Executive compensation and the performance of the firm


Autoria(s): Loderer, Claudio; Lewellen, Wilbur; Martin, Kenneth; Blum, Gerald
Data(s)

1992

Resumo

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://boris.unibe.ch/39535/1/1992%20Executive%20Compensation%20and%20the%20Performance%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf

Loderer, Claudio; Lewellen, Wilbur; Martin, Kenneth; Blum, Gerald (1992). Executive compensation and the performance of the firm. Managerial and Decision Economics, 13(1), pp. 65-74. Wiley 10.1002/mde.4090130108 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090130108>

doi:10.7892/boris.39535

info:doi:10.1002/mde.4090130108

urn:issn:0143-6570

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Wiley

Relação

http://boris.unibe.ch/39535/

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Loderer, Claudio; Lewellen, Wilbur; Martin, Kenneth; Blum, Gerald (1992). Executive compensation and the performance of the firm. Managerial and Decision Economics, 13(1), pp. 65-74. Wiley 10.1002/mde.4090130108 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090130108>

Palavras-Chave #330 Economics
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

PeerReviewed