Transitory Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict

I examine whether civil conflict is triggered by transitory negative economic shocks. My approach follows Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) in using rainfall as an exogenous source of economic shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries. The main difference is that my empirical specifications take into account that rainfall shocks are transitory. Failure to do so may, for example, lead to the conclusion that civil conflict is more likely to break out following negative rainfall shocks when conflict is most probable following years with exceptionally high rainfall levels.

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment

Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) argue that lowerrainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks increase conflictrisk in Sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion rests on theirfinding of a negative correlation between conflict in t andrainfall growth between t-1 and t-2. I argue that this findingis driven by a positive correlation between conflict in t andrainfall levels in t-2. If lower rainfall levels or negativerainfall shocks increased conflict, one might have expectedMSS s finding to reflect a negative correlation betweenconflict in t and rainfall levels in t-1. In the latest data,conflict is unrelated to rainfall.

Population Size and Civil Conflict Risk: Is There A Causal Link?

[spa] La estimación del impacto del tamaño de la populación sobre la probabilidad de conflicto civil se complica por el sesgo de endogeneidad y las variables omitidas. Este artículo trata el problema de causalidad utilizando métodos de variables instrumentales en un panel de 37 países del África Sub-sahariana en el período 1981-2004. Encontramos que un aumento de la población en un 1% aumenta la probabilidad de conflicto civil por un 5.2%.

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia

¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.

Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda

We study the effect of civil conflict on social capital, focusing on Uganda's experience during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document large causal effects on trust and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of ethnic conflicts in 2002-2005. We exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer (Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Uganda, 2000, 2008), including information on socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level, and geo-referenced measures of fighting events from ACLED. Our identification strategy exploits variations in the both the spatial and ethnic intensity of fighting. We find that more intense fighting decreases generalized trust and increases ethnic identity. The effects are quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of violence, and different statistical techniques involving ethnic and spatial fixed effects and instrumental variables. Controlling for the intensity of violence during the conflict, we also document that post-conflict economic recovery is slower in ethnically fractionalized counties. Our findings are consistent with the existence of a self-reinforcing process between conflicts and ethnic cleavages.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

El análisis de las relaciones regionales de Sierra Leona en materia de seguridad bajo el marco de Mano River Union después de la guerra civil, 2002-2007

En 1973 se establece una asociación internacional entre Liberia y Sierra Leona llamada Mano River Union (MRU) con el objetivo de establecer una integración económica subregional, a la cual Guinea se integró en 1980. Tras el final de los conflictos civiles en la región, en el 2004 se lleva a cabo la Inauguración del Foro de Paz de Mano River Union, en el cual se establecieron nuevos parámetros para el funcionamiento del grupo subregional el cual está basado en identificar las amenazas comunes y actuar en conjunto frente a ellas. Dentro de las amenazas que tienen el potencial de debilitar la seguridad de la región y así mismo, debilitar las estructuras estatales, se establecen a los problemas de gobernanza, las amenazas fronterizas y los temas de refugiados como los más importantes a tratar.

Conflict-induced poverty: Evidence from Colombia

En Colombia, la pobreza y el conflicto están estrechamente relacionados. Este estudio usa medidas de disuasión del gobierno como instrumentos de varias variables específicas de conflicto para estimar el impacto del conflicto sobre la pobreza en Colombia. Usando datos del censo a nivel municipal para el año 2005, evalúo el efecto sobre la incidencia urbana y rural del recientemente-desarrollado Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que el conflicto aumenta significativamente la pobreza rural. Esto es consistente con el hecho que la mayor parte del conflicto en Colombia ocurre en las áreas rurales. También evalúo el efecto rezagado del conflicto en la pobreza para concluir que éste dura por al menos tres años pero que decae en el tiempo. Finalmente, pruebo que mis resultados son robustos a una batería de especificaciones adicionales, incluyendo una versión modificada de mi variable dependiente y el uso de una base alternativa de conflicto.