Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Privatization in an international mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

We study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international duopoly serving two countries, with pollution abatement. This analysis is done in both mixed and privatized markets. The model has two stages: First, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously; then, the firms compete in the market by choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export and also abatement levels.

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Pesticides, preference heterogeneity and environmental taxes

In this paper we present results from two choice experiments (CE), designed to take account of the different negative externalities associated with pesticide use in agricultural production. For cereal production, the most probable impact of pesticide use is a reduction in environmental quality. For fruit and vegetable production, the negative externality is on consumer health. Using latent class models we find evidence of the presence of preference heterogeneity in addition to reasonably high willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for a reduction in the use of pesticides for both environmental quality and consumer health. To place our WTP estimates in a policy context we convert them into an equivalent pesticide tax by type of externality. Our tax estimates suggest that pesticide taxes based on the primary externality resulting from a particular mode of agricultural production are a credible policy option that warrants further consideration.

Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Impact of taxes on competition: the legal status quo in the European Union

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Negócios, Europeu e Transnacional

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

Economic and environmental effects of the CO2 taxation: an input-output analysis for Spain

CO2 emissions induced by human activities are the major cause of climate change; hence, strong environmental policy that limits the growing dependence on fossil fuel is indispensable. Tradable permits and environmental taxes are the usual tools used in CO2 reduction strategies. Such economic tools provide incentives to polluting industries to reduce their emissions through market signals. The aim of this work is to investigate the direct and indirect effects of an environmental tax on Spanish products and services. We apply an environmentally extended input-output (EIO) model to identify CO2 emission intensities of products and services and, accordingly, we estimate the tax proportional to these intensities. The short-term price effects are analyzed using an input-output price model. The effect of tax introduction on consumption prices and its influence on consumers’ welfare are determined. We also quantify the environmental impacts of such taxation in terms of the reduction in CO2 emissions. The results, based on the Spanish economy for the year 2007, show that sectors with relatively poor environmental profile are subjected to high environmental tax rates. And consequently, applying a CO2 tax on these sectors, increases production prices and induces a slight increase in consumer price index and a decrease in private welfare. The revenue from the tax could be used to counter balance the negative effects on social welfare and also to stimulate the increase of renewable energy shares in the most impacting sectors. Finally, our analysis highlights that the environmental and economic goals cannot be met at the same time with the environmental taxation and this shows the necessity of finding other (complementary or alternative) measures to ensure both the economic and ecological efficiencies. Keywords: CO2 emissions; environmental tax; input-output model, effects of environmental taxation.

Epäasianmukainen verontorjunta ympäristöverotuksessa

Epäasianmukaisella verontorjunnalla kannustintyyppisten ympäristöverojen yhteydessä tarkoitetaan sitä, että veron määrä vähenee ilman ympäristön tilan paranemista. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään, millaisia epäasianmukaisia verontorjuntakeinoja ympäristöveroihin liittyy, kuinka paljon niissä on kyse lainsäädäntöteknisistä valinnoista sekä lainsäädännön puutteellisuudesta ja kuinka ympäristöverotusta voitaisiin mahdollisesti parantaa. Esitys painottuu normatiiviseen sääntelyteoriaan eli siihen, minkälainen ohjauskeino tai sääntely palvelee parhaiten tietyn yhteiskuntapoliittisen päämäärän saavuttamista. Päästöt ovat usein suorassa suhteessa tuotteen ominaisuuksiin, mutta ympäristöverot eivät. Ongelmalliseksi muodostuvat lisäksi veronalennukset, kuten veroporrastukset ja veron palautukset. Nämä kannustavat epäasianmukaiseen verontorjuntaan, kuten yritysjärjestelyihin, hamstraukseen ja esimerkiksi jätteiden sijoittamiseen kaatopaikkojen ulkopuolelle. Epäasianmukaista verontorjuntaa voidaan ehkäistä muun muassa kiristämällä rangaistuksia, tiedottamalla, kaventamalla normaaliverokohtelun ja lievennetyn verokohtelun eroa sekä verotuksen kohdetta muuttamalla. Tärkeintä tulevaisuudessa olisi kuitenkin keskittyä kansainväliseen yhteistyöhön ja ympäristöverotuksen yhdenmukaistamiseen.

Taxation of nuclear waste in Spain

Law 15/2012 established in Spain four new environmental taxes and extended the scope objective excise duties on mineral oils to tax the use of natural gas and coal as sources of electricity. One of the newly created taxes falls on all electric power producers, and has as tax base the turnover. The second one tax hydropower production, and the other two fall on the nuclear industry. So, there are two new taxes in Spain on the production of electricity from nuclear sources. The first one is a tax on nuclear waste production; the second one is a tax on the storage of nuclear waste. However, these are not the only levies in the Spanish tax system affecting nuclear waste. At the State level there are already several charges on nuclear waste. At the regional level, on the other hand, two Autonomous Communities were taxing nuclear waste. The creation of these new State taxes will finish with the regional taxes, but the State will be oblige to compensate these regions for losing revenues. The purpose of this work is to carry out a critical analysis of the Spanish system of taxation on nuclear waste.

L'application du principe du pollueur-payeur à la gestion du risque environnemental et à la mutualisation des coûts de la pollution

Le but de cette étude est de déterminer qui paie pour le risque de pollution et par conséquent de vérifier si le principe du pollueur-payeur est effectivement mis en œuvre dans le domaine de la gestion du risque environnemental. Il s’agit d’examiner le degré de mutualisation de la gestion du risque dans différentes législations particulière. Les payeurs peuvent a priori se classer dans quatre catégories : les personnes dont l’activité contribue au risque de pollution, les compagnies d’assurance qui acceptent d’assurer ces personnes, les organismes ou autorités publics et les tiers. Divers exemples issus de la législation belge ou européenne seront examinés afin de déterminer s’ils sont conformes à la lettre et/ou à l’esprit du principe pollueur-payeur. Il s’agit notamment de la responsabilité civile, de la responsabilité environnementale, de la gestion des déchets et du marché de quotas d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Les techniques de responsabilité qui interviennent après que le dommage ait lieu et requièrent la démonstration de l’existence d’un lien de causalité ne permettent pas toujours d’assurer pleinement la fonction préventive du principe du pollueur-payeur. Elles ne constituent pas des instruments adéquats de gestion de la pollution diffuse ou chronique. En conséquence, des techniques de mutualisation de la gestion du risque environnemental se sont développées. Le recours à ces techniques de mutualisation (par le recours à l’assurance, aux fonds publics financés par la fiscalité environnementale ou aux marchés de droit d’émissions) est-il conforme au principe pollueur-payeur et permet-il d’atteindre l’objectif d’un niveau élevé de protection de l’environnement ? L’effet dissuasif du principe pollueur-payeur n’est-il pas amoindri par la mutualisation ? L’article montre que la définition du principe pollueur-payeur par la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne est centrée sur la contribution au risque de pollution ce qui permet de recourir aux techniques de mutualisation de la gestion du risque tout en respectant le Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne. 

Los tributos medioambientales: estudio comparado Andino

El desarrollo de la presente tesis es hacer un estudio comparativo de la implementación de los tributos Medioambientales en nuestro país, a partir de la experiencia de la Comunidad Europea quienes desarrollaron y siguen desarrollando la protección y conservación del Medio Ambiente a través de la imposición tributaria. En ese sentido partimos definiendo y precisando el término Medio Ambiente y ecología a fin de delimitar el tema de estudio, ya que el objetivo de la tesis es identificar las formas o mecanismos de protección del Medio Ambiente, enfatizando en la imposición Medioambiental que pueden ser a través de los impuestos, tasas o contribuciones; además de la consideración por nuestra Constitución del medio ambiente como un derecho humano fundamental de los seres humanos. Durante el desarrollo de la tesis, exponemos los instrumentos nacionales e internacionales, cuya finalidad busca garantizar la protección y conservación del Medio Ambiente, bajo el principio “quien contamina paga”, que no es otra cosa que la el criterio objetivo en la que el sujeto que deteriora o contamina el Medio Ambiente debe ser el responsable de reparar el daño causado. Finalmente analizamos la viabilidad de la protección del Medio Ambiente en los países andinos y en nuestro texto constitucional.

The need of sustainable buildings construction in the Kingdom of Bahrain

This thesis is aimed to initiate implementing sustainable building construction in the kingdom of Bahrain, i.e. Building-Integration PhotoVoltaic (BIPV) or Wind Energy (BIWE). It highlights the main constrains that discourage such modern concept in building and construction. Three groups have been questioned using a questionnaire. These are the policy and decision makers, the leading consultants and the contractors. The main constrains of the dissemination of BIVP and BIWE, according to the policy and decision makers, are: lack of knowledge and awareness of the public in sustainable technology, low cost of electricity, low cost of gas and oil and difficulty in applying local environmental taxes. The consultants had attributed the constrains to ignorance of life cycle cost of PV and Wind turbines systems, lack of education and knowledge in sustainable design, political system, shortage of markets importing sustainable technologies and client worries in profitability and pay-back period. The contractors are found to be very enthusiastic and ready to take over any sustainable building project and prefer to have a construction manger to coordinate between the design and contracting team. Design and Build is found the favorable procurement method in Bahrain for conducting BIPV or BIWE projects.