values of pride in the quality of their work.

Interpreting white goods: Kunie women's perceptions of progress in New Caledonia

Acknowledging and describing the ways that women shape relations of power and property can add to understandings of how local communities create and experience globalisation. In this paper I examine how relations of power are actively and discursively constructed within Kunieacute households in New Caledonia, how they are inscribed by gender, and link them to local narrativisations of progress.

Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Long-run consumption risk with durable goods : UK evidence for equity and bond markets

"It is a widely accepted fact that the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) fails to provide a good explanation of many important features of the behaviour of financial market returns in a large range of countries over a long period of time. However, within a representative consumer/investor model, it is hard to see how the basic structure of the consumption based model can be safely abandoned." [introdução]

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Continuous improvement logidtics project: A study on the increase of the finished goods warehouse of Unilever at Sta. Iria

This project is called Improvement Logistics Project and aims to study an opportunity of expansion of the output in 80% of the Unilever warehouse at Sta. Iria via an increase in exportations for the next two years. This has been done using the Distibuidora Luís Simões tariff rates as basis of comparison for the as-is and to-be situations. For this matter, an allocation of all the costs of the warehouse is prepared and described with the goal of comparing the differences with and without expansion. The results show that a better outcome is achieved with the investment, but the warehouse is yet to prove its efficiency against the distribution company.

On the provision of global public goods : experimental evidence on climate change mitigation issues

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2011

Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.