Pragmatism and precision : psychology in the service of civil litigation

While forensic psychology is commonly associated with the criminal and family law domains, its ambit to offer skills and knowledge at the legal interface also makes it particularly suited to the civil law domain. At this time, civil law is arguably the least represented legislative area in terms of psychological research and professional commentary. However, it is also a broad area, with its very breadth providing scope for research consideration, as urged by Greene. The purposes of this article are (1) to review the broad role of the psychologist in the conduct of civil litigation matters in Australia, (2) to assist the novice to the area by indicating a non-exhaustive list of potentially ambiguous terms and concepts common to the conduct of professional practice, and; (3) to highlight, as an example, one area of practice not only where legal direction demands professional pragmatism but also where opportunity arises for psychological research to vitally address a major social issue.

Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation : Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

This study focuses on two philosophical issues related to the interpretation of art. Firstly, it considers the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. Secondly, the study raises the issue of relativism in interpretation through a discussion of the relativistic tendencies apparent in the views of three major figures of contemporary philosophy: Joseph Margolis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richard Rorty. The major goal of the thesis is to develop a theory of interpretation supporting the role of authorial intentions in interpretation on the basis of Donald Davidson s late philosophy of language and the holistic account of interpretation that underlies different parts of his philosophy. It is my belief that an intentionalist view of interpretation built on Davidsonian elements manages to form the most convincing defense of that interpretive position against the skepticism present in the views of Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty. The theoretical issues addressed in the thesis are illuminated by discussions of case-examples, most importantly Richard Wagner s The Valkyrie, Thomas Adés America: A Prophecy, and some symphonies by Dimitri Shostakovich. In chapter one, I present a critical discussion of Margolis robust relativism. While finding Margolis criticism of the self-refutive argument plausible, I, nevertheless, argue that the relativistic logic Margolis offers should not be favored in interpretation. The first parts of chapter two outline Davidsonian intentionalism by presenting a reading of Davidson s later work in philosophy of language and mind, and by indicating its relationship to Davidson s views of literature. Then, I shall compare Davidson s ideas with some recent modest forms of intentionalism found in analytic aesthetics, and argue that Davidsonian intentionalism is in many respects more satisfactory compared to them. Chapter three engages Gadamer s hermeneutics by defending E.D. Hirsch s criticism of Gadamer. Uncovering the shortcomings in the replies of Gadamer s followers to Hirsch s criticism serves as a basis for the defense of intentionalism in interpretation carried out in the chapter. That defense is then extended with a discussion of some recent hermeneutic readings of Davidson s views. Chapter four deals with the standing of intentionalism through Rorty s pragmatist approach to literature. By indicating the position of pragmatist notions of aesthetic experience and imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism, it is shown that an intentionalist approach need not be as impoverished with regard to the value Rorty attributes to literature as he assumes. The concluding chapter outlines some ways in which one can be a pluralist with regard to art and interpretation without falling into relativism.

From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.

Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought

The present book is devoted to "European connections of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism". The theme, chosen carefully and intentionally, is supposed to show the motivation behind the writing of the present work, as well as to show its intended extent. Let us consider briefly the first three parts of the theme, to enlighten a little our intentions. "European" is perhaps the most important description for it was precisely that thread that was most important to me, being the only context seriously taken into account, as I assumed right from the start that I would not be writing about rather more widely unknown to me - and much less fascinating (even to Rorty, the hero of the story) from my own, traditional, Continental philosophical perspective - American analytic philosophy. So accordingly I have almost totally skipped "American" connections (to use the distinction I need here) of Rorty's philosophy, that is to say, firstly, a years-long work within analytic philosophy, secondly struggles with it on its own grounds, and finally attempts to use classical American, mainly Deweyan, pragmatism for his own needs and numerous polemics associated with it - the questions that are far away from my interests and that arise limited interest among reading and writing philosophical audience in Poland, and perhaps also among Continental philosophers. It did not seem possible to me to write a book on Rorty in his American connections for they are insufficiently known to me, demanding knowledge of both post-war American analytic philosophy as well as pragmatism of its father-founders. I could see, setting to work on Richard Rorty, that a book on his American connections (leaving aside the issue that it would not be a philosophical problem but rather, let us say, the one of writing a monograph) written by a Polish philosopher in Poland and then in the USA was not a stimulating intellectual challenge but rather a thankless working task. Besides, having spent much time on Rorty's philosophy, writing extensively about him and translating his works, I already knew that the "Continental" context was extremely important to his neopragmatism, and that thinking about it could be relatively prolific (as opposed to the context potentially given by American philosophy).

Meta-Theoretical Paradigms Underpinning Risk in Child Welfare: Towards a Position of Methodological Pragmatism

The aim of this paper is to explore the ‘natural attitude’ underpinning risk practices in child welfare. This refers to various taken-for-granted approaches to risk that social workers and other human service professionals draw upon in their everyday practice. The approach proceeds by identifying and critically examining three key, meta-theoretical paradigms on risk which typically shape the natural attitude. They are labelled ‘objectivist’, ‘subjectivist’ and ‘critical’. The ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological premises supporting each paradigm, and how they shape risk practices, are then reviewed leading to a composite, meta-theoretical position on risk termed ‘methodological pragmatism’. This position draws on the strengths of each paradigm and is formulated into ten propositions which consider how risk should be approached in child welfare. Within this corpus of thought salient themes are endorsed such as the need for method triangulation, an examination of ‘deep causality’, and the promotion of emancipatory perspectives. By critically reflecting on meta-theory, the paper contributes to the development of substantive theories of risk assessment and management in child welfare.

Patience, Persistence and Pragmatism: Experiences and Lessons Learnt from the Implementation of Clinically Integrated Teaching and Learning of Evidence-Based Health Care - A Qualitative Study

Background

Clinically integrated teaching and learning are regarded as the best options for improving evidence-based healthcare (EBHC) knowledge, skills and attitudes. To inform implementation of such strategies, we assessed experiences and opinions on lessons learnt of those involved in such programmes.

Methods and Findings

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 24 EBHC programme coordinators from around the world, selected through purposive sampling. Following data transcription, a multidisciplinary group of investigators carried out analysis and data interpretation, using thematic content analysis. Successful implementation of clinically integrated teaching and learning of EBHC takes much time. Student learning needs to start in pre-clinical years with consolidation, application and assessment following in clinical years. Learning is supported through partnerships between various types of staff including the core EBHC team, clinical lecturers and clinicians working in the clinical setting. While full integration of EBHC learning into all clinical rotations is considered necessary, this was not always achieved. Critical success factors were pragmatism and readiness to use opportunities for engagement and including EBHC learning in the curriculum; patience; and a critical mass of the right teachers who have EBHC knowledge and skills and are confident in facilitating learning. Role modelling of EBHC within the clinical setting emerged as an important facilitator. The institutional context exerts an important influence; with faculty buy-in, endorsement by institutional leaders, and an EBHC-friendly culture, together with a supportive community of practice, all acting as key enablers. The most common challenges identified were lack of teaching time within the clinical curriculum, misconceptions about EBHC, resistance of staff, lack of confidence of tutors, lack of time, and negative role modelling.

Conclusions

Implementing clinically integrated EBHC curricula requires institutional support, a critical mass of the right teachers and role models in the clinical setting combined with patience, persistence and pragmatism on the part of teachers.

Opening truth to imagination : the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty

This study explores in a comparative way the works of two American pragmatist philosophers-John Dewey and Richard Rorty. I have provided a reading of their broader works in order to offer what I hope is a successful sympathetic comparison where very few exist. Dewey is often viewed as the central hero in the classical American pragmatic tradition, while Rorty, a contemporary pragmatist, is viewed as some sort of postmodern villain. I show that the different approaches by the two philosophers-Dewey's experiential focus versus Rorty's linguistic focus-exist along a common pragmatic continuum, and that much of the critical scholarship that pits the two pragmatists against each other has actually created an unwarranted dualism between experience and language. I accomplish this task by following the critical movement by each of the pragmatists through their respective reworking of traditional absolutist truth conceptions toward a more aesthetical, imaginative position. I also show how this shift or "turning" represents an important aspect of the American philosophical tradition-its aesthetic axis. I finally indicate a role for liberal education (focusing on higher nonvocational education) in accommodating this turning, a turning that in the end is necessitated by democracy's future trajectory

Between pragmatism and the defence of a “Sister State” : the national association for the advancement of colored people and the U.S. occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922

À l’origine, la nouvelle concernant l’occupation américaine d’Haïti en 1915 a suscité peu d’indignation aux États-Unis. En effet, on reproche à la république son instabilité politique et on juge aussi qu’une intervention américaine concourrait à l’édifice de l’autorité de la loi. À partir de 1915 et surtout en 1920, l’Association nationale pour l’avancement des gens de couleur (NAACP), fondée en 1909, critique cette ingérence et milite pour y voir un terme. W.E. B. Du Bois et James Weldon Johnson, deux figures publiques noires importantes travaillant au sein de l’organisation, dénoncent avec conviction l’occupation d’Haïti. Les historiens ont jusqu’ici jugé que la NAACP fut inspirée par des considérations de solidarité raciale en adhérant à la cause de la souveraineté haïtienne. Si la thèse présente ne réfute pas cette possibilité, elle cherche tout de même à démontrer que le cadre conceptuel de la solidarité raciale ne saurait illustrer toute la complexité de la campagne haïtienne érigée par la NAACP. Par conséquent, une attention dirigée davantage sur le contexte social et politique américain entre 1915 et 1922 révèle que pour la NAACP, la dénonciation de l’occupation américaine d’Haïti représentait d’une part une opportunité de discuter des problèmes sociaux touchant les Afro-Américains, et d’autre part, une occasion de renforcer sa position aux États-Unis.

Crime stories: posnerian pragmatism, Rawlsian pure procedural justice, and the fictional problem

There are many different ways in which law and truth may be said to be related. It is perhaps in the criminal trial that connections between them are of most significance. An orthodox way of describing a criminal trial is that the criminal procedure is seeking to establish the truth concerning some past event, and that success of the procedure is measured by how close its outcome converges with that truth. Criminal justice presents the community with challenging dilemmas in this regard, such as those arising from the notion of double jeopardy. This paper discusses the Rawlsian notions of 'imperfect', 'perfect' and 'pure' procedural justice, and suggests against Rawls that it is pure procedural justice that best represents what we want from a criminal justice system. Good procedure makes good criminal law. A comparison is made with the writings of Habermas and Posner, and given that pure procedural justice eschews transcendental truths, some brief comments are made on the convergence of that position with the realm of the fictional.

Rhetorical theory of public relations: opening the door to semiotic and pragmatism approaches

The 2001 Handbook of Public Relations edited by Robert Heath contains a prominent article advocating the use of rhetorical theory or ‘rhetorical enactment rational’ as a fruitful way of advancing theoretical understandings of public relations. In 2004 Heath and Dan Millar edited: Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. These are the latest excursions into a perspective on public relations reflecting the extensive study of rhetoric in North America. Other examples are Public Relations Inquiry as Rhetorical Criticism (Elwood, 1995); Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations (Toth and Heath, 1992); and a chapter Public Relations? No, Relations with Publics: A Rhetorical-Organisational Approach to Contemporary Corporate Communication (Cheney and Dionisopoulos, in Botan and Hazleton (Eds.) 1989).

The conventional notion of rhetoric is argumentation and persuasion stemming from the ancient Greek sophists, such as Aristotle, and from the Romans, particularly Cicero and Quintillion. Rhetoric became a fundamental plank of the trivium of ancient and medieval education: grammar, logic and rhetoric. Then in the 20th century Kenneth Burke, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca extended Aristotle’s suggestion that: “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic” Aristotle (trans. 1991). To use the rhetorical approach to argue that rational discourse cannot describe the world on its own. Instead living, enculturated human beings have to perceive ‘their’ truths. They take a perceptual ‘position’ on reason.

Public relations, is an industry for influencing perceptual ‘positions’. But the study of perception and attempts to influence perception cannot be claimed by rhetorical scholars alone. Semioticians and linguists who take the perspective of linguistic pragmatics also claim this field. This paper takes the example of ‘public relations’ as a focus for the confluence of rhetorical, semiotic and pragmatism approaches to the ‘problematic’ of understanding and truth.