How distinctive is philosophers’ intuition talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.

A questão da inexauribilidade do texto: o Frühromantik e a escritura derridiana

This article aims to investigate the configuration on the new scenario, during the Early German Romanticism, which led to dismantle the philosophical discourse as the expression of a safe and fixed content, free from the ambiguity of figural language. Our main argument is that already Schelling’s concept of symbol brings up the question about the opacity of the text. By analyzing to what extent this problematization around the language lingers on in the contemporariness, we refer to Derrida’s thought which points out to the illusion embedded in the pretension to conceive a clear and unambiguous language, creating therefore a new ground between art and philosophy since the text itself as a neutral and closed subject will be questioned now.

The Double‐Edged Sword Of Interdict: Some More Warnings From History

In this paper I revisit the age-old question of the relationship between philosophy and theology by rejecting the claim that throughout the history of the Christian Church, whenever Christian thinkers have baptized philosophy, they have done so to the detriment of theology. Church history reveals just the opposite, i. e., that sometimes theologians have creatively and fruitfully used philosophical language, concepts, methods, and conclusions to understand and express the faith. In addition, church history records numerous attempts to limit philosophical enquiry for theological reasons that proved unsuccessful and counter-productive. Both types of interaction between philosophy and theology occurred at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. Despite repeated efforts of some officials to place philosophy under interdict, that is, to ban the reading of particular philosophical works or the teaching of philosophical propositions from the university faculties, a series of university theologians applied Aristotelian tools of enquiry to questions about the Christian faith with positive and constructive results. If academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has anything to teach us, it is that interdict cuts both ways. It might protect some theological claims from philosophical contamination or compromise, but it can also insulate theological claims from much needed critical analysis. The thinkers and developments surveyed in this paper suggest that perhaps instead of placing deconstruction under interdict, today’s Christian thinkers should use some of the language, concepts, methods and conclusions of Derrida to further theological understanding.

Plato’s Parmenides and understanding the One in the philosophy of Plotinus: an oversight by Heidegger?

The present article focuses on the study of the exegesis by Plotinus with regard to the meaning of the ineffability of the one provided in Plato’s Parmenides in the first hypothesis. He places this first ineffable one at the very centre of his system, which would have important implications from both an ontological point of view and with regard to understanding the language. The conception of reality that derives from the ineffability of the first principle and the implications for the nature of philosophical language that this postulate raises will be the centre of our reflections. To shed light on the position set down in the Enneads, we will review the key points based on the original texts that deal with this issue and related critical works. We will also look at the contemporary relevance of this position and its ability to go beyond the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics.

The youth's catechetical grammar; or, A simple illustration of the principles of the English language, adapted to the capacity of the juvenile mind; comprising a philosophical view of orthography, etymology, syntax and prosody,

Mode of access: Internet.

A philosophical grammar of the English language : adapted equally to the use of schools or private study : in which are contained, in numerous instances, theoretical and practical refutations of the most prevailing systems in modern use /

"Recommendations": 10 p. at beginning of vol.

The alphabet of the primitive language of Spain, and philosophical examination of the antiquity and civilization of the Basque people: an extract from the work of Don Juan Bautista de Erro.

Translated from the Spanish by George William Erving.

An introduction to a general system of hydrostaticks and hydraulicks, philosophical and practical. Wherein the most reasonable and advantageous methods of raising and conducting water, for the watering noblemens and gentlemens seats, buildings, gardens, &c., are carefully (and in a manner not yet publish'd in any language) laid down ... Illustrated and explain'd by sixty copper cuts, done by the best hands ... Collected from the best of the Italian and French designs (together with some new ones of the author's own invention) ...

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A brief philosophical examination of ADHD

Concerns have been raised over ADHD from within a range of different disciplines, concerns which are not only voiced from within the hard sciences themselves, but also from within the social sciences. This paper will add the discipline of philosophy to that number, arguing that an analysis of two traditionally philosophical topics - namely "truth" and "free-will" - allows us a new and unsettling perspective on conduct disorders like ADHD. More specifically, it will be argued that ADHD not only fails to meet its own ontological and epistemological standards as an 'objective' pathology, but it also constitutes one more element in what has already become a significant undermining of a crucial component of social life: moral responsibility.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Deconstructing 'Mono'-Lingualism: considerations of value for 'English' 'language' education in a global setting.

Traditionally, language speakers are categorised as mono-lingual, bilingual, or multilingual. It is traditionally assumed in English language education that the ‘lingual’ is something that can be ‘fixed’ in form, written down to be learnt, and taught. Accordingly, the ‘mono’-lingual will have a ‘fixed’ linguistic form. Such a ‘form’ differs according to a number of criteria or influences including region or ‘type’ of English (for example, World Englishes) but is nevertheless assumed to be a ‘form’. ‘Mono-lingualism’ is defined and believed, traditionally, to be ‘speaking one language’; wherever that language is; or whatever that language may be. In this chapter, grounded in an individual subjective philosophy of language, we question this traditional definition. Viewing language from the philosophical perspectives such as those of Bakhtin and Voloshinov, we argue that the prominence of ‘context’ and ‘consciousness’ in language means that to ‘fix’ the form of a language goes against the very spirit of how it is formed and used. We thus challenge the categorisation of ‘mono’-lingualism; proposing that such a categorisation is actually a category error, or a case ‘in which a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property’ (Restivo, 2013, p. 175), in this case the property of ‘mono’. Using this proposition as a starting point, we suggest that more time be devoted to language in its context and as per its genuine use as a vehicle for consciousness. We theorise this can be done through a ‘literacy’ based approach which fronts the context of language use rather than the language itself. We outline how we envision this working for teachers, students and materials developers of English Language Education materials in a global setting. To do this we consider Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence as an exemplar to promote conscious language use in context.

Within the carnal: re-reading Merleau-Ponty through the language of drawing

In order to present visual art as a paradigm for philosophy, Merleau-Ponty investigated the creative processes of artists whose work corresponded closely with his philosophical ideas. His essays on art are widely valued for emphasising process over product, and for challenging the primacy of the written word in all spheres of human expression. While it is clear that he initially favoured painting, Merleau-Ponty began to develop a much deeper understanding of the complexities of how art is made in his late work in parallel with his advancement of a new ontology. Although his ontology remains unfinished and only exists as working notes and a manuscript entitled The Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty had begun to appreciate the fundamental role drawing plays in the making of art and the creation of a language of expression that is as vital as the written or spoken word. Through an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished manuscript and working notes my thesis will investigate his working methods and use of materials and also explore how he processed his ideas by using my own art practice as the basis of my research. This research will take the form of an inquiry into how the unfinished and incomplete nature of text and artworks, while they are still ‘works in progress’, can often reveal the more human and carnal components of creative processes. Applying my experience as a practitioner and a teacher in an art school, I focus on the significance of drawing practice for Merleau-Ponty’s later work, in order to rebalance an overemphasis on painting in the literature. Understanding the differences between these two art forms, and how they are taught, can offer an alternative engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later work and his struggle to find a language to express his developing new ontology. In addition, by re-reading his work through the language of drawing, I believe we gain new insights which reaffirm Merleau-Ponty's relevance to contemporary art making and aesthetics.