Tiered Pricing and Cost Functions: Are Equity, Cost Recovery and Economic Efficiency Compatible Goals?

Suppliers of water and energy are frequently natural monopolies, with their pricing regulated by governmental agencies. Pricing schemes are evaluated by the efficiency of the resource allocation they lead to, the capacity of the utilities to capture their costs and the distributional effects of the policies, in particular, impacts on the poor. One pricing approach has been average cost pricing, which guarantees cost recovery and allows utilities to provide their product at relatively low prices. However, average cost pricing leads to economically inefficient consumption levels, when sources of water and energy are limited and increasing the supply is costly. An alternative approach is increasing block rates (hereafter, IBR or tiered pricing), where individuals pay a low rate for an initial consumption block and a higher rate as they increase use beyond that block. An example of IBR is shown in Figure 1 (on next page), which shows a rate structure for residential water use. With the rates in Figure 1, a household would be charged $0.46 and $0.71 per hundred gallons for consumption below and above 21,000 gallons per month, respectively.

Regulatory strategies for construction site erosion control programs : forms, costs, and cost recovery mechanisms : contractor assistance for the cost of financing regulatory programs /

"December, 1980."

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs.

Custo histórico versus justo valor

Oriêntador: Mestre Carlos Pedro

Quality costs analysis: case study in the automotive industry

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia e Gestão Industrial

Insecticide treated mosquito nets for malaria control in India-experience from a tribal area on operational feasibility and uptake

The study assessed the operational feasibility and acceptability of insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) in one Primary Health Centre (PHC) in a falciparum malaria endemic district in the state of Orissa, India, where 74% of the people are tribes and DDT indoor residual spraying had been withdrawn and ITNs introduced by the National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme. To a population of 63,920, 24,442 ITNs were distributed free of charge through 101 treatment centers during July-August 2002. Interview of 1,130, 1,012 and 126 respondents showed that the net use rates were 80%, 74% and 55% in the cold, rainy and summer seasons, respectively. Since using ITNs, 74.5-76.6% of the respondents observed reduction of mosquito bites and 7.2-32.1% reduction of malaria incidence; 37% expressed willingness to buy ITNs if the cost was lower and they were affordable. Up to ten months post-treatment, almost 100% mortality of vector mosquitoes was recorded on unwashed and washed nets (once or twice). Health workers re-treated the nets at the treatment centers eight months after distribution on a cost-recovery basis. The coverage reported by the PHC was only 4.2%, mainly because of unwillingness of the people to pay for re-treatment and to go to the treatment centers from their villages. When the re-treatment was continued at the villages involving personnel from several departments, the coverage improved to about 90%.Interview of 126 respondents showed that among those who got their nets re-treated, 81.4% paid cash for the re-treatment and the remainder were reluctant to pay. Majority of those who paid said that they did so due to the fear that if they did not do so they would lose benefits from other government welfare schemes. The 2nd re-treatment was therefore carried out free of charge nine months after the 1st re-treatment and thus achieved coverage of 70.4%. The study showed community acceptance to use ITNs as they perceived the benefit. Distribution and re-treatment of nets was thus possible through the PHC system, if done free of charge and when personnel from different departments, especially those at village level, were involved.

Subsidios cruzados en servicios públicos domiciliarios basados en el avalúo catastral

Este artículo presenta una primera propuesta de determinación de subsidios y contribuciones de tarifas de servicios públicos domiciliarios – SPD para la Capital colombiana, que no parta de una clasificación de grupos (estratos socioeconómicos). A partir de un ejercicio exploratorio, se diseña un esquema de pagos del servicio de acueducto a partir del avalúo catastral del inmueble en que habita cada hogar. El ejercicio establece el pago por unidad de consumo de agua, de manera que cada hogar en Bogotá destine una misma proporción de su gasto total al gasto en el servicio de acueducto y garantiza que el total de pagos cubran los costos de provisión del servicio.

Protecting developing countries' forests: enforcement in theory and practice

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identify large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple tiers of enforcement and the incentives facing enforcement officers, and conflict between protected area managers and rural people's needs.

Estudio y diseño de un régimen fiscal que optimice la inversión en exploración y producción de hidrocarburos

Los regímenes fiscales que se aplican a los contratos de exploración y desarrollo de petróleo y gas, entre los propietarios del recurso natural (generalmente el país soberano representado por su gobierno) y las compañías operadoras internacionales (COI) que aportan capital, experiencia y tecnología, no han sabido responder a la reciente escalada de los precios del crudo y han dado lugar a que los países productores no estén recibiendo la parte de renta correspondiente al incremento de precios. Esto ha provocado una ola de renegociaciones llegándose incluso a la imposición unilateral de nuevos términos por parte de algunos gobiernos entre los que destacan el caso de Venezuela y Argentina, por ser los más radicales. El objetivo del presente trabajo es el estudio y diseño de un régimen fiscal que, en las actuales condiciones del mercado, consiga que los gobiernos optimicen sus ingresos incentivando la inversión. Para ello se simulan los efectos de siete tipos diferentes de fiscalidades aplicadas a dos yacimientos de características muy distintas y se valoran los resultados. El modelo utilizado para la simulación es el modelo de escenarios, ampliamente utilizado tanto por la comunidad académica como por la industria para comparar el comportamiento de diferentes regímenes fiscales. Para decidir cuál de las fiscalidades estudiadas es la mejor se emplea un método optimización multicriterio. Los criterios que se han aplicado para valorar los resultados recogen la opinión de expertos de la industria sobre qué factores se consideran deseables en un contrato a la hora invertir. El resultado permite delinear las características de un marco fiscal ideal del tipo acuerdo de producción compartida, sin royalties, con un límite alto de recuperación de crudo coste que permita recobrar todos los costes operativos y una parte de los de capital en cualquier escenario de precios, un reparto de los beneficios en función de un indicador de rentabilidad como es la TIR, con un mecanismo de recuperación de costes adicional (uplift) que incentive la inversión y con disposiciones que premien la exploración y más la de alto riesgo como la amortización acelerada de los gastos de capital o una ampliación de la cláusula de ringfence. Un contrato con estas características permitirá al gobierno optimizar los ingresos obtenidos de sus reservas de petróleo y gas maximizando la producción al atraer inversión para la exploración y mejorar la recuperación alargando la vida del yacimiento. Además al reducir el riesgo percibido por el inversor que recupera sus costes, menor será la rentabilidad exigida al capital invertido y por tanto mayor la parte de esos ingresos que irá a parar al gobierno del país productor. ABSTRACT Fiscal systems used in petroleum arrangements between the owners of the resource (usually a sovereign country represented by its government) and the international operating company (IOC) that provides capital, knowhow and technology, have failed to allocate profits from the recent escalation of oil prices and have resulted in producing countries not receiving the right share of that increase. This has caused a wave of renegotiations and even in some cases, like Venezuela and Argentina, government unilaterally imposed new terms. This paper aims to outline desirable features of a petroleum fiscal system, under current market conditions, for governments to maximize their revenues while encouraging investment. Firstly the impact of seven different types of fiscal regimes is studied with a simulation for two separate oil fields using the scenario approach. The scenario approach has been frequently employed by academic and business researchers to compare the performance of diverse fiscal regimes. In order to decide which of the fiscal regimes’ performance is best we used a multi-objective optimization decision making approach to assess the results. The criteria applied gather the preferences of a panel of industry experts about the desirable features of a contract when making investment decisions. The results show the characteristics of an ideal fiscal framework that closely resembles a production sharing contract, with no royalty payment and a high cost recovery limit that allows the IOC to recover all operating expenses and a share of its capital costs under any price scenario, a profit oil sharing mechanism based on a profitability indicator such as the ROR, with an uplift that allows to recover an additional percentage of capital costs and provisions that promote exploration investment, specially high-risk exploration, such as accelerated depreciation for capital costs and a wide definition of the ringfence clause. A contract with these features will allow governments to optimize overall revenues from its petroleum resources maximizing production by promoting investment on exploration and extending oil fields life. Also by reducing the investor’s perception of risk it will reduce the minimum return to capital required by the IOC and therefore it will increase the government share of those revenues.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Why Do Some Water Utilities Recycle More than Others? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis in New South Wales, Australia

Although the recycling of municipal wastewater can play an important role in water supply security and ecosystem protection, the percentage of wastewater recycled is generally low and strikingly variable. Previous research has employed detailed case studies to examine the factors that contribute to recycling success but usually lacks a comparative perspective across cases. In this study, 25 water utilities in New South Wales, Australia, were compared using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This research method applies binary logic and set theory to identify the minimal combinations of conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome to occur within the set of cases analyzed. The influence of six factors (rainfall, population density, coastal or inland location, proximity to users; cost recovery and revenue for water supply services) was examined for two outcomes, agricultural use and "heavy" (i.e., commercial/municipal/industrial) use. Each outcome was explained by two different pathways, illustrating that different combinations of conditions are associated with the same outcome. Generally, while economic factors are crucial for heavy use, factors relating to water stress and geographical proximity matter most for agricultural reuse. These results suggest that policies to promote wastewater reuse may be most effective if they target uses that are most feasible for utilities and correspond to the local context. This work also makes a methodological contribution through illustrating the potential utility of fsQCA for understanding the complex drivers of performance in water recycling.

Self-insuring environmental liabilities : a residual risk-bearer’s perspective

Peer reviewed

Increased water charges improve efficiency and equity in an irrigation system

Conventional wisdom in many agricultural systems across the world is that farmers cannot, will not, or should not pay the full costs associated with surface water delivery. Across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only a handful can claim complete recovery of operation, maintenance, and capital costs; across Central and South Asia, fees are lower still, with farmers in Nepal, India, and Kazakhstan paying fractions of a U.S. penny for a cubic meter of water. In Pakistan, fees amount to roughly USD 1-2 per acre per season. However, farmers in Pakistan spend orders of magnitude more for diesel fuel to pump groundwater each season, suggesting a latent willingness to spend for water that, under the right conditions, could potentially be directed toward water-use fees for surface water supply. Although overall performance could be expected to improve with greater cost recovery, asymmetric access to water in canal irrigation systems leaves the question open as to whether those benefits would be equitably shared among all farmers in the system. We develop an agent-based model (ABM) of a small irrigation command to examine efficiency and equity outcomes across a range of different cost structures for the maintenance of the system, levels of market development, and assessed water charges. We find that, robust to a range of different cost and structural conditions, increased water charges lead to gains in both efficiency and concomitant improvements in equity as investments in canal infrastructure and system maintenance improve the conveyance of water resources further down watercourses. This suggests that, under conditions in which (1) farmers are currently spending money to pump groundwater to compensate for a failing surface water system, and (2) there is the possibility that through initial investment to provide perceptibly better water supply, genuine win-win solutions can be attained through higher water-use fees to beneficiary farmers.

DEVELOPMENT OF A FAIR CHARGING MODEL FOR A PUBLIC DATA CENTER

The purpose of the study was to explore how a public, IT services transferor, organization, comprised of autonomous entities, can effectively develop and organize its data center cost recovery mechanisms in a fair manner. The lack of a well-defined model for charges and a cost recovery scheme could cause various problems. For example one entity may be subsidizing the costs of another entity(s). Transfer pricing is in the best interest of each autonomous entity in a CCA. While transfer pricing plays a pivotal role in the price settings of services and intangible assets, TCE focuses on the arrangement at the boundary between entities. TCE is concerned with the costs, autonomy, and cooperation issues of an organization. The theory is concern with the factors that influence intra-firm transaction costs and attempting to manifest the problems involved in the determination of the charges or prices of the transactions. This study was carried out, as a single case study, in a public organization. The organization intended to transfer the IT services of its own affiliated public entities and was in the process of establishing a municipal-joint data center. Nine semi-structured interviews, including two pilot interviews, were conducted with the experts and managers of the case company and its affiliating entities. The purpose of these interviews was to explore the charging and pricing issues of the intra-firm transactions. In order to process and summarize the findings, this study employed qualitative techniques with the multiple methods of data collection. The study, by reviewing the TCE theory and a sample of transfer pricing literature, created an IT services pricing framework as a conceptual tool for illustrating the structure of transferring costs. Antecedents and consequences of the transfer price based on TCE were developed. An explanatory fair charging model was eventually developed and suggested. The findings of the study suggested that the Chargeback system was inappropriate scheme for an organization with affiliated autonomous entities. The main contribution of the study was the application of TP methodologies in the public sphere with no tax issues consideration.