Richard Rorty, innovation strategies & movie inspiration

Movie innovation is a conversation between screenwriters and producers in our mixed economy – a concept of innovation supported by Richard Rorty and Aristole's Poetics. During innovation conversations, inspired writers describe fresh movie actions to empathetic producers. Some inspired actions may confuse. Writers and producers use strategies to inquire about confusing actions. This Australian study redescribes 25 writer-producer strategies in the one place for the first time. It adds a new strategy. And, with more evidence than the current literature, it investigates writer inspiration, which drives film innovation. It reports inspiration in pioneering, verifiable detail.

Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought

The present book is devoted to "European connections of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism". The theme, chosen carefully and intentionally, is supposed to show the motivation behind the writing of the present work, as well as to show its intended extent. Let us consider briefly the first three parts of the theme, to enlighten a little our intentions. "European" is perhaps the most important description for it was precisely that thread that was most important to me, being the only context seriously taken into account, as I assumed right from the start that I would not be writing about rather more widely unknown to me - and much less fascinating (even to Rorty, the hero of the story) from my own, traditional, Continental philosophical perspective - American analytic philosophy. So accordingly I have almost totally skipped "American" connections (to use the distinction I need here) of Rorty's philosophy, that is to say, firstly, a years-long work within analytic philosophy, secondly struggles with it on its own grounds, and finally attempts to use classical American, mainly Deweyan, pragmatism for his own needs and numerous polemics associated with it - the questions that are far away from my interests and that arise limited interest among reading and writing philosophical audience in Poland, and perhaps also among Continental philosophers. It did not seem possible to me to write a book on Rorty in his American connections for they are insufficiently known to me, demanding knowledge of both post-war American analytic philosophy as well as pragmatism of its father-founders. I could see, setting to work on Richard Rorty, that a book on his American connections (leaving aside the issue that it would not be a philosophical problem but rather, let us say, the one of writing a monograph) written by a Polish philosopher in Poland and then in the USA was not a stimulating intellectual challenge but rather a thankless working task. Besides, having spent much time on Rorty's philosophy, writing extensively about him and translating his works, I already knew that the "Continental" context was extremely important to his neopragmatism, and that thinking about it could be relatively prolific (as opposed to the context potentially given by American philosophy).

Emissão e omissão no Wittgenstein de Rorty

O trabalho de Ludwig Wittgenstein é uma das mais constantes referências no percurso de Richard Rorty, cujos escritos, por sua vez, assumem um papel de relevo no âmbito do comentário wittgensteiniano. Apesar de abundarem os textos que contestam a leitura que Rorty faz de Wittgenstein, não há nenhum que, de forma global, vise analisar o modo como se desenrola tal leitura. Na parte I, faremos, pois, o retrato da leitura que Rorty faz de Wittgenstein, recorrendo aos três artigos que o norte-americano escreveu sobre o pensador austríaco: “Keeping Philosophy Pure: an Essay on Wittgenstein”, publicado em 1982, no livro Consequences of Pragmatism – Essays 1972-1980; “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language”, publicado, em 1991, no segundo volume dos Philosophical Papers de Rorty; e “Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn”, publicado em 2007, no quarto e último volume dos Philosophical Papers. Na parte II, procuraremos pôr em relevo três implicações democráticas do pensamento de Ludwig Wittgenstein, as quais, apesar de não mencionadas por Rorty, não só são compatíveis com o seu pragmatismo como, sobretudo, estabelecem uma conexão que Rorty não fez: aquela que liga o Rorty leitor de Wittgenstein ao Rorty que reflecte sobre os fundamentos da democracia. A defesa da democracia e a leitura de Wittgenstein surgem separadas no pensamento de Rorty; a sugestão que permeia a parte II é que teria sido mais frutífero, para Rorty e de acordo com os seus próprios parâmetros, estabelecer uma conexão entre o trabalho de Wittgenstein e a reflexão acerca da democracia. Argumenta-se que a pertinência de tal conexão permite concluir que Rorty rejeitou precipitadamente os termos terapia, metafísica e humanidade, na medida em que os mesmos, desde que entendidos num determinado sentido, são úteis para pensar a democracia como exigindo uma certa terapia, como o sistema que privilegia uma pluralidade de metafísicas ou como o modo de convívio no qual a humanidade consiste num espaço relacional de intercâmbio linguístico.

Opening truth to imagination : the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty

This study explores in a comparative way the works of two American pragmatist philosophers-John Dewey and Richard Rorty. I have provided a reading of their broader works in order to offer what I hope is a successful sympathetic comparison where very few exist. Dewey is often viewed as the central hero in the classical American pragmatic tradition, while Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist, is viewed as some sort of postmodern villain. I show that the different approaches by the two philosophers-Dewey's experiential focus versus Rorty's linguistic focus-exist along a common pragmatic continuum, and that much of the critical scholarship that pits the two pragmatists against each other has actually created an unwarranted dualism between experience and language. I accomplish this task by following the critical movement by each of the pragmatists through their respective reworking of traditional absolutist truth conceptions toward a more aesthetical, imaginative position. I also show how this shift or "turning" represents an important aspect of the American philosophical tradition-its aesthetic axis. I finally indicate a role for liberal education (focusing on higher nonvocational education) in accommodating this turning, a turning that in the end is necessitated by democracy's future trajectory

Dialogue sur l'avenir de la démocratie libérale : John Rawls, Richard Rorty et Leo Strauss

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV).

Richard Rorty i una aproximació pragmatista al liberalisme polític de John Rawls

Aquest article es proposa explorar la possibilitat d'apropar a la concepció del liberalisme polític metafilosòfic de John Rawls des del punt de vista pragmatista de Richard Rorty. La proposta està motivada per les similituds que es poden observar entre elles respecte de la finalitat i la sortida d'una concepció política. El resultat final de l'article és ambigua: d'una banda, no sembla tan descabellat afirmar que la teoria de Rawls es pot llegir sense més dificultats des d'una perspectiva pragmàtica, d'altra banda, hi ha alguns aspectes importants en els quals un liberalisme polític de Rawls segueix sent incompatible amb una concepció política de Rorty

Sobre el valor de la verdad: una crítica a Richard Rorty

En el presente texto se sostiene, con Rorty, que la verdad no es una propiedad de hechos –ni mucho menos de objetos–. Sin embargo, contra Rorty, se afirma que asumir esta posición no implica la eliminación del concepto de verdad de nuestros discursos teóricos y filosóficos, esto es, que sigue teniendo sentido hacer una reflexión filosófica sobre la verdad. La estrategia para mostrar esto es abiertamente pragmatista: se inicia con el análisis de las prácticas de los hablantes para mostrar que no adquirimos los mismos compromisos cuando atribuimos verdad y cuando atribuimos justificación (sección 1); posteriormente, se evidencia en qué sentido la distinción filosófica entre verdad y justificación es útil socialmente (sección 2); y para finalizar, se muestra que dicha distinción no entraña ninguna metafísica misteriosa (sección 3).

Liberalismo e ironía en Richard Rorty

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O que há de real e de irreal com o realismo: Searle versus Rorty

O texto fala a respeito do debate entre Searle e Rorty sobre irracionalismo de Rorty. Ele tenta mostrar que a posição de Rorty está fora do campo realismo versus anti-realismo e o irracionalismo não é um bom adjetivo. Searle estaria sobre uma linha incorreta em sua abordagem do tema da verdade em Rorty.

Democracia y pragmatismo en la obra de R. Rorty

Fil: Daguerre, Martín. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.

Democracia y pragmatismo en la obra de R. Rorty

Fil: Daguerre, Martín. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.