The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?

Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt in Multinational Restaurant Firms

The purpose of this paper is to understand whether multinational restaurant firms (MNRF’s) have higher agency and expected bankruptcy costs. Given this expectation, this may have an impact on the amount of debt incurred by MNRF’s. Overall, the findings are consistent with the existing literatue in terms of the positive relationship between MNRF’s and agency and bankruptcy cost. However, it was found that MNRF’s also have more total debt. This is surprising given the higher agency and bankruptcy costs. The importance of this research is that there may be considerations other than agency and bacnkruptcy costs affecting the capital structure decisions of MNRF’s.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Agency theory and the family business

The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development).

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.

Empresas familiares vs. Empresas não familiares : evidência empírica em Portugal numa ótica de desempenho e do órgão de gestão

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Análise Financeira

Financiamento bancário e o desempenho das empresas em portugal: qual a relação?

Dissertação de mestrado em Economia Monetária, Bancária e Financeira

Stockholder conflicts and dividends

Conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders affect a large proportion of firms in any economy, but has received little attention in the empirical literature. We examine the link between the potential for such conflicts and the firm's payout policy on a large sample of Norwegian private firms with controlling stockholders and detailed ownership data. Our evidence shows that the stronger the potential conflict between the stockholders, the higher the proportion of earnings paid out as dividends. This tendency to reduce stockholder conflicts by dividend payout is more pronounced when the minority is diffuse and when a family's majority block is held by a single family member. We also find evidence that a minority-friendly payout policy is associated with higher future minority investment in the firm. These results are consistent with the notion that potential agency costs of ownership are mitigated by dividend policy when the majority stockholder benefits from not exploiting the minority.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Pääomarakenteisiin vaikuttavat tekijät suomalaisissa pörssiyrityksissä

Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää lineaarisen regressioanalyysin avulla paneelidataa käyttäen suomalaisten pörssiyritysten pääomarakenteisiin vaikuttavat tekijät vuosina 1999-2004. Näiden tekijöiden avulla päätellään, mitä pääomarakenneteoriaa/-teorioita nämä yritykset noudattavat. Pääomarakenneteoriat voidaan jakaa kahteen luokkaan sen mukaan, pyritäänkö niissä optimaaliseen pääomarakenteeseen vai ei. Tradeoff- ja siihen liittyvässä agenttiteoriassa pyritään optimaaliseen pääomarakenteeseen. Tradeoff-teoriassa pääomarakenne valitaan punnitsemalla vieraan pääoman hyötyjä ja haittoja. Agenttiteoria on muuten samanlainen kuin tradeoff-teoria, mutta siinä otetaan lisäksi huomioon velan agenttikustannukset. Pecking order - ja ajoitusteoriassa ei pyritä optimaaliseen pääoma-rakenteeseen. Pecking order -teoriassa rahoitus valitaan hierarkian mukaan (tulorahoitus, vieras pääoma, välirahoitus, oma pääoma). Ajoitusteoriassa valitaan se rahoitusmuoto, jota on kannattavinta hankkia vallitsevassa markkinatilanteessa. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan velkaantumisaste riippuu positiivisesti riskistä, vakuudesta ja aineettomasta omaisuudesta. Velkaantumisaste riippuu negatiivisesti likviditeetistä, osaketuotoista ja kannattavuudesta. Osingoilla ei ole vaikutusta velkaantumisasteeseen. Toimialoista teollisuustuotteiden ja -palveluiden sekä perusteollisuuden aloilla on korkeammat velkaantumisasteet kuin muilla toimialoilla. Tulokset tukevat pääosin pecking order -teoriaa ja jonkin verran ajoitusteoriaa. Muut teoriat saavat vain vähäistä tukea.

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.