Coevolution of adaptive technology, maladaptive culture and population size in a producer-scrounger game.

Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a 'producer-scrounger' game, which can also usefully be interpreted as an 'individual-social' learner interaction. Producers (individual learners) are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural transmission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism, where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.

On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules.

In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal's lifespan, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics and evolution of learning rules producing behavior. Owing to the intrinsic stochastic and frequency-dependent nature of learning dynamics, these rules are often studied in evolutionary biology via agent-based computer simulations. In this paper, we show that stochastic approximation theory can help to qualitatively understand learning dynamics and formulate analytical models for the evolution of learning rules. We consider a population of individuals repeatedly interacting during their lifespan, and where the stage game faced by the individuals fluctuates according to an environmental stochastic process. Individuals adjust their behavioral actions according to learning rules belonging to the class of experience-weighted attraction learning mechanisms, which includes standard reinforcement and Bayesian learning as special cases. We use stochastic approximation theory in order to derive differential equations governing action play probabilities, which turn out to have qualitative features of mutator-selection equations. We then perform agent-based simulations to find the conditions where the deterministic approximation is closest to the original stochastic learning process for standard 2-action 2-player fluctuating games, where interaction between learning rules and preference reversal may occur. Finally, we analyze a simplified model for the evolution of learning in a producer-scrounger game, which shows that the exploration rate can interact in a non-intuitive way with other features of co-evolving learning rules. Overall, our analyses illustrate the usefulness of applying stochastic approximation theory in the study of animal learning.

Les effets du lien social et du niveau de défense des ressources sur l’utilisation des tactiques producteur et chapardeur par les diamants mandarins

Plusieurs espèces s’alimentant en groupe ont un comportement correspondant au jeu producteur-chapardeur (P-C). Même si à l’origine ce jeu ne prenait pas en compte plusieurs éléments susceptibles d’être présents dans un groupe social, certaines études récentes suggèrent que des facteurs, notamment le niveau de défense des ressources et les liens sociaux, pourraient affecter ses prédictions. Notre étude avait pour but d’étudier les effets de ces facteurs en exposant des groupes de diamants mandarins à quatre traitements expérimentaux faisant varier la taille du groupe et le degré d’attachement des oiseaux. Notre étude est la première à montrer que le niveau de défense des ressources a un réel effet sur les fréquences d’utilisation des tactiques producteur et chapardeur. De fait, contrairement à ce qui est prédit dans le jeu P-C original, nous avons trouvé que la fréquence des chapardeurs n’augmente pas avec la taille du groupe dans un contexte favorisant la défense des ressources. Par ailleurs, nous n’avons pas trouvé d’effet significatif du lien social sur les fréquences d’utilisation des tactiques. Cependant, nos résultats suggèrent que les liens de couple changent le comportement individuel des sujets en ce qui a trait au chapardage et à l’agressivité : bien que le résultat soit non significatif, les individus chapardent davantage leur partenaire social que les autres membres du groupe, mais avec une agressivité plus faible. Les résultats obtenus sont prometteurs et ouvrent la voie à de nombreuses autres études sur l’effet des liens sociaux et la défense des ressources chez les espèces grégaires.

Influence d’une augmentation du taux de testostérone sur les décisions d’approvisionnement chez les diamants mandarins mâles (Taeniopygia guttata)

Un animal qui s’approvisionne en groupe peut rechercher soi-même sa nourriture (tactique producteur) ou tenter de se joindre à des parcelles déjà découvertes par un autre individu (tactique chapardeur). Bien que les modèles de jeu producteur-chapardeur partent du principe que les gains moyens à l’équilibre associés à chacune de ces tactiques sont égaux et ne dépendent pas des caractéristiques des individus, de plus en plus d’études démontrent que le gain de chaque tactique est influencé par certaines caractéristiques phénotypiques (agressivité, capacités d’apprentissage,…). Dans cette étude, nous nous intéressons aux effets de la testostérone sur le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement chez les mâles de diamant mandarin (Taeniopygia guttata). La testostérone est connue pour influencer le développement du cerveau et l’agressivité, nous avons donc testé les effets d’une exposition prénatale à la testostérone ainsi que durant l’âge adulte sur le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement lorsque la nourriture est cryptique ou défendable. Nous avons réalisé deux expériences : nous avons tout d’abord utilisé la longueur du tarse ainsi que la différence entre les longueurs des doigts 2 et 4 comme des indicateurs de l’exposition prénatale à la testostérone puis testé si ces différences morphologiques se traduisent par des différences dans le choix des tactiques dans une condition défendable et une condition cryptique. Nous avons trouvé que le choix des tactiques chez les diamants mandarins était limité par le phénotype. Une exposition précoce à la testostérone au cours du développement prénatal pourrait donc être la cause d’au moins une part de la variation observée dans le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement. Ensuite, nous avons manipulé le taux de testostérone plasmatique chez des mâles adultes grâce à des implants hormonaux sous-cutanés puis comparé le comportement des individus lorsqu’ils portaient un implant hormonal et un implant contrôle et ce, dans chacune des deux conditions d’approvisionnement. Nous n’avons mis en évidence aucun effet du taux de testostérone plasmatique sur le choix des tactiques à l’âge adulte. Nos résultats sont en accord avec l’hypothèse que le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement peut être influencé par les hormones. Notre conclusion est que les hormones stéroïdiennes peut affecter le choix des tactiques via l’existence d’effets maternels dans le jeu producteur-chapardeur.

Cooperação em sagüis comuns callithrix jacchus: condições e restrições

The cooperative behavior is no longer a dilemma for the theory of evolution, since there are models that explain the evolution of this behavior by means of natural selection at the individual level. However, there have been few studies on the proximal factors that interfere with cooperative behavior. In the study of the influence of cognition on cooperation, many authors have been interested in situations in which individuals decide whether to act cooperatively and select partners with different qualities to cooperate. Of the factors studied, we highlight the need for understanding the apparatus and communication between partners to the occurrence of cooperation. Recently, highlight is the proposal that the ability to cooperate would be greater in species with cooperative breeding system. Thus, the common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) is a New World monkey which stands as a valuable species for this type of study because it presents cooperative actions in nature, such as sharing food and protection of the community territory. Our experiment investigated whether common marmosets unrelated females (n = 6) were able to cooperate using an electrical and a mechanical apparatus, if this cooperation is a byproduct of individual actions or involve social attention, if it occurs inter-individual variation in the use of devices and formation of roles (producer / scrounger) in dyads. We use the number of rewards obtained by animals (Ratio of Correct Pulls) as indicators of cooperation and glances for partners (Ratio of Correct Glances) as indicators of social attention and communication. The results indicate that the type of apparatus was not a constraint for the occurrence of cooperation between the marmosets, but still has not been verified formation of roles in the dyads. The performance of animals in the two devices showed a large variation in the learning time, not having relationship with the performance in the tests phase. In both devices the level of social glances at control phases were casually correlated with any other phase, but the data showed that there was not social attention, that is, the monkeys realized that they gave food to the partners, but the partners did

As relações de gênero em uma escola de futebol : quando o jogo é possível? = Genders relations at a football school : when the game happen?

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Anti-tumor therapy with macroencapsulated endostatin producer cells

Background: Theracyte is a polytetrafluoroethylene membrane macroencapsulation system designed to induce neovascularization at the tissue interface, protecting the cells from host's immune rejection, thereby circumventing the problem of limited half-life and variation in circulating levels. Endostatin is a potent inhibitor of angiogenesis and tumor growth. Continuous delivery of endostatin improves the efficacy and potency of the antitumoral therapy. The purpose of this study was to determine whether recombinant fibroblasts expressing endostatin encapsulated in Theracyte immunoisolation devices can be used for delivery of this therapeutic protein for treatment of mice bearing B16F10 melanoma and Ehrlich tumors. Results: Mice were inoculated subcutaneously with melanoma (B16F10 cells) or Ehrlich tumor cells at the foot pads. Treatment began when tumor thickness had reached 0.5 mm, by subcutaneous implantation of 10(7) recombinant encapsulated or non-encapsulated endostatin producer cells. Similar melanoma growth inhibition was obtained for mice treated with encapsulated or non-encapsulated endostatin-expressing cells. The treatment of mice bearing melanoma tumor with encapsulated endostatin-expressing cells was decreased by 50.0%, whereas a decrease of 56.7% in tumor thickness was obtained for mice treated with non-encapsulated cells. Treatment of Ehrlich tumor-bearing mice with non-encapsulated endostatin-expressing cells reduced tumor thickness by 52.4%, whereas lower tumor growth inhibition was obtained for mice treated with encapsulated endostatin-expressing cells: 24.2%. Encapsulated endostatin-secreting fibroblasts failed to survive until the end of the treatment. However, endostatin release from the devices to the surrounding tissues was confirmed by immunostaining. Decrease in vascular structures, functional vessels and extension of the vascular area were observed in melanoma microenvironments. Conclusions: This study indicates that immunoisolation devices containing endostatin-expressing cells are effective for the inhibition of the growth of melanoma and Ehrlich tumors. Macroencapsulation of engineered cells is therefore a reliable platform for the refinement of innovative therapeutic strategies against tumors.

Multifractal regime transition in a modified minority game model

The search for more realistic modeling of financial time series reveals several stylized facts of real markets. In this work we focus on the multifractal properties found in price and index signals. Although the usual minority game (MG) models do not exhibit multifractality, we study here one of its variants that does. We show that the nonsynchronous MG models in the nonergodic phase is multifractal and in this sense, together with other stylized facts, constitute a better modeling tool. Using the structure function (SF) approach we detected the stationary and the scaling range of the time series generated by the MG model and, from the linear (non-linear) behavior of the SF we identified the fractal (multifractal) regimes. Finally, using the wavelet transform modulus maxima (WTMM) technique we obtained its multifractal spectrum width for different dynamical regimes. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The game inside the school: a representation of 5(th) graders physical education classes

Since the beginning of Physical Education entrance in the brazilin public schools, the game has been frequently used as content, and in the course of time that practice seems to be intensified. In spite of many approaches of different purposes to justify its pedagogic usefulness, the game has been used as an indiscriminate way due to the fascination that it provides to the students. The present study searches for a description and analysis of children`s (10-12 years old) attitudes behaviors in games, on Physical Education classes, inside a public school. The study was accomplished with the researcher also attending as a teacher (action research). For the accomplishment of the study 55 children were filmed in four different games, of different kinds (exposed, transformed, and spontaneous). The classes` description and analysis were focused in the attitude axis and it was defined four topics for the discussion: Conflicts, Respect of rules, Expressiveness, and Competitiveness. The relationship between the individual with the game and its culture were pointed as the main characteristics in the configuration of the ludicrous activity atmosphere. It was also possible to observe specific situations of this relationship, once the games were limited to the social games (Piaget category), in a school atmosphere where children have students roles. Due to the obtained results, the study proposes a reflexive practice in which the students notice their own attitudes and try to adapt the game to their needs and not he other way around. In this perspective, the teacher has an important mediator roll, once he will be responsible to point out the students` difficulties and promote discussions in favor to provide teamwork.

Experimental results on the nonlinear H(infinity) control via quasi-LPV representation and game theory for wheeled mobile robots

In this paper, nonlinear dynamic equations of a wheeled mobile robot are described in the state-space form where the parameters are part of the state (angular velocities of the wheels). This representation, known as quasi-linear parameter varying, is useful for control designs based on nonlinear H(infinity) approaches. Two nonlinear H(infinity) controllers that guarantee induced L(2)-norm, between input (disturbances) and output signals, bounded by an attenuation level gamma, are used to control a wheeled mobile robot. These controllers are solved via linear matrix inequalities and algebraic Riccati equation. Experimental results are presented, with a comparative study among these robust control strategies and the standard computed torque, plus proportional-derivative, controller.

Role of price and enforcement in water allocation: Insights from Game Theory

As many countries are moving toward water sector reforms, practical issues of how water management institutions can better effect allocation, regulation, and enforcement of water rights have emerged. The problem of nonavailability of water to tailenders on an irrigation system in developing countries, due to unlicensed upstream diversions is well documented. The reliability of access or equivalently the uncertainty associated with water availability at their diversion point becomes a parameter that is likely to influence the application by users for water licenses, as well as their willingness to pay for licensed use. The ability of a water agency to reduce this uncertainty through effective water rights enforcement is related to the fiscal ability of the agency to monitor and enforce licensed use. In this paper, this interplay across the users and the agency is explored, considering the hydraulic structure or sequence of water use and parameters that define the users and the agency`s economics. The potential for free rider behavior by the users, as well as their proposals for licensed use are derived conditional on this setting. The analyses presented are developed in the framework of the theory of ""Law and Economics,`` with user interactions modeled as a game theoretic enterprise. The state of Ceara, Brazil, is used loosely as an example setting, with parameter values for the experiments indexed to be approximately those relevant for current decisions. The potential for using the ideas in participatory decision making is discussed. This paper is an initial attempt to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing such situations but with a focus on the reservoir-canal system water rights enforcement.

Functional characterization of the oxaloacetase encoding gene and elimination of oxalate formation in the beta-lactam producer Penicillium chrysogenum

Penicillium chrysogenum is widely used as an industrial antibiotic producer, in particular in the synthesis of g-lactam antibiotics such as penicillins and cephalosporins. In industrial processes, oxalic acid formation leads to reduced product yields. Moreover, precipitation of calcium oxalate complicates product recovery. We observed oxalate production in glucose-limited chemostat cultures of P. chrysogenum grown with or without addition of adipic acid, side-chain of the cephalosporin precursor adipoyl-6-aminopenicillinic acid (ad-6-APA). Oxalate accounted for up to 5% of the consumed carbon source. In filamentous fungi, oxaloacetate hydrolase (OAH; EC3.7.1.1) is generally responsible for oxalate production. The P. chrysogenum genome harbours four orthologs of the A. niger oahA gene. Chemostat-based transcriptome analyses revealed a significant correlation between extracellular oxalate titers and expression level of the genes Pc18g05100 and Pc22g24830. To assess their possible involvement in oxalate production, both genes were cloned in Saccharomyces cerevisiae, yeast that does not produce oxalate. Only the expression of Pc22g24830 led to production of oxalic acid in S. cerevisiae. Subsequent deletion of Pc22g28430 in P. chrysogenum led to complete elimination of oxalate production, whilst improving yields of the cephalosporin precursor ad-6-APA. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A vaccination game based on public health actions and personal decisions

Susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) models are commonly used for representing the spread of contagious diseases. A SIR model can be described in terms of a probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA), where each individual (corresponding to a cell of the PCA lattice) is connected to others by a random network favoring local contacts. Here, this framework is employed for investigating the consequences of applying vaccine against the propagation of a contagious infection, by considering vaccination as a game, in the sense of game theory. In this game, the players are the government and the susceptible newborns. In order to maximize their own payoffs, the government attempts to reduce the costs for combating the epidemic, and the newborns may be vaccinated only when infective individuals are found in their neighborhoods and/or the government promotes an immunization program. As a consequence of these strategies supported by cost-benefit analysis and perceived risk, numerical simulations show that the disease is not fully eliminated and the government implements quasi-periodic vaccination campaigns. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.