Compulsory licensing of standard-essential patents and injunctive relief as abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU

When a dominant undertaking holding a standard-essential patent uses its exclusive right to the IP to seek injunctions against those wishing to produce either de jure or de facto standard compliant products, it creates a conflict between the exclusive right to the use of the IP on the one hand and the possible abuse of dominance due to the exclusionary conduct on the other. The aim of the thesis is to focus on the issues concerning abuse of dominance in violation of Article 102 TFEU when the holder of the standard-essential patent seeks an injunction against a would-be licensee. The thesis is mainly based on the most recent ECJ case law in Huawei and the Commission’s recent decisions in Samsung and Motorola. The case law in Europe prior to those decisions was mainly focused on the German case law from Orange Book Standard which provided IP holders great leverage due to the almost automatic granting of injunctions against infringers. The ECJ in Huawei set out the requirements for when a de jure standard-essential patent holder would not be violating Article 102 TFEU when seeking an injunction, requiring that negotiations in good faith must take place prior to the seeking of the injunction and that all offers must comply with FRAND terms, thus limiting the scope of case law derived from Orange Book Standard in Germany. The ECJ chose not to follow all of the reasoning the Commission had laid out in Samsung and Motorola which provided a more licensee-friendly approach on the matter, but rather chose a compromise between the IP holder friendly German case law and the Commission’s decisions. However, the ECJ did not disclose how FRAND terms themselves should be interpreted, but rather left it for the national courts to decide. Furthermore, the thesis strongly argues that Huawei did not change the fact that only vertically integrated IP holders who have made a FRAND declaration are subject to the terms laid out in Huawei, thus leaving non-practicing entities such as patent trolls and entities that have not made a FRAND declaration outside its scope. The resulting conclusion from the thesis is that while the ECJ in Huawei presented new exceptional circumstances for when an IP holder could be abusing its dominant position when it seeks an injunction, it still left many more questions answered, such as the meaning of FRAND and whether deception in giving a FRAND declaration is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU or not.

Welfare provision in Sweden and the dominant position of the Sap

There have been almost fifty years since Harry Eckstein' s classic monograph, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, 1961), where he sketched out the basic tenets of the “congruence theory”, which was to become one of the most important and innovative contributions to understanding democratic rule. His next work, Division and Cohesion in Democracy, (Princeton University Press: 1966) is designed to serve as a plausibility probe for this 'theory' (ftn.) and is a case study of a Northern democratic system, Norway. What is more, this line of his work best exemplifies the contribution Eckstein brought to the methodology of comparative politics through his seminal article, “ “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” ” (in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, 1975), on the importance of the case study as an approach to empirical theory. This article demonstrates the special utility of “crucial case studies” in testing theory, thereby undermining the accepted wisdom in comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better. Although not along the same lines, but shifting the case study unit of research, I intend to take up here the challenge and build upon an equally unique political system, the Swedish one. Bearing in mind the peculiarities of the Swedish political system, my unit of analysis is going to be further restricted to the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Svenska Arbetare Partiet. However, my research stays within the methodological framework of the case study theory inasmuch as it focuses on a single political system and party. The Swedish SAP endurance in government office and its electoral success throughout half a century (ftn. As of the 1991 election, there were about 56 years - more than half century - of interrupted social democratic "reign" in Sweden.) are undeniably a performance no other Social Democrat party has yet achieved in democratic conditions. Therefore, it is legitimate to inquire about the exceptionality of this unique political power combination. Which were the different components of this dominance power position, which made possible for SAP's governmental office stamina? I will argue here that it was the end-product of a combination of multifarious factors such as a key position in the party system, strong party leadership and organization, a carefully designed strategy regarding class politics and welfare policy. My research is divided into three main parts, the historical incursion, the 'welfare' part and the 'environment' part. The first part is a historical account of the main political events and issues, which are relevant for my case study. Chapter 2 is devoted to the historical events unfolding in the 1920-1960 period: the Saltsjoebaden Agreement, the series of workers' strikes in the 1920s and SAP's inception. It exposes SAP's ascent to power in the mid 1930s and the party's ensuing strategies for winning and keeping political office, that is its economic program and key economic goals. The following chapter - chapter 3 - explores the next period, i.e. the period from 1960s to 1990s and covers the party's troubled political times, its peak and the beginnings of the decline. The 1960s are relevant for SAP's planning of a long term economic strategy - the Rehn Meidner model, a new way of macroeconomic steering, based on the Keynesian model, but adapted to the new economic realities of welfare capitalist societies. The second and third parts of this study develop several hypotheses related to SAP's 'dominant position' (endurance in politics and in office) and test them afterwards. Mainly, the twin issues of economics and environment are raised and their political relevance for the party analyzed. On one hand, globalization and its spillover effects over the Swedish welfare system are important causal factors in explaining the transformative social-economic challenges the party had to put up with. On the other hand, Europeanization and environmental change influenced to a great deal SAP's foreign policy choices and its domestic electoral strategies. The implications of globalization on the Swedish welfare system will make the subject of two chapters - chapters four and five, respectively, whereupon the Europeanization consequences will be treated at length in the third part of this work - chapters six and seven, respectively. Apparently, at first sight, the link between foreign policy and electoral strategy is difficult to prove and uncanny, in the least. However, in the SAP's case there is a bulk of literature and public opinion statistical data able to show that governmental domestic policy and party politics are in a tight dependence to foreign policy decisions and sovereignty issues. Again, these country characteristics and peculiar causal relationships are outlined in the first chapters and explained in the second and third parts. The sixth chapter explores the presupposed relationship between Europeanization and environmental policy, on one hand, and SAP's environmental policy formulation and simultaneous agenda-setting at the international level, on the other hand. This chapter describes Swedish leadership in environmental policy formulation on two simultaneous fronts and across two different time spans. The last chapter, chapter eight - while trying to develop a conclusion, explores the alternative theories plausible in explaining the outlined hypotheses and points out the reasons why these theories do not fit as valid alternative explanation to my systemic corporatism thesis as the main causal factor determining SAP's 'dominant position'. Among the alternative theories, I would consider Traedgaardh L. and Bo Rothstein's historical exceptionalism thesis and the public opinion thesis, which alone are not able to explain the half century social democratic endurance in government in the Swedish case.

“Nova” lei da concorrência de 2012 é mais justiça?

Quando foi publicado o “novo” Regime Jurídico da Concorrência (RJC) no D.R. de 8/5/12, logo se falou de “grande reforma no sector da concorrência” por “iluminados”. Acontece que de acordo com o art. 101º do RJC, a lei só entraria em vigor passados 60 dias. Até aqui tudo normal. É preciso uma “vacatio legis” para a adaptação dos destinatários, incluindo a Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC). Abstract: When published the "new" Legal Framework for Competition (RJC) in DR 05.08.12, soon spoke of "major reform in the competitive sector" by "enlightened". It turns out that according to art. 101 of the RJC, the law would only enter into force after 60 days. So far so normal. It takes a "vacatio legis" to adapt the recipients, including the Competition Authority (CA).

The abuse of intellectual property rights and regulations in China: a law and economic analysis

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

Crime Económico Não Esquecendo Crime Clássico

Fala-se hoje em dia muito e bem no crime económico e social. Crime de colarinho branco. Também crime da ocupação, profissional ou amadora. Falamos sobre direito penal económico e social. Fraude fiscal, corrupção, branqueamento de capitais, crimes da bolsa, abuso de posição dominante, etc.. Contudo, isto não podemos esquecer o crime clássico, furtos, roubos, danos, ofensas à integridade física, violação, tortura, ameaças, ofensas à honra, injúria ou difamação, abuso sexual (não apenas de crianças), violação, homicídios domésticos ou entre estranhos, etc.. § There is talk nowadays long and hard in the economic and social crime. White collar crime. Also crime of occupation, professional or amateur. We talk about economic and social criminal law. Tax fraud, corruption, money laundering, stock crimes, abuse of dominant position, etc .. However, this can not forget the classic crime, theft, robbery, damage, bodily harm, rape, torture, threats, insults to honor, slander or defamation, sexual abuse (not just children), rape, domestic or among strangers murders, etc ..

Compatibilidade do contrato de concessão comercial com as regras de defesa da concorrência

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

Avainhyödyke doktriinin kehitys ja soveltaminen Euroopan yhteisön kilpailuoikeudessa

Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan avainhyödyke doktriini kehittymistä ja sen soveltamista Euroopan yhteisön kilpailuoikeudessa. Avainhyödyke doktriinissa määräävässä markkina asemassa olevalla yrityksellä on hallussaan hyödyke, palvelu tai infrastruktuuri, jonka uudelleen tuottaminen samoilla markkinoilla ei ole kannattavaa. Määräävässä asemassa olevan yrityksen kilpailijoille tai alalle pyrkiville uusille yrityksille on kuitenkin välttämätöntä päästä käyttämään kyseistä avainhyödykettä, mikäli he haluavat toimia alalla. Tällaisissa tilanteissa avainhyödykkeen haltijalle voidaan asettaa kilpailuoikeudellinen velvollisuus ryhtyä liikesuhteeseen kilpailijoiden ja alalle pyrkivien yritysten kanssa. Avainhyödyke doktriinin soveltaminen nousee erityisen tärkeäksi aloilla, joilta on juuri purettu sääntely. Näillä aloilla doktriinin voidaan katsoa turvaavan jonkinlaisen tasapuolisuuden markkinoilla ja lisäävän kilpailua. Tästä huolimatta avainhyödyke doktriinia on kritisoitu runsaasti, sillä siinä ei oteta huomioon omistusoikeutta, sopimusvapautta tai yleensä taloudellisen toimijan autonomiaa. Avainhyödyke doktriinin kilpailuoikeudellisesta ristiriitaisuudesta olennaisena osoituksena on, ettei Euroopan yhteisön tuomioistuin ei ole ottanut kantaa doktriinin olemassaoloon.

La facultad de modificación unilateral en los contratos de distribución de acuerdo con la jurisprudencia arbitral

Las partes pueden pactar cláusulas de modificación unilateral en los contratos de distribución, puesto que dicha facultad se encuentra fundamentada en el ejercicio de la autonomía de la voluntad, por medio del cual las partes pueden elegir la manera y la figura mediante la cual van a desarrollar sus relaciones. Sin embargo, dicha facultad no es absoluta y tiene un límite en el orden público y las buenas costumbres. Particularmente en el contrato de distribución, por ser atípico, esta facultad presenta mayor relevancia pues al analizar sus elementos esenciales, no se puede acudir a la ley, sino que se debe acudir a la costumbre y a la práctica mercantil. Para analizar e interpretar la facultad de modificación unilateral, los tribunales arbitrales parten del principio de buena fe, a través del cual se analiza si el ejercicio de dicha facultad es abusivo, pues se ha establecido que este tipo de cláusulas no son en sí mismas abusivas. El análisis trazado se realiza de acuerdo con el del principio de la buena fe en las diferentes etapas de la negociación, debiendo estar presente a su vez durante toda la negociación y posteriormente durante su ejecución. Así, entonces, los árbitros analizan si la cláusula de modificación unilateral fue pactada, es decir que se revisa la validez de la misma y, en segundo lugar, se analiza si el ejercicio de la cláusula fue abusivo, es decir si conllevó a un abuso del derecho o a un abuso de la posición dominante en el contrato.

European Community Communications Law : An Introduction

The present article is an abridged version of a chapter to the book EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May, 2007). It provides an introduction to the rules at the European Community level governing the electronic communications sector (previously and more traditionally referred to as telecommunications). Such an introduction encompasses essentially an enquiry into the relevant competition law rules, of which here particular attention is paid to abuse of dominant position and the essential facilities doctrine, as well as an analysis of the EC sector specific regulatory framework, which has substantially evolved since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector back in the beginning of the 1990s. It is the objective of the article to explore to what extent both regulatory tools could deal with the specificities of communications markets, and where they may fail to do so.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

The AstraZeneca Case. Research Papers in Law, 4/2007

Introduction. On June 2005, after a five year investigation, the Commission imposed a 60 millions euros fine on AstraZeneca (hereinafter AZ) for having abused its dominant position in several Member States in the market for proton-pump inhibitors (PPI)2. It was alleged that AZ misused the patent system and procedures for marketing pharmaceuticals to block or delay the entry of generic competitors and parallel traders to its ulcer drug Losec3. This decision is a seminal one. The political and legal importance of the CFI judgment that will review the case (and the ECJ appeal that is likely to follow) cannot be understated. On the one hand the incentive to innovate and to undertake R&D is at stake, on the other, the uncertain boundaries between competition and intellectual property law should once again be explored. In contrast to the US, where many cases concerning the abuse of regulatory and governmental procedures have already been dealt with competition authorities and courts, it is the first time in Europe that such conduct is subject to scrutiny through an anti-trust lens. Moreover, following the appeal brought by AZ against the Commission decision, the CFI will be confronted for the first time with an abuse of a dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector, which explains why this judgment is eagerly anticipated4.

Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

TechFrame's internationalization plan: Next stop UK

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics