Rapid and Proactive Approach on Exploration of Database Vulnerabilities

In today's complicated computing environment, managing data has become the primary concern of all industries. Information security is the greatest challenge and it has become essential to secure the enterprise system resources like the databases and the operating systems from the attacks of the unknown outsiders. Our approach plays a major role in detecting and managing vulnerabilities in complex computing systems. It allows enterprises to assess two primary tiers through a single interface as a vulnerability scanner tool which provides a secure system which is also compatible with the security compliance of the industry. It provides an overall view of the vulnerabilities in the database, by automatically scanning them with minimum overhead. It gives a detailed view of the risks involved and their corresponding ratings. Based on these priorities, an appropriate mitigation process can be implemented to ensure a secured system. The results show that our approach could effectively optimize the time and cost involved when compared to the existing systems

Web application protection against SQL injection attack

SQL injection vulnerabilities poses a severe threat to web applications as an SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA) could adopt new obfuscation techniques to evade and thwart countermeasures such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). SQLIA gains access to the back-end database of vulnerable websites, allowing hackers to execute SQL commands in a web application resulting in financial fraud and website defacement. The lack of existing models in providing protections against SQL injection has motivated this paper to present a new and enhanced model against web database intrusions that use SQLIA techniques. In this paper, we propose a novel concept of negative tainting along with SQL keyword analysis for preventing SQLIA and described our that we implemented. We have tested our proposed model on all types of SQLIA techniques by generating SQL queries containing legitimate SQL commands and SQL Injection Attack. Evaluations have been performed using three different applications. The results show that our model protects against 100% of tested attacks before even reaching the database layer.

Applied web traffic analysis for numerical encoding of SQL Injection attack features.

SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA) remains a technique used by a computer network intruder to pilfer an organisation’s confidential data. This is done by an intruder re-crafting web form’s input and query strings used in web requests with malicious intent to compromise the security of an organisation’s confidential data stored at the back-end database. The database is the most valuable data source, and thus, intruders are unrelenting in constantly evolving new techniques to bypass the signature’s solutions currently provided in Web Application Firewalls (WAF) to mitigate SQLIA. There is therefore a need for an automated scalable methodology in the pre-processing of SQLIA features fit for a supervised learning model. However, obtaining a ready-made scalable dataset that is feature engineered with numerical attributes dataset items to train Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Machine Leaning (ML) models is a known issue in applying artificial intelligence to effectively address ever evolving novel SQLIA signatures. This proposed approach applies numerical attributes encoding ontology to encode features (both legitimate web requests and SQLIA) to numerical data items as to extract scalable dataset for input to a supervised learning model in moving towards a ML SQLIA detection and prevention model. In numerical attributes encoding of features, the proposed model explores a hybrid of static and dynamic pattern matching by implementing a Non-Deterministic Finite Automaton (NFA). This combined with proxy and SQL parser Application Programming Interface (API) to intercept and parse web requests in transition to the back-end database. In developing a solution to address SQLIA, this model allows processed web requests at the proxy deemed to contain injected query string to be excluded from reaching the target back-end database. This paper is intended for evaluating the performance metrics of a dataset obtained by numerical encoding of features ontology in Microsoft Azure Machine Learning (MAML) studio using Two-Class Support Vector Machines (TCSVM) binary classifier. This methodology then forms the subject of the empirical evaluation.

Analysis of indirect message injection for MAC generation using stream ciphers

This paper presents a model for generating a MAC tag with a stream cipher using the input message indirectly. Several recent proposals represent instances of this model with slightly different options. We investigate the security of this model for different options, and identify cases which permit forgery attacks. Based on this, we present a new forgery attack on version 1.4 of 128-EIA3. Design recommendations to enhance the security of proposals following this general model are given.

Indirect message injection for MAC generation

This paper presents a model for the generation of a MAC tag using a stream cipher. The input message is used indirectly to control segments of the keystream that form the MAC tag. Several recent proposals can be considered as instances of this general model, as they all perform message accumulation in this way. However, they use slightly different processes in the message preparation and finalisation phases. We examine the security of this model for different options and against different types of attack, and conclude that the indirect injection model can be used to generate MAC tags securely for certain combinations of options. Careful consideration is required at the design stage to avoid combinations of options that result in susceptibility to forgery attacks. Additionally, some implementations may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks if used in Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithms. We give design recommendations to provide resistance to these attacks for proposals following this model.

Practical Modbus flooding attack and detection

The Modicon Communication Bus (Modbus) protocol is one of the most commonly used protocols in industrial control systems. Modbus was not designed to provide security. This paper confirms that the Modbus protocol is vulnerable to flooding attacks. These attacks involve injection of commands that result in disrupting the normal operation of the control system. This paper describes a set of experiments that shows that an anomaly-based change detection algorithm and signature-based Snort threshold module are capable of detecting Modbus flooding attacks. In comparing these intrusion detection techniques, we find that the signature-based detection requires a carefully selected threshold value, and that the anomaly-based change detection algorithm may have a short delay before detecting the attacks depending on the parameters used. In addition, we also generate a network traffic dataset of flooding attacks on the Modbus control system protocol.

Vascular attack by 5,6-dimethylxanthenone-4-acetic acid combined with B7.1 (CD80)-mediated immunotherapy overcomes immune resistance and leads to the eradication of large tumors and multiple tumor foci

The promise of cancer immunotherapy is that it will not only eradicate primary tumors but will generate systemic antitumor immunity capable of destroying distant metastases. A major problem that must first be surmounted relates to the immune resistance of large tumors. Here we reveal that immune resistance can be overcome by combining immunotherapy with a concerted attack on the tumor vasculature. The functionally related antitumor drugs 5,6-dimethylxanthenone-4-acetic acid (DMXAA) and flavone acetic acid (FAA), which cause tumor vasculature collapse and tumor necrosis, were used to attack the tumor vasculature, whereas the T-cell costimulator B7.1 (CD80), which costimulates T-cell proliferation via the CD28 pathway, was used to stimulate antitumor immunity. The injection of cDNA (60–180 µg) encoding B7.1 into large EL-4 tumors (0.8 cm in diameter) established in C57BL/6 mice, followed 24 h later by i.p. administration of either DMXAA (25 mg/kg) or FAA (300 mg/kg), resulted in complete tumor eradication within 2–6 weeks. In contrast, monotherapies were ineffective. Both vascular attack and B7.1 immunotherapy led to up-regulation of heat shock protein 70 on stressed and dying tumor cells, potentially augmenting immunotherapy. Remarkably, large tumors took on the appearance of a wound that rapidly ameliorated, leaving perfectly healed skin. Combined therapy was mediated by CD8+ T cells and natural killer cells, accompanied by heightened and prolonged antitumor cytolytic activity (P < 0.001), and by a marked increase in tumor cell apoptosis. Cured animals completely rejected a challenge of 1 x 107 parental EL-4 tumor cells but not a challenge of 1 x 104 Lewis lung carcinoma cells, demonstrating that antitumor immunity was tumor specific. Adoptive transfer of 2 x 108 splenocytes from treated mice into recipients bearing established (0.8 cm in diameter) tumors resulted in rapid and complete tumor rejection within 3 weeks. Although DMXAA and B7.1 monotherapies are complicated by a narrow range of effective doses, combined therapy was less dosage dependent. Thus, a broad range of amounts of B7.1 cDNA were effective in combination with 25 mg/kg DMXAA. In contrast, DMXAA, which has a very narrow range of high active doses, was effective at a low dose (18 mg/kg) when administered with a large amount (180 µg) of B7.1 cDNA. Importantly, combinational therapy generated heightened antitumor immunity, such that gene transfer of B7.1 into one tumor, followed by systemic DMXAA treatment, led to the complete rejection of multiple untreated tumor nodules established in the opposing flank. These findings have important implications for the future direction and utility of cancer immunotherapies aimed at harnessing patients’ immune responses to their own tumors.

Defence against code injection attacks

Code injection attacks are considered serious threats to the Internet users. In this type of attack the attacker injects malicious codes in the user programs to change or divert the execution flows. In this paper we explore the contemporary defence strategies against code injection attacks (CIAs) and underline their limitations. To overcome these limitations, we suggest a number of countermeasure mechanisms for protecting from CIAs. Our key idea relies on the multiplexing technique to preserve the exact return code to ensure the integrity of program execution trace of shell code. This technique also maintains a FIFO (first in first out) queue to defeat the conflict state when multiple caller method makes a call simultaneously. Finally, our technique can provide better performance, in terms of protection and speed, in some point compared to the CFI (control flow integrity) as well as CPM (code pointer masking) techniques.

An investigation into PL/SQL Injection.

SQL injection is a common attack method used to leverage infor-mation out of a database or to compromise a company’s network. This paper investigates four injection attacks that can be conducted against the PL/SQL engine of Oracle databases, comparing two recent releases (10g, 11g) of Oracle. The results of the experiments showed that both releases of Oracle were vulner-able to injection but that the injection technique often differed in the packages that it could be conducted in.

Early analysis of fault-attack effects for cryptographic hardware

International audience

Detecting and characterising malicious executable payloads

Buffer overflow vulnerabilities continue to prevail and the sophistication of attacks targeting these vulnerabilities is continuously increasing. As a successful attack of this type has the potential to completely compromise the integrity of the targeted host, early detection is vital. This thesis examines generic approaches for detecting executable payload attacks, without prior knowledge of the implementation of the attack, in such a way that new and previously unseen attacks are detectable. Executable payloads are analysed in detail for attacks targeting the Linux and Windows operating systems executing on an Intel IA-32 architecture. The execution flow of attack payloads are analysed and a generic model of execution is examined. A novel classification scheme for executable attack payloads is presented which allows for characterisation of executable payloads and facilitates vulnerability and threat assessments, and intrusion detection capability assessments for intrusion detection systems. An intrusion detection capability assessment may be utilised to determine whether or not a deployed system is able to detect a specific attack and to identify requirements for intrusion detection functionality for the development of new detection methods. Two novel detection methods are presented capable of detecting new and previously unseen executable attack payloads. The detection methods are capable of identifying and enumerating the executable payload’s interactions with the operating system on the targeted host at the time of compromise. The detection methods are further validated using real world data including executable payload attacks.

Bit-pattern based integral attack

Integral attacks are well-known to be effective against byte-based block ciphers. In this document, we outline how to launch integral attacks against bit-based block ciphers. This new type of integral attack traces the propagation of the plaintext structure at bit-level by incorporating bit-pattern based notations. The new notation gives the attacker more details about the properties of a structure of cipher blocks. The main difference from ordinary integral attacks is that we look at the pattern the bits in a specific position in the cipher block has through the structure. The bit-pattern based integral attack is applied to Noekeon, Serpent and present reduced up to 5, 6 and 7 rounds, respectively. This includes the first attacks on Noekeon and present using integral cryptanalysis. All attacks manage to recover the full subkey of the final round.