Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

On bounds for network revenue management

The Network Revenue Management problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem (DP or the\optimal" solution V *) whose exact solution is computationally intractable. Consequently, a number of heuristics have been proposed in the literature, the most popular of which are the deterministic linear programming (DLP) model, and a simulation based method, the randomized linear programming (RLP) model. Both methods give upper bounds on the optimal solution value (DLP and PHLP respectively). These bounds are used to provide control values that can be used in practice to make accept/deny decisions for booking requests. Recently Adelman [1] and Topaloglu [18] have proposed alternate upper bounds, the affine relaxation (AR) bound and the Lagrangian relaxation (LR) bound respectively, and showed that their bounds are tighter than the DLP bound. Tight bounds are of great interest as it appears from empirical studies and practical experience that models that give tighter bounds also lead to better controls (better in the sense that they lead to more revenue). In this paper we give tightened versions of three bounds, calling themsAR (strong Affine Relaxation), sLR (strong Lagrangian Relaxation) and sPHLP (strong Perfect Hindsight LP), and show relations between them. Speciffically, we show that the sPHLP bound is tighter than sLR bound and sAR bound is tighter than the LR bound. The techniques for deriving the sLR and sPHLP bounds can potentially be applied to other instances of weakly-coupled dynamic programming.

Subcontract and supply enquiries in the tender process of contractors

In the tender process, contractors often rely on subcontract and supply enquiries to calculate their bid prices. However, this integral part of the bidding process is not empirically articulated in the literature. Over 30 published materials on the tendering process of contractors that talk about enquiries were reviewed and found to be based mainly on experiential knowledge rather than systematic evidence. The empirical research here helps to describe the process of enquiries precisely, improve it in practice, and have some basis to support it in theory. Using a live participant observation case study approach, the whole tender process was shadowed in the offices of two of the top 20 UK civil engineering construction firms. This helped to investigate 15 research questions on how contractors enquire and obtain prices from subcontractors and suppliers. Forty-three subcontract enquiries and 18 supply enquiries were made across two different projects with average value of 7m. An average of 15 subcontract packages and seven supply packages was involved. Thus, two or three subcontractors or suppliers were invited to bid in each package. All enquiries were formulated by the estimator, with occasional involvement of three other personnel. Most subcontract prices were received in an average of 14 working days; and supply prices took five days. The findings show 10 main activities involved in processing enquiries and their durations, as well as wasteful practices associated with enquiries. Contractors should limit their enquiry invitations to a maximum of three per package, and optimize the waiting time for quotations in order to improve cost efficiency.

Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Three essays on liquidity

Doutoramento em Gestão.

LMP based bid formation for virtual power players operating in smart grids

Power system organization has gone through huge changes in the recent years. Significant increase in distributed generation (DG) and operation in the scope of liberalized markets are two relevant driving forces for these changes. More recently, the smart grid (SG) concept gained increased importance, and is being seen as a paradigm able to support power system requirements for the future. This paper proposes a computational architecture to support day-ahead Virtual Power Player (VPP) bid formation in the smart grid context. This architecture includes a forecasting module, a resource optimization and Locational Marginal Price (LMP) computation module, and a bid formation module. Due to the involved problems characteristics, the implementation of this architecture requires the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are used for resource and load forecasting and Evolutionary Particle Swarm Optimization (EPSO) is used for energy resource scheduling. The paper presents a case study that considers a 33 bus distribution network that includes 67 distributed generators, 32 loads and 9 storage units.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.

Back from beyond the bid-ask spread: perspectives on liquidity

Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the availability of data. Although bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to researchers, Roll (1984) provided a conceptual model that estimated the effective bid-ask prices from regular time series data, recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data availability improved and researchers were able to address questions regarding the factors that influenced the spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. More recently transaction data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the impact of transactions on price movements (Clayton and McKinnon, 2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This paper aims to use techniques that combine elements from all three approaches and, by studying US data over a relatively long time period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous factors such as market, age and size of REIT. It also reveals some comparable results for the UK market over the same period.

Is the Australian wool futures market efficient as a predictor of spot prices?

Giles and Goss (1980) have suggested that, if a futures market provides a forward pricing function, then it is an efficient market. In this article a simple test for whether the Australian Wool Futures market is efficient is proposed. The test is based on applying cointegration techniques to test the Law of One Price over a three, six, nine, and twelve month spread of futures prices. We found that the futures market is efficient for up to a six-month spread, but no further into the future. Because futures market prices can be used to predict spot prices up to six months in advance, woolgrowers can use the futures price to assess when they market their clip, but not for longer-term production planning decisions. (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Qualitative assessment of stock prices listed on the Sao Paulo stock exchange: An approach from the perspective of homogeneity analysis

The stock market suffers uncertain relations throughout the entire negotiation process, with different variables exerting direct and indirect influence on stock prices. This study focuses on the analysis of certain aspects that may influence these values offered by the capital market, based on the Brazil Index of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), which selects 100 stocks among the most traded on Bovespa in terms of number of trades and financial volume. The selected variables are characterized by the companies` activity area and the business volume in the month of data collection, i.e. April/2007. This article proposes an analysis that joins the accounting view of the stock price variables that can be influenced with the use of multivariate qualitative data analysis. Data were explored through Correspondence Analysis (Anacor) and Homogeneity Analysis (Homals). According to the research, the selected variables are associated with the values presented by the stocks, which become an internal control instrument and a decision-making tool when it comes to choosing investments.