934 resultados para budget deficit
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"November 7, 2005."
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The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.
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Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities. The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible. To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy. We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with dynamical stability of the economy. We show that, if we take supply-side effects into ac-count, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions. We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy. The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks. The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit. Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias. We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions. With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.
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The use of a contractive fiscal policy in times of crisis and austerity can lead to so many different opinion streams which can be, at the same time, very opposite with each other. The high budget deficit in some economies has forced the eurozone to implement austerity policies, meaning that the debate is now more alive than ever. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of the implementation of a contractive policy during a crisis considering the case of Spain. The positive effects in financial markets were noticed due to the decrease of the risk premium and the payment of interests, and also thanks to the increase of trust towards Spain. This way, the reduction of the Spanish deficit was remarkable but in any case there is still a long path until reaching the limit of 3% of the GDP. Also, in the short run it is possible to see that the consolidation had contractive effects in the economic activity but, in the long run, the debate is among the defenders of the fact that austerity is followed by a growing period and the ones opposing to it due to the drowning effect produced by it.
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Full Text / Article complet
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Desenvolvem-se neste artigo as bases teóricas da contabilidade com juros reais. A Seção 11 apresenta uma evidência empírica que corrobora, do ponto de vista macroeconômico, a utilização de juros reais no cálculo do déficit público. A Seção 111 descreve a metodologia de cálculo com juros reais. Inicialmente apenas no tocante aos ativos financeiros denominados em moeda doméstica e, em seguida, analisando tambem o caso em que tais ativos se denominam em moeda estrangeira. As seções IV e V visam apenas a exemplificar, tomando-se como base as contas do setor público brasileiro, a utilização da metodologia aqui apresentada. Calcula-se aí, a partir dos dados da dívida líquida do setor público publicados pelo Banco Central, o deficit real do governo e a diferença entre juros nominais e reais liquidamente pagos pela dívida pública. A seção VI• apresenta uma série histórica de imposto inflacionário e transferência inflacionária (a favor dos bancos comerciais) para o Brasil. A Seção VII estende toda a metodologia de cálculo com juros reais à Contabilidade Social. Introduz-se também a contabilidade operacional, onde a discriminação entre juros reais e nominais se estende a todos os ativos financeiros da economia, exceto ã base monetária. Um resultado importante dessa seção é mostrar que as tautologias usualmente utilizadas nas Contas Nacionais são válidas em qualquer contabilidade, seja ela nominal, real ou operacional. Por último, a Seção VIII mostra que todo este arcabouço pode ser visualizado como uma extensão dos mecanismos de correção de lucros das empresas, amplamente utilizados no Brasil desde 1964.
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This paper contributes to the debate on whether the Brazilian public debt is sustainable or not in the long run by considering threshold effects on the Brazilian Budget Deficit. Using data from 1947 to 1999 and a threshold autoregressive model, we find evidence of delays in fiscal stabilization. As suggested in Alesina (1991), delayed stabilizations reflect the existence of political constraints blocking deficit cuts, which are relaxed only when the budget deficit reaches a sufficiently high level, deemed to be unsustainable. In particular, our results suggest that, in the absence of seignorage, only when the increase in the budget deficit reaches 1.74% of the GDP will fiscal authorities intervene to reduce the deficit. If seignorage is allowed, the threshold increases to 2.2%, suggesting that seignorage makes government more tolerant to fiscal imbalances.
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Highly indebted countries, particularly the Latin American ones, presented dismal economic outcomes in the 1990s, which are the consequence of the ‘growth cum foreign savings strategy’, or the Second Washington Consensus. Coupled with liberalization of international financial flows, such strategy, which did not make part of the first consensus, led the countries, in the wave of a new world wide capital flow cycle, to high current account deficits and increase in foreign debt, ignoring the solvency constraint and the debt threshold. In practical terms it involved overvalued currencies (low exchange rates) and high interest rates; in policy terms, the attempt to control de budget deficit while the current account deficit was ignored. The paradoxical consequence was the adoption by highly indebted countries of ‘exchange rate populism’, a less obvious but more dangerous form of economic populism.
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Includes bibliography
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This thesis analysis micro and macro aspect of applied fiscal policy issues. The first chapter investigates the extent to which local budget spending composition reacts to fiscal rules variations. I consider the budget of Italian municipalities and exploit specific changes in the Domestic Stability Pact’s rules, to perform a difference-in-discontinuities analysis. The results show that imposing a cap on the total amount of consumption and investment is not as binding as two caps, one for consumption and a different one for investment. More specifically, consumption is triggered by changes in wages and services spending, while investment relies on infrastructure movements. In addition, there is evidence that when an increase in investment is achieved, there is also a higher budget deficit level. The second chapter intends to analyze the extent to which fiscal policy shocks are able to affect macrovariables during business cycle fluctuations, differentiating among three intervention channels: public taxation, consumption and investment. The econometric methodology implemented is a Panel Vector Autoregressive model with a structural characterization. The results show that fiscal shocks have different multipliers in relation to expansion or contraction periods: output does not react during good times while there are significant effects in bad ones. The third chapter evaluates the effects of fiscal policy announcements by the Italian government on the long-term sovereign bond spread of Italy relative to Germany. After collecting data on relevant fiscal policy announcements, we perform an econometric comparative analysis between the three cabinets that followed one another during the period 2009-2013. The results suggest that only fiscal policy announcements made by members of Monti’s cabinet have been effective in influencing significantly the Italian spread in the expected direction, revealing a remarkable credibility gap between Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments with respect to Monti’s administration.
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This paper reviews the relationship between public sector investment and private sector investment through government expenditures financed by government bonds in the Japanese economy. This study hypothesizes that deficit financing by bond issues does not crowd out private sector investment, and this finance method may crowd in. Thus the government increases bond issues and sells them in the domestic and international financial markets. This method does not affect interest rates because they are insensitive to government expenditures and they depend on interest rates levels in the international financial market more than in the domestic financial market because of globalization and integration among financial markets.
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The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government consumption expenditure in developing countries and estimates the determinants which have influenced government expenditure. Using a panel data set for 111 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables significantly influence government expenditure. Among other results, the paper finds new evidence of Wagner's law which states that peoples' demand for service and willingness to pay is income-elastic hence the expansion of public economy is influenced by the greater economic affluence of a nation (Cameron1978). Corruption is found to be influential in explaining the public expenditure of developing countries. On the contrary, size of the economy and fractionalization are found to have significant negative association with government expenditure. In addition, the study finds evidence that public expenditure significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other form of governance.
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The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.
Exploring civil servant resistance to M-government:a story of transition and opportunities in Turkey
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The concept of mobility, related to technology in particular, has evolved dramatically over the last two decades including: (i) hardware ranging from walkmans to Ipods, laptops to netbooks, PDAs to 3G mobile phone; (ii) software supporting multiple audio and video formats driven by ubiquitous mobile wireless access, WiMax, automations such as radio frequency ID tracking and location aware services. Against the background of increasing budget deficit, along with the imperative for efficiency gains, leveraging ICT and mobility promises for work related tasks, in a public administration context, in emerging markets, point to multiple possible paths. M-government transition involve both technological changes and adoption to deliver government services differently (e.g. 24/7, error free, anywhere to the same standards) but also the design of digital strategies including possibly competing m-government models, the re-shaping of cultural practices, the creation of m-policies and legislations, the structuring of m-services architecture, and progress regarding m-governance. While many emerging countries are already offering e-government services and are gearing-up for further m-government activities, little is actually known about the resistance that is encountered, as a reflection of civil servants' current standing, before any further macro-strategies are deployed. Drawing on the resistance and mobility literature, this chapter investigates how civil servants' behaviors, in an emerging country technological environment, through their everyday practice, react and resist the influence of m-government transition. The findings points to four main type of resistance namely: i) functional resistance; ii) ideological resistance; iii) market driven resistance and iv) geographical resistance. Policy implication are discussed in the specific context of emerging markets. © 2011, IGI Global.