Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

State usury ceilings : hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 2515 ... April 3 and 5, 1979.

Cover title.

To authorize a national usury ceiling : hearings before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, August 19 and September 28, 1982.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Remarks upon usury and its effects: a national bank a remedy; in a letter, &c.

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 32290.34.

The land owner's manual. Containing a summary of statute regulations, in New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa and Wisconsin, concerning land titles, deeds, mortgages, wills of real estate, descents, land taxes, tax sales, redemptions, limitations, exemptions, interest of money and usury, with an appendix, containing the constitutions of the said states.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.

Pikavipit – Kuluttajien riistoa vai tiukan valvonnan alla olevaa liiketoimintaa?

Pikavippi on nykykäsityksen mukaan vakuudeton, lyhytaikainen, euromääräisesti pienehkö luotto, joka hankitaan yleensä joko tekstiviestillä tai Internetissä täytettävällä hakemuksella. Luotto maksetaan hakijan tilille asiakkaan suostuttua luotontarjoajan ehtoihin luottotietojen tarkistuksen jälkeen. Tutkielmassa on selvitetty millainen oli lainsäädännöllinen lähtötilanne, kun pikavipit tulivat markkinoille. Lisäksi halusin selvittää lainsäätäjän toimia alaa kohtaan, sekä selvittää ovatko pikaluotot koronkiskontaa tai ovatko ne sitä joskus olleet. Tutkielma toteutettiin lainopillista ja de lege ferenda – menetelmiä käyttäen. Lainsäätäjä on tehnyt kaksi merkittävää lainmuutospakettia pikaluottoja kohtaan erityisesti kuluttajansuojan parantamiseksi. Pikaluotot eivät ole täyttäneet missään vaiheessa koronkiskonnan tunnusmerkistöä. Jos maksamattomat luotot päätyvät oikeuteen perittäviksi niin perintäkulut muodostuvat lain asettamien taulukkohintojen mukaisesti, vaikka kuluttajasta saattaa tuntua kohtuuttomalta maksaa suuria perintäkuluja. Mikäli pikaluotot kielletään, siirtynevät lyhytaikaisten pienluottojen markkinat ainakin osittain pimeille markkinoille tai tarjolle tulee lakia kiertäviä korvaavia lainatuotteita.

La finance islamique: fondements, theorie et realite.

L’Islam interdit le riba , mot arabe signifiant à la fois usure et intérêt. L’interdiction du rib figure dans la loi islamique, née dans l’Arabie du Moyen Âge. Elle est à la base de la finance islamique qui connut une expansion remarquable durant la deuxième moitié du XX e siècle. Nous nous interrogeons sur les origines de cette interdiction, sur les problèmes que connaît actuellement la finance islamique et sur ses perspectives d’avenir.

Figures de l'avarice et de l'usure dans les comédies : The Merchant of Venice de Shakespeare, Volpone de Jonson et L'Avare de Molière

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense