Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Understanding Economic Cycle Effects on Top Executive Compensation: An Analysis Applied to American NYSE Listed Companies.

Rapport de recherche présenté à la Faculté des arts et des sciences en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en sciences économiques.

Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

The Taxation of Bonuses and its Effect on Executive Compensation - Evidence from the UK Experience

This paper explores the reaction of compensation components awarded to executive directors of UK financial institutions following the adoption of the bonus tax in December 2009. Excessive bonuses are blamed for encouraging risk taking and are regarded as one of the pull factors of the financial crisis. The British government attempted to reduce bonuses and accordingly corporate risk-taking by means of a special tax on cashbased bonuses. Using a comprehensive dataset on executive compensation we show that the introduction of the bonus tax decreased the net cash bonuses awarded to directors by about 43%, accompanied however by a simultaneous increase in other compensation components leaving both variable as well as total compensation unaffected. Hence, the incidence of the bonus tax was borne by the firms which compensated their managers for the decrease in cash-based compensation by awarding them different forms of pay. Consistent with this finding our data also suggests that firms reduced dividend pay-outs as a consequence of the bonus tax.

Effects of taxation; executive compensation and retirement plans.

Mode of access: Internet.

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: evidence from the UK

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation:an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

The impact of institutional complexity and top management characteristics on executive compensation and firm performance

While most studies take a dyadic view when examining the environmental difference between the home country of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a particular foreign country, they ignore that an MNE is managing a network of subsidiaries embedded in diverse environments. Additionally, neither the impacts of global environments on top executives nor the effects of top executives’ capabilities to handle institutional complexity are fully explored. Thus, using a three-essay format, this dissertation tried to fill these gaps by addressing the effects of institutional complexity and top management characteristics on top executive compensation and firm performance. ^ Essay 1 investigated the impact of an MNE’s institutional complexity, or the diversity of national institutions facing an MNE’s network of subsidiaries, on the top management team (TMT) compensation. This essay proposed that greater political and cultural complexity leads to not only greater TMT total compensation but also to a greater portion of TMT compensation linked with long-term performance. The arguments are supported in this essay by using an unbalanced panel dataset including 296 U.S. firms with 1,340 observations. ^ Essay 2 explored TMT social capital and its moderating role on value creation and appropriation by the chief executive officer (CEO). Using a sample with 548 U.S. firms and 2,010 observations, it found that greater TMT social capital does facilitate the effects of CEO intellectual capital and social capital on firm growth. Finally, essay 3 examined the performance implications for the fit between managerial information-processing capabilities and institutional complexity. It proposed that institutional complexity is associated with the needs of information-processing. On the other hand, smaller TMT turnover and larger TMT size reflect larger managerial information-processing capabilities. Consequently, superior performance is achieved by the match among institutional complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size. All hypotheses in essay 3 are supported in a sample of 301 U.S. firms and 1,404 observations. ^ To conclude, this dissertation advances and extends our knowledge on the roles of institutional environments and top executives on firm performance and top executive compensation.^

Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevantcriterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating thatinformation, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We usepublicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the relationsbetween golf handicaps of CEOs and corporate performance, on the one hand, and CEO compensationand golf handicaps, on the other hand. Although we find no relation between handicap and corporateperformance, we do find a relation between handicap and CEO compensation. In short, golfers earnmore than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. We relate these findings to the difficultiesof judging compensation for CEOs. To overcome this and possibly other illusory correlations inthese kinds of decisions, we recommend the use of explicit, mechanical decision rules.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Management Control for Corporate Sustainability Execution: The Role of Employee Compensation

The research described in this thesis examines the characteristics, the benefits and the challenges associated with the implementation of management accounting systems in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Applied to the CSR context, management accounting relates to the identification, elaboration and communication of information about an organization's interactions with the society and the environment. Based on this information, firms are able to make decisions to achieve social and environmental objectives and provide evidence justifying the benefits and the costs of such actions. The study begins by focusing on green management and exploring the characteristics of Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) systems within firms. The first chapter informs the reader about the growing body of EMA research and reveals unexplored relevant aspects that need to be further investigated. The work also emphasizes the importance of developing new theoretical hypotheses and appropriate research designs to empirically tackle new aspects of EMA and gain understanding on the use of these practices. Subsequently, given the acknowledged importance of control systems in influencing the behaviour of individuals within organizations, the remaining two chapters of the dissertation focus on the functioning of CSR-linked incentives assigned to employees in the form of compensation plans. The second chapter examines the determinants influencing corporate provision of incentives for the attainment of environmental targets. Empirical analysis of a sample of international firms reveals that companies are likely to use green incentives as mechanisms to increase the efficacy in contracting with their employees as well as to respond to social influences. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effectiveness of contracting associated with the use of CSR-linked executive compensation. Empirical analysis of a sample of US-based companies shows that corporate choice to tie senior executives' pay to CSR targets promotes the firm's CSR performance. Cette thèse examine les caractéristiques, avantages et défis associés à l'utilisation des systèmes de contrôle de gestion dans le domaine de la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE). Dans le contexte de la RSE, les activités du contrôle de gestion impliquent l'identification, l'élaboration et la communication d'informations qui concernent les interactions des organisations avec la société et l'environnement. Avec ces informations les entreprises sont en mesure de prendre des décisions visant à atteindre les objectifs sociaux et environnementaux de l'organisation et de documenter les bénéfices et coûts de ces actions. Dès le début, la thèse se concentre sur les caractéristiques des systèmes de contrôle de gestion environnementale au sein des entreprises. Le premier chapitre passe en revue la littérature existante et révèle des aspects inexplorés. Pour ce faire, le travail suggère le développement de nouvelles théories ainsi que l'utilisation de méthodes appropriées. Ces dernières doivent permettre d'aborder empiriquement de nouveaux aspects des systèmes de contrôle environnemental et faciliter la compréhension sur l'utilisation de ces pratiques. Considérant l'importance des systèmes de contrôle pour influencer le comportement des individus au sein des organisations, la suite du travail se concentre sur le fonctionnement des contrats de rémunération des employées liées aux résultats de la RSE. Plus particulièrement, le deuxième chapitre examine les facteurs qui influencent la décision des entreprises d'assigner des objectifs environnementaux aux employées. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon d'entreprises internationales montre que les entreprises sont susceptibles d'utiliser des mécanismes incitatifs écologiques pour augmenter l'efficacité des contrats ainsi que pour répondre aux influences sociales. Finalement, le troisième chapitre analyse l'efficacité des contrats de rémunération des dirigeants liés aux résultats de la RSE. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon de sociétés américaines indique que le choix de l'entreprise de lier la rémunération des dirigeants à des objectifs de la RSE favorise la performance RSE de l'organisation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation