Forest owners' acceptance of incentive based policy instruments in forest biodiversity conservation : a choice experiment based approach

Abstract

Forest Policy Reform in Brazil

Rapid deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, caused by economic, social, and policy factors, has focused global and national attention on protecting this valuable forest resource. In response, Brazil reformed its federal forest laws in 2006, creating new regulatory, development, and incentive policy instruments and institutions. Federal forestry responsibilities are maintained within the ministry of the environment; its regulatory agency responsibilities are divided among three different branches of the agency; many powers are delegated to states and municipalities; and a new private concession system is being developed. These reforms offer promise to improve forest protection and management in Brazil but must overcome significant institutional and social resistance for success.

Simulation of Land Use and Investment Behaviour under Different Policy Scenarios: Results of the extended farm/household model. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 27, July 2012

Factor markets are a central issue in analyses of farm development and of agricultural sector vitality. Among the different production factors, land is one of the most studied. Several studies seek to estimate the effect of government policy payments on land value or land rental prices. The studies mostly agree that government payments and other types of policy support are significant in explaining land prices and account for a large share of them. In October 2011, the European Commission published a new policy proposal for the common agricultural policy (CAP) up to 2020. The proposed regulation includes a shift from historical to regional payments. The objective of this paper is to provide an ex ante analysis of the impact of the new CAP policy instruments on the land market. In particular, the effect of the regionalisation of payments in Italy is examined. The analysis is based on the use of a mathematical programming model to simulate the changes in land demand for a farm in Emilia Romagna. The results highlight the relevance of the new policy mechanism in determining a change in land demand. Yet the effect is highly dependent on initial ownership of entitlements under the historical payment scheme.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

La marca país Argentina como herramienta cultural para el desarrollo económico

Argentina, uno de los países más visitados de América Latina deja al descubierto su marca país " Argentina Late con vos". Un mecanismo de política exterior con el cual el país ha obtenido grandes beneficios económicos.

Good governance and the extractive industries in sub-saharan Africa

This article critically examines the challenges that come with implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)a policy mechanism marketed by donors and Western governments as a key to facilitating economic improvement in resource-rich developing countriesin sub-Saharan Africa. The forces behind the EITI contest that impoverished institutions, the embezzlement of petroleum and/or mineral revenues, and a lack of transparency are the chief reasons why resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa is underperforming economically, and that implementation of the EITI, with its foundation of good governance, will help address these problems. The position here, however, is that the task is by no means straightforward: that the EITI is not necessarily a blueprint for facilitating good governance in the region's resource-rich countries. It is concluded that the EITI is a policy mechanism that could prove to be effective with significant institutional change in host African countries but, on its own, it is incapable of reducing corruption and mobilizing citizens to hold government officials accountable for hoarding profits from extractive industry operations.

New models of old(?) payment questions

Is private money feasible and desirable? In its absence, is there a central bank policy that partially or fully substitutes for private money? In this paper, some recent modeling ideas about how to address these questioned are reviewed and applied. The main ideas are that people cannot commit to future actions and that their histories are to some extent unknown - are not common knowledge. Under the additional assumption that the private monies issued by diferent people are distinct, a strong recognizability assumption, it is shown that there is a role for private money.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Regional subsidies and industrial prospects of lagging regions

Large and sustained differences in economic performance across regions of developing countries have long provided motivation for fiscal incentives designed to encourage firm entry in lagging areas. Empirical evidence in support of these policies has, however, been weak at best. This paper undertakes a direct evaluation of the most prominent fiscal incentive policy in Brazil, the Fundos Constitucionais de Financiamento (Constitutional Funds). In doing so, we exploit valuable features of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor's RAIS data set to address two important elements of firm location decisions that have the potential to bias an assessment of the Funds: (i) firm “family structure” (in particular, proximity to headquarters for vertically integrated firms), and (ii) unobserved spatial heterogeneity (with the potential to confound the effects of the Funds). We find that the pull of firm headquarters is very strong relative to the Constitutional Funds for vertically integrated firms, but that, with non-parametric controls for time invariant spatial heterogeneity, the Funds provide statistically and economically significant incentives for firms in many of the targeted industries.

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.

A coleta seletiva como instrumento propulsor da gestão do consórcio de resíduos sólidos na região metropolitana do Cariri-Ceará

Pós-graduação em Geografia - IGCE

Características da resposta à Aids de secretarias de saúde, no contexto da Política de Incentivo do Ministério da Saúde¹

OBJETIVOS: Analisar a cobertura da Política de Incentivo do Ministério da Saúde para Programas de Aids e as características das ações de prevenção, assistência, gestão e apoio às organizações da sociedade civil induzidas nos Estados e municípios. METODOLOGIA: Os Planos de Ações e Metas de 2006, das 27 Unidades Federadas e de 427 municípios incluídos na Política de Incentivo, foram analisados segundo indicadores estabelecidos para aferir a complexidade e a sustentabilidade das ações induzidas, a inclusão de populações prioritárias e a capacidade de intervenção na epidemia. Informações sobre população e casos de aids registrados foram utilizadas para mensurar a cobertura. RESULTADOS: Os municípios incluídos representaram uma cobertura de 85,2% dos casos de aids do País. Houve uma baixa proporção de secretarias estaduais (48,2%) e municipais (32,6%) de saúde que contemplaram, concomitantemente, ações de prevenção para a população geral e as de maior prevalência da doença, assim como ações para o diagnóstico do HIV, o tratamento de pessoas infectadas e a prevenção da transmissão vertical. Em relação às populações prioritárias, 51,9% dos Estados e 31,1% dos municípios propuseram ações específicas na prevenção e na assistência. Estados (44,4%) e municípios (27,9%) com Planos abrangentes estão mais concentrados no Sudeste e em cidades de grande porte, representando a maioria dos casos de aids do País. CONCLUSÃO: A Política de Incentivo do Ministério da Saúde compreende as regiões de maior ocorrência da aids no Brasil, porém, o perfil da resposta induzida encontra-se parcialmente dissociado das características epidemiológicas da doença no País.

How Should Consumers’ Willingness to Pay Be Measured? An Empirical Comparison of State-of-the-Art Approaches

This study compares the performance of four commonly used approaches to measure consumers’ willingness to pay with real purchase data (REAL): the open-ended (OE) question format; choicebased conjoint (CBC) analysis; Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak’s (BDM) incentive-compatible mechanism; and incentive-aligned choice-based conjoint (ICBC) analysis. With this five-in-one approach, the authors test the relative strengths of the four measurement methods, using REAL as the benchmark, on the basis of statistical criteria and decision-relevant metrics. The results indicate that the BDM and ICBC approaches can pass statistical and decision-oriented tests. The authors find that respondents are more price sensitive in incentive-aligned settings than in non-incentive-aligned settings and the REAL setting. Furthermore, they find a large number of “none” choices under ICBC than under hypothetical conjoint analysis. This study uncovers an intriguing possibility: Even when the OE format and CBC analysis generate hypothetical bias, they may still lead to the right demand curves and right pricing decisions.

Cálculo del valor ambiental de los jardines frontales urbanos : Mendoza (Argentina)

Los espacios verdes y, en general, la vegetación que cumple funciones estéticas y de protección ambiental son valorados, medidos y calculados por el área destinada al cultivo, en lugar de basar los cálculos en los elementos vegetales constitutivos. Esto significa una simplificación excesiva de la valoración de la vegetación (actual o proyectada) que no aporta criterios de cuantificación valorativa necesarios, actualmente, tanto para preservar vegetación existente como para políticas de desarrollo urbano y proyectos de ingeniería del mejoramiento ambiental. En el presente trabajo se propone aplicar a la valoración de los jardines frontales urbanos de la ciudad de Mendoza una metodología cuantitativa desarrollada por R. Codina et al., que se apoya en un concepto nuevo que es su influencia como mejoradores ambientales. La ecuación de cálculo se integra con índices de valoración como el Índice de Vegetación Ambientalmente Activa y el Índice Ambiental Urbanístico, que permiten cuantificar la importancia urbanística y ambiental de la vegetación. También se propone una base para implementar una política de incentivo de los jardines frontales mediante la disminución del avalúo valor terreno del impuesto inmobiliario, en una escala progresiva según el Índice Ambiental Urbanístico de cada propiedad, tendiente a la transformación de la ciudad en una ciudad-jardín, mejorando la calidad de vida y el atractivo turístico urbano.

Assessing economically viable carbon reductions for the production of ammonia from biomass gasification

Greenhouse gas emissions from fertiliser production are set to increase before stabilising due to the increasing demand to secure sustainable food supplies for a growing global population. However, avoiding the impacts of climate change requires all sectors to decarbonise by a very high level within several decades. Economically viable carbon reductions of substituting natural gas reforming with biomass gasification for ammonia production are assessed using techno-economic and life cycle assessment. Greenhouse gas savings of 65% are achieved for the biomass gasification system and the internal rate of return is 9.8% at base-line biomass feedstock and ammonia prices. Uncertainties in the assumptions have been tested by performing sensitivity analysis, which show, for example with a ±50% change in feedstock price, the rate of return ranges between -0.1% and 18%. It would achieve its target rate of return of 20% at a carbon price of £32/t CO, making it cost competitive compared to using biomass for heat or electricity. However, the ability to remain competitive to investors will depend on the volatility of ammonia prices, whereby a significant decrease would require high carbon prices to compensate. Moreover, since no such project has been constructed previously, there is high technology risk associated with capital investment. With limited incentives for industrial intensive energy users to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, a sensible policy mechanism could target the support of commercial demonstration plants to help ensure this risk barrier is resolved. © 2013 The Authors.