Agency theory and the family business
Data(s) |
2015
|
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Resumo |
The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development). |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-34241 urn:isbn:9781783479658 urn:isbn:9781783479665 doi:10.4337/9781783479665.00011 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Department of Strategic Management, University of Innsbruck, Austria Cheltenham |
Relação |
Theoretical perspectives on family businesses, p. 58-77 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #family business #agency theory #agency costs #altruism #monitoring #heterogeneity #entrepreneurial attitudes |
Tipo |
Chapter in book info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart text |