Tax havens and their impacts on the non-haven countries

Tax havens have attracted increasing attention from the authorities of non-haven countries. The financial crisis exacerbates the negative attitude to tax havens. Offshore zones are now under strong pressure from the international, both financial and political institutions. Thus, the thesis will focus on the current problem of the modern economy, namely tax havens and their impact on the non-haven countries. This thesis will be based on the several articles, in particular “Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens��� by Joel Slemrod and John D. Wilson (University of Michigan, 2009) and “Do Havens Divert Economic Activity” by James R. Hines Jr., C. Fritz Foley and Mihir A. Desai (Ross School of Business, 2005). This paper provides two completely different and contradictory viewpoints on the problem of coexisting tax havens and non-haven countries. There are two models, examined in this work, present two important researches. The first one will be concentrated on the positive effect from tax havens whereas the last model will be focused on the completely negative effect from offshore jurisdictions. The first model gives us a good explanation and proof of its statement why tax havens can positively influence on nearby high-tax countries. It describes that the existence of offshore jurisdictions can stimulate the growth of operations and facilitates economic activity in non-haven countries. In contrast to above mentioned, the model with quite opposite view was presented. This economic model and its analysis confirms the undesirability of the existence of offshore areas. Taking into consideration, that the jurisdictions choose their optimal policy, the elimination of offshores will have positive impact on the rest of countries. The model proofs the statement that full or partial elimination of tax havens raises the equilibrium level of the public good and increases country welfare. According to the following study, it can be concluded that both of the models provide telling arguments to prove their assertions. Thereby both of these points of view have their right to exist. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate concerning this issue still will raise a lot of questions.

Tax havens and their use by United States taxpayers : an overview : a report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney General (Tax Division) and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy) /

Mode of access: Internet.

Tax haven information book.

Mode of access: Internet.

What determines tax haven FDI

This paper examines the determinants of a multinational enterprise’s (MNEs) decision to invest in countries classified as tax havens. To the best of our knowledge this has not been analysed at the cross-country level before. We use the ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) paradigm and link it with financial specific advantages to develop a number of hypotheses which are subsequently tested by our empirical model. Our analysis is based on a large firm-level database covering 39,543 MNEs across the world for the period 2002- 2011. We find that higher corporate taxes faced by MNEs at home increase the likelihood of locating in a tax haven. Moreover, high technology manufacturing and services MNEs that possess large levels of intangible assets are also more likely to locate subsidiaries in tax havens. Finally, we find evidence that MNEs from countries with a more coordinated market orientation are less likely to locate in tax havens.

A fair tax (system) or an ethical taxpayer?

An interpretation of fairness based on the equal sacrifice principle is not clear; three taxation rules can be derived from it. Instead of searching for a fair tax system, ethical behavior of the taxpayer should be expected and set as a target. Ethical taxation can be encouraged and the propensity to pay taxes could be reinforced by abolishing the secrecy of individual and family tax returns, setting restrictions on cash operations which are associated with corruption, and gradually eliminating tax havens and offshore areas.

A nation’s role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting : balancing sovereignty with international collaboration and coordination

The notion of sovereignty is central to any international tax issue. While a nation is free to design its tax laws as it sees fit and raise revenue in accordance with the needs of its citizens, it is not possible to undertake such a task in isolation. In a world of cross-border investments and business transactions, all tax regimes impact on one another. Tax interactions between sovereign states cannot be avoided. Ultimately, the interactions mean that a nation must decide whether to engage in both collaboration and coordination with other nations and supranational bodies alike or maintain an individualised stance in relation to its tax policy. Whatever the decision, there is arguably an exercise in national sovereignty in some form. In the context of an international tax regime, whether that regime is interpreted broadly as meaning international norms generally adopted by nations around the world or domestic regimes legislating for cross-border transactions, rhetoric around national fiscal sovereignty takes on many different forms. At one end of the spectrum it is relied upon by financial secrecy jurisdictions (tax havens) as a defence to their position on the basis that ‘other’ nations cannot interfere with the fiscal sovereignty of a jurisdiction. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that profit shifting and international tax avoidance if not stopped is, in and of itself, a threat to a nation’s fiscal sovereignty on the basis that it threatens the ability to tax and raise the revenue needed. This paper considers a modern conceptualisation of sovereignty along with its role within international tax coordination and collaboration to argue that a move towards a more unified approach to addressing international base erosion and profit shifting may be the ultimate exercise of national fiscal sovereignty. By using the current transfer pricing regime as a case study, this paper posits that it is not merely enough to have international agreement on allocation rules to be applied, but that the ultimate exercise of national sovereignty is political agreement with other states to ensure that it is governments which determine the allocational basis of worldwide profits to be taxed. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the arm’s length pricing requirement of the current transfer pricing regime, rather than providing governments with the ability to determine the location of profits, is providing multinational entities with the ultimate power to determine that location. If left unchecked, this will eventually erode a nation’s ability to capture the required tax revenue and, as a consequence, may be deemed a failure by nation states to exercise their fiscal sovereignty.

Transfer pricing and multinational financial institutions : the case for replacing arm’s length price with a unitary approach

The international tax system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace with the modern multinational entity rendering it ineffective in taxing many modern businesses according to economic activity. One of those modern multinational entities is the multinational financial institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and significant example of the failure of the current system on a global scale. The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading operations. A primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in developing countries grew by 122 per cent. The same study indicates that foreign banks have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and developing countries. Hence, most significant is that fact that MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as mining and tourism. IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies. The difficulties for developing countries in applying current international tax rules, especially the current traditional transfer pricing regime, are particularly acute in relation to MNFIs, which are the biggest users of tax havens and offshore finance. This paper investigates whether a unitary taxation approach which reflects economic reality would more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions which give rise to those profits. It has previously been argued that the uniqueness of MNFIs results in a failure of the current system to accurately allocate profits and that unitary tax as an alternative could provide a sounder allocation model for international tax purposes. This paper goes a step further, and examines the practicalities of the implementation of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, along with their their implications. This paper adopts a two-step approach in considering the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which requires international acceptance and agreement. First, the definitional issues of the unitary MNFI are examined and second, an appropriate allocation formula for this sector is investigated. To achieve this, the paper asks first, how the financial sector should be defined for the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector and second, what is the ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.

The case for unitary taxation with formulary apportionment in the finance sector and the effect on developing nations

In 2013 the OECD released its 15 point Action plan to deal with base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). In that plan it was recognised that BEPS has a significant effect on developing countries. This is because the lack of tax revenue can lead to a critical underfunding of public investment that would help promote economic growth. To this end, the BEPS project is aimed at ensuring an inclusive approach to take into account not only views of the G20 and OECD countries but also the perspective of developing nations. With this focus in mind and in the context of developing nations, the purpose of this article is to consider a possible solution to profit shifting which occurs under the current transfer pricing regime, with that solution being unitary taxation with formulary apportionment. It does so using the finance sector as a specific case for application. Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-client’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. Further, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens but also, more than other industries, have opportunities to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This article establishes a case for an industry specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. It argues that such a model would benefit not only developed nations but also developing nations which are currently suffering the effects of BEPS. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of such an implementation by examining both definitional issues and a possible formula for MNFIs. This article argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined as well as factors that should be included in an allocation formula, along with the appropriate weighting. While it would be difficult for developing nations to adopt such a regime, it is argued that it would be no more difficult than addressing issues they face with the current transfer pricing regime. As such, this article concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry specific alternative for MNFIs which would assist developing nations and aid independent fiscal soundness.

Unitary Taxation of the Finance Sector

Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing the activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-customer’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. However, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens, but also, more than other industries, have the opportunity to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This paper establishes a case for an industry-specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of implementing this by examining both definitional issues and possible formulas for MNFIs. This paper argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined, as well as the factors that should be included in an allocation formula, and the appropriate weighting. This paper concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry-specific alternative for MNFIs.

The fisc and the frontier: Approaches to cross-border charity in Australia and the UK

The late twentieth century witnessed the transformation of the global economy beyond the fixed geographic boundaries of the nation-state system to one dominated by financial centers, global markets, and transnational firms. In the two decades to 2011, cross-border philanthropy from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries to the developing world grew from approximately USD 5 billion to USD 32 billion (OECD, n.d.),[1] with some estimates for 2011 as high as USD 59 billion (Center for Global Prosperity, 2013). This is only part of cross-border philanthropy, which also includes remittances from migrant communities, social-media-enabled global fundraising, and medical research collaborations.

Paraísos fiscales: una aproximación a los agujeros negros de la economía

Este estudio intenta dar a conocer esos territorios calificados como paraísos fiscales, así como su funcionamiento, tamaño, los efectos económicos que ejercen sobre la economía globalizada y los estados; basado en investigaciones previas de diferentes expertos e instituciones. Ha quedado demostrado como las operaciones opacas realizadas en estos territorios han tenido un gran impacto en la actual situación de crisis financiera y económica, de manera que deben tomarse medidas más decisivas y efectivas para su control y regulación con el fin de evitar una próxima crisis global; por lo que en este estudio se presentan dos capítulos que recogen estas preocupaciones. Además he querido averiguar la relación que guardan estos paraísos fiscales con nuestro país, de manera que se hará una especial mención al caso de España teniendo en cuenta el efecto de las operaciones financieras opacas ejercen sobre el país así como la cuantía de los flujos financieros con destino a paraísos fiscales tienen como origen nuestro país. Finalmente, se procede a realizar un resumen de los escándalos financieros más relevantes a nivel mundial relacionados con paraísos fiscales. En español.

Una Evaluación de las Medidas Contra los Paraísos Fiscales

(ESPAÑOL)Siempre ha habido paraísos fiscales utilizados para evadir impuestos. La globalización, sin embargo, ha hecho que su importancia cuantitativa aumente sustancialmente. Los paraísos fiscales se caracterizan por tener un sistema dual, porque la ley regula el secreto bancario y porque dan facilidades para la creación de empresas. La crisis ha hecho que los gobiernos tomen medidas para recuperar el dinero que se ha evadido a paraísos fiscales. Entre otras, la OCDE ha favorecido el intercambio de información, también se han impulsado otras medidas como el Common Reporting Standard, la Directiva de Cooperación Administrativa, la Google Tax y la Ley FATCA. España, ha apoyado todas estas medidas e individualmente ha tomado otras: ha firmado acuerdos de intercambio de información con otros países, ha obligado a declarar los bienes en el extranjero, ha reformado el IS y el IRPF y ha aumentado el control de las transferencias con el SEPBLAC. En el trabajo se comprueba que las medidas no son suficientes y se proponen otras complementarias para luchar contra los paraísos fiscales.

La lucha contra los paraísos fiscales: realidad o apariencia

[ES]La globalización y el libre movimiento de los capitales han facilitado el funcionamiento de los paraísos fiscales. Estos territorios de baja o nula tributación se caracterizan por ofrecer ventajas fiscales y legales a sus usuarios, así como por la posibilidad de ocultar la titularidad de las transacciones realizadas. Los grandes patrimonios y las multinacionales los utilizan para evadir impuestos, los gobiernos para esconder los fondos provenientes de la corrupción y las asociaciones criminales para camuflar el dinero proveniente de actividades ilícitas. Son varios los autores que defienden la existencia de estos territorios como medio para el aumento de la competitividad, pero lo cierto es que reducen la recaudación fiscal, crean inestabilidad en el sistema financiero internacional y hacen vulnerables a las democracias. En los últimos años se ha intensificado la lucha contra los paraísos fiscales, pero la implantación de las medidas no está teniendo la eficacia esperada.

Why and how FDI stocks are a biased measure of MNE affiliate activity

Many international business (IB) studies have used foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks to measure the aggregate value-adding activity of multinational enterprises (MNE) affiliates in host countries. We argue that FDI stocks are a biased measure of that activity, because the degree to which they overestimate or underestimate affiliate activity varies systematically with host-country characteristics. First, most FDI into countries that serve as tax havens generate no actual productive activity; thus FDI stocks in such countries overestimate affiliate activity. Second, FDI stocks do not include locally raised external funds, funds widely used in countries with well-developed financial markets or volatile exchange rates, resulting in an underestimation of affiliate activity in such countries. Finally, the extent to which FDI translates into affiliate activity increases with affiliate labor productivity, so in countries where labor is more productive, FDI stocks also result in an underestimation of affiliate activity. We test these hypotheses by first regressing affiliate value-added and affiliate sales on FDI stocks to calculate a country-specific mismatch, and then by regressing this mismatch on a host country's tax haven status, level of financial market development, exchange rate volatility, and affiliate labor productivity. All hypotheses are supported, implying that FDI stocks are a biased measure of MNE affiliate activity, and hence that the results of FDI-data-based studies of such activity need to be reconsidered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paraísos fiscais: prejuízos e benefícios

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Doutor José Campos Amorim