Job Intelligence-Services für Hochschulen

Internetbasierte Jobportale liefern in Form von Stellenanzeigen eine interessante Datengrundlage, um Qualifikationsanforderungen von nachfragenden Unternehmen an potenzielle Hochschulabsolventen transparent zu machen. Hochschulen können durch Analyse dieser Qualifikationsanforderungen das eigene Aus- und Weiterbildungsangebot arbeitsmarktorientiert weiterentwickeln und sich somit in der Hochschullandschaft profilieren. Hierfür ist es indes erforderlich, die Stellenanzeigen aus Jobportalen zu extrahieren und mithilfe adäquater analytischer Informationssysteme weiter zu verarbeiten. In diesem Beitrag zum CampusSource White Paper Award wird ein Konzept für Job Intelligence-Services vorgestellt, die die systematische Analyse von Qualifikationsanforderungen auf Grundlage von Stellenanzeigen aus Jobportalen gestatten.

The Communicative Dimension and Security in Asia-Pacific: A communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services

The postwar development of the Intelligence Services in Japan has been based on two contrasting models: the centralized model of the USA and the collegiality of UK, neither of which has been fully developed. This has led to clashes of institutional competencies and poor anticipation of threats towards national security. This problem of opposing models has been partially overcome through two dimensions: externally through the cooperation with the US Intelligence Service under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; and internally though the pre-eminence in the national sphere of the Department of Public Safety. However, the emergence of a new global communicative dimension requires that a communicative-viewing remodeling of this dual model is necessary due to the increasing capacity of the individual actors to determine the dynamics of international events. This article examines these challenges for the Intelligence Services of Japan and proposes a reform based on this new global communicative dimension.

Espionage against Poland in the Documents and Analyses of the Polish Special Services (1944 - 1989) - as Illustrated by the Intelligence Activities of the USA

The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the “Solidarity” social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text.

Spying on Science : Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961

Maddrell, John, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.xi+330 RAE2008

Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence

Jackson, Peter; Siegel, Jennifer., 'Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence', In: Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), pp.11-51 RAE2008

The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism

Outrora dominado por ameaças provenientes de Estados-nação, o cenário global actual, dominado por uma rápida mudança de poderes que nos apresenta uma interacção complexa entre múltiplos actores, onde inimigos desconhecidos, anteriormente bem identificados, é actualmente controlado por grupos terroristas bem preparados e bem organizados. Hezbollah é reconhecido como um dos grupos terroristas mais capazes, com uma extensa rede fora do Líbano dedicada a tráfico de droga, armas e seres humanos, tal como o branqueamento de capitais para financiar o terrorismo, representando um grande foco de instabilidade à segurança. Como instrumento de Estado, os serviços de informações detêm a capacidade de estar na linha da frente na prevenção e combate ao terrorismo. Todavia, para compreender este fenómeno é necessário analisar os actores desta ameaça. À luz desta conjuntura, esta dissertação está dividida em três capítulos principais que visam responder às seguintes questões fundamentais: O que é o terrorismo? Como opera um grupo terrorista transnacional? Será que os serviços de informações têm as ferramentas necessárias para prevenir e combater estas ameaças?

Intelligence professionalism in the Americas = Profesionalismo de inteligencia en las Américas /

Shipping list no.: 2004-0011-P.

KNOWING THE ENEMY: NAZI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR, HOLOCAUST, AND POSTWAR

“Knowing the Enemy: Nazi Foreign Intelligence in War, Holocaust and Postwar,” reveals the importance of ideologically-driven foreign intelligence reporting in the wartime radicalization of the Nazi dictatorship, and the continued prominence of Nazi discourses in postwar reports from German intelligence officers working with the U.S. Army and West German Federal Intelligence Service after 1945. For this project, I conducted extensive archival research in Germany and the United States, particularly in overlooked and files pertaining to the wartime activities of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Abwehr, Fremde Heere Ost, Auswärtiges Amt, and German General Staff, and the recently declassified intelligence files pertaining to the postwar activities of the Gehlen Organization, Bundesnachrichtendienst, and Foreign Military Studies Program. Applying the technique of close textual analysis to the underutilized intelligence reports themselves, I discovered that wartime German intelligence officials in military, civil service, and Party institutions all lent the appearance of professional objectivity to the racist and conspiratorial foreign policy beliefs held in the highest echelons of the Nazi dictatorship. The German foreign intelligence services’ often erroneous reporting on Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and international Jewry simultaneously figured in the radicalization of the regime’s military and anti-Jewish policies and served to confirm the ideological preconceptions of Hitler and his most loyal followers. After 1945, many of these same figures found employment with the Cold War West, using their “expertise” in Soviet affairs to advise the West German Government, U.S. Military, and CIA on Russian military and political matters. I chart considerable continuities in personnel and ideas from the wartime intelligence organizations into postwar West German and American intelligence institutions, as later reporting on the Soviet Union continued to reproduce the flawed wartime tropes of innate Russian military and racial inferiority.

"Kirjailijoiden tapaus" Venäjällä vuonna 1997

In the autumn of 1997, Russian government was faced with media pressure when owners of the TV channels ORT and NTV joined forces against it. This study is based on media sources from October 1997 to December 1997. It shows clearly how the enormous power of the media was able to dictate what happened in Russia. In the mid-1990s Russians started to talk about political technology, which became a commonly used term by professionals, journalists, politicians and intelligence services. As a result of this action, two leading reformers in the government, Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, were dismissed from their highly influential posts as finance and energy ministers respectively, but retained their power as first deputy prime ministers. According to the correspondents, the real reason was to resolve a conflict within the parliament, which had demanded the dismissal of Mr. Chubais. This demand was presented after Chubais had accepted $90,000 as a reward for co-writing a book on privatization. Chubais was considered to be Russia’s “business card” towards the west – the"Authors’ case" (Delo avtorov) was only solved after President Boris Yeltsin took part in the public debate. According to the research, the media owned by powerful businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, was able to use its own security services to expose sensitive material (Russian term ‘kompromat’), if necessary, concerning any given person. The so-called Authors’ case can be considered as a part of the battle and the tip of the iceberg in arrangements designed to organize the funding of the Russian presidential election campaign in 2000. The reason why this particular incident was so widely covered on television was because several programs aimed to reveal to the public "hidden bribes" that, as they claimed, government officials had received. The political aspect, however, was quite mild, when the concrete issues of possible dismissals of Ministers were debated in the Parliament. Everything was dealt with as a “family matter” inside Kremlin. Yeltsin's "family" consisted of practically anybody from oligarch Berezovsky to Chubais, the father of Russia's privatization policy. Methods of critical history implementation analysis has been used in this research in determining the use of the source material. Literature and interviews have also provided a good base for the study. The study proves that any literature dealing with the subject has not paid enough attention to how the dismissal of Alexander Kazakov, deputy of President’s administration, was linked directly with Gazprom, the state gas monopoly. Kazakov had to leave Gazprom and lose his position as Chubais' ally when the influential ORT television company was deteriorated.

Comite National de Secours Aux Refugies 1933-1934

Materials on the founding and organizational structure of the Comite. Lists of board members, reports, minutes of meetings. Correspondence and other materials from HIAS-JCA-EMIGDIRECT, Government of France. List of German Jewish students at Lucien de Hirsch school in Paris. List of German Jewish refugees.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

Nachrichtendienstpsychologie 1

Herausgeberwerk (Litzcke): 1. Die Intelligence-Acht. Überlegungen zu einer wissenschaftlichen Annäherung an nachrichtendienstliches Tun. 2. Korruption in Auslandsnachrichtendiensten 3. Interkulturelle Kommunikation Deutschland - China 4. Aspekte eines nachrichtendienstlichen Gesprächs 5. Nonverbale Lügen- und Machtmerkmale 6. Illegale Migration aus psychologischer und aus nachrichtendienstlicher Sicht 7. Stessbelastung operativ arbeitender Mitarbeiter 8. Psychologie verdeckter Ermittler 9. Psychologische Aspekte des Einsatzes kriminalpolizeilicher Verbindungsbeamter im Ausland 10. Agentinnen aus Liebe - psychologische Betrachtung der Romeomethode

Nachrichtendienstpsychologie 4

Mit dem vorliegenden Band kann bereits der Vierte zum Thema Nachrichtendienstpsychologie herausgegeben werden. Nach Kenntnis der Herausgeber stoßen die Aufsatzsammlungen zu unterschiedlichen psychologischen Themen, die im Rahmen der nachrichtendienstlichen Arbeit von Interesse sind, auch außerhalb der Nachrichtendienste auf Interesse. Dies dürfte zum Teil darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass einige Themen inhaltliche Überschneidungen zu der Aufgabenstellung anderer Sicherheitsbehörden, wie z.B. der Polizeibehörden aufweisen. Aber auch innerhalb der Nachrichtendienste ergibt sich verstärkt die Notwendigkeit, bei der Lösung von Fragestellungen psychologische Erkenntnisse zu nutzen bzw. – auf dem speziellen Gebiet der Nachrichtendienstpsychologie – selbst zu generieren. Die Nachrichtendienste sind Bestandteil einer rechtsstaatlichen Struktur, die Gefahren für die Öffentlichkeit erkennen sollen. Dass auch Nachrichtendienste sich nicht vom wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt abkoppeln können, wenn sie dieser Aufgabe nachkommen wollen, ist evident. Wenn beispielsweise Gefahren für die öffentliche Sicherheit von Personen ausgehen, die sich ihrerseits psychologischer Mittel bedienen, müssen Sicherheitsbehörden klären, wie diese psychologischen Mittel eingesetzt werden und welche Wirkung sie entfalten, um ggf. Gegenstrategien vorzuschlagen. Aber auch ihr eigenes Instrumentarium müssen Nachrichtendienste ständig verbessern. Zentral dafür ist die Schulung der Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter. Hierzu beizutragen ist eine Funktion der Reihe Nachrichtendienstpsychologie.

Da intercepção de comunicações, acções encobertas e serviços de informações

The Portuguese Intelligence Services have their operational skills limited due to the grievances caused by the Dictatorship and, in particular, by its political police. With the help of historical elements, and by analyzing current legislation, we demonstrate that such grievances are today unjustified and misplaced, mainly taking into account the Risk Society’s multifaceted threats. Also part of our analysis is the impugnment of the Constitutional Court’s decision nº 413/2015, which pronounced unconstitutional the norm contained in Decree nº 426/XII, of the Republic’s Assembly, article nº 78, nº2, which intended to allow Intelligence Services access to the so-called “metadata”, as well as to tax and banking information. It is our understanding, and we demonstrate it in our dissertation, that should be allowed the access of, not only the above mentioned information, but also the means known as communications interception and undercover operations to the Intelligence Services, as long as properly supervised and inspected.

Fiscalização dos serviços de informações em Portugal

The present work offers a brief historical and evolutionary introduction to the legal basis of the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP) which comprises two services – the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) – and two entities responsible for its oversight – the Supervisory Body (CFSIRP) and the Data Monitoring Committee (CFD), also responsible for supervising the Military Intelligence and Security Centre (CISMIL) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMGFA). The initial narrative subsequently leads us to a detailed analysis of the Portuguese Intelligence services' current model of monitoring, as well as of the legislator’s options, namely in the legal drafting field, used within the construction and definition of the legal structure that currently regulates the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System. For the purposes of this study we have broadly examined different models of the European Union, in particular those of Belgium, the Netherlands and Croatia. We have also transposed to the text the valuable contributions collected during the research phase, more precisely the replies to questionnaires and interviews conducted with certain individuals selected according to their knowledge and affinity with the subject of this study, including members and former members of the Supervisory Body and former directors of the three portuguese intelligence services. The present dissertation intends to contribute to the development of this subject, promoting critical analysis, within and beyond the academia, with the aim that some of its reflections might be useful towards the intelligence system’s future reform, particularly in what concerns intelligence services monitoring.