Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.

Public Authorities' Use of Exhibition

This thesis studies the use of exhibitions by public authorities and the possibilities of making exhibits out of authority topics.

The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Resistência: Direito Fundamental Constitucional

“Todos têm o direito de resistir a qualquer ordem que ofenda os seus direitos, liberdades e garantias e de repelir pela força qualquer agressão, quando não seja possível recorrer à autoridade pública”. É o que consagra o art. 21º da Constituição da República Portuguesa. Trata-se não apenas dum direito fundamental, mas também dum dever fundamental. § "Everyone has the right to resist any order that offends the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to resist by force any aggression when it is not possible recourse to a public authority." It is what establishes the art. 21 of the Portuguese Constitution. It is not just of a fundamental right, but also as a fundamental duty.

Resistência II: Direito Fundamental Constitucional

Invocava então o art. 21º da CRP. “Todos têm o direito de resistir a qualquer ordem que ofenda os seus direitos, liberdades e garantias e de repelir pela força qualquer agressão, quando não seja possível recorrer à autoridade pública”: art. 21º da Constituição. § Then invoked the art. 21 of the CRP. "Everyone has the right to resist any order that offends the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to resist by force any aggression when it is not possible to use public authority" means art. 21 of the Constitution.

A aplicação do imposto sobre o valor acrescentado nas autarquias locais

Mestrado em Fiscalidade

Segurança privada

This work aims to reflect on the way as the security has come to evolue, fitting new private actors who now play functions, long ago private the public beings. This new situation raises issues of privatization of public authority, which puts into question the ius imperii and rights of citizens. Although private security is a growing reality, and that it needed to study.

Hospital-empresa : crónica de um nascimento retardado : Políticas de saúde : Em foco

RESUMO - A gestão empresarial dos hospitais é uma velha aspiração do sistema e dos profissionais da saúde em Portugal. Já o Estatuto Hospitalar de 1968 previa a organização e a gestão dos hospitais «em termos de gestão empresarial». A Lei de Bases da Saúde, de 1990, relembrava que a administração das unidades de saúde deveria obedecer a «regras de gestão empresarial». O Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, criado desde 1991, foi objecto de concessão de gestão por contrato, precedendo concurso público, a uma entidade privada, em 1995. Em 1997, o relatório do Grupo de Trabalho sobre o Estatuto Jurídico do Hospital recomendava a adopção da figura de instituto público com natureza empresarial, adequada autonomia de gestão e forte responsabilidade, podendo regular-se, em alguns domínios, por normas de direito privado. Em 1998 foi criado o Hospital de São Sebastião, em Santa Maria da Feira, com formas inovadoras de gestão, utilizando meios de gestão maleáveis. Em 1999 foi criada a Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, englobando não apenas o Hospital de Pedro Hispano, naquela cidade, mas também os quatro centros de saúde da sua área de atracção. Em 2001 foi criado o Hospital do Barlavento Algarvio, em moldes semelhantes aos do Hospital de São Sebastião. Os restantes hospitais públicos mantiveram a estrutura e regras de funcionamento convencionais. Observa-se que o modelo de gestão convencional do hospital público tem hoje consequências desfavoráveis para os cidadãos, para os profissionais que nele trabalham e também para o sistema de saúde no seu conjunto. Em 2002, uma nova lei alterou disposições da Lei de Bases da Saúde de 1990 e aprovou um novo regime jurídico de gestão hospitalar. De acordo com ele, a rede de prestação de cuidados de saúde passou a integrar vários modelos de hospitais: hospitais SPA, hospitais EPE, hospitais SA, clínicas privadas com ou sem nome de hospital, instituições e serviços geridos por entidades públicas ou privadas, mediante contrato de gestão e hospitais PPP. Analisam-se os ganhos introduzidos pelo modelo inovador de hospital SA, no que respeita ao estatuto, dotação de capital, poderes especiais, regras de controlo financeiro, regimes laborais, órgãos sociais, instrumentos de gestão e direcção técnica. Finalmente, antecipa-se um quadro analítico de oportunidades e riscos sobre este modelo. As críticas têm-se concentrado sobre a estratégia de mudança e sobre o mecanismo de escolha dos dirigentes e das respectivas chefias intermédias. Em relação à estratégia, conclui-se ser a questão mais empírica do que conceptual. Em relação à forma de identificação dos dirigentes, recomenda-se o acompanhamento crítico da experiência, salientando-se, a par do que ela pode trazer de positivo, os riscos de partidarização e instabilidade.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Equality Project Brief (PDF 54 KB)

Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires each public authority, in carrying out its functions, to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity, and also to the desirability of promoting good relations. While the Department, and its associated bodies (includes Health and Social Services Boards, Trusts and Agencies) have made good progress in meeting the statutory obligations set out under Section 75, the work to date has mainly focused on processes, awareness raising, learning new ways to consult, and carrying out Equality Impact Assessments. åÊ

Equality Impact Assessments - Oral Health Strategy - General Dental Services - May 2001 (PDF 72KB)

In 1998, a new law came into force in Northern Ireland – the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Section 75 of the Act places a legal obligation on each public authority to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity: • between persons of different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation; • between men and women generally; • between persons with a disability and persons without; and • between persons with dependants and persons without. åÊ

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.