La génesis del matrimonio civil

Resumen: Es insuficiente para comprender adecuadamente las causas sociales, políticas e ideológicas de la incorporación del matrimonio civil obligatorio a nuestra legislación, el analizar el período histórico próximo a la sanción de la ley 2.393. Por ello hemos organizado la investigación en tres capítulos: “Los matrimonios entre personas de distinta religión”, “Católicos y liberales” y “La Ley de Matrimonio Civil”. El primero abarca la problemática, las distintas soluciones y la legislación aplicable, en el Río de la Plata, desde el tiempo de la colonia hasta la sanción del Código Civil. El segundo, la concepción filosófica de los hombres de la generación del ochenta, protagonistas de la sanción de la ley 2.393, las dos corrientes de pensamiento enfrentadas por su concepto del hombre, la libertad y el Estado, la posición de la prensa, los criterios sustentados por los doctorandos de la época, el fenómeno inmigratorio y el proceso de secularización. Por último, el proyecto de ley, sus repercusiones en la sociedad, en la prensa, el clero y la opinión pública; y su tratamiento en el Congreso de la Nación. Buscamos discernir las causas verdaderas y principales y las ficticias que llevaron a la introducción del matrimonio civil en el derecho argentino, para ello no solo hemos consultado las fuentes habituales, sino que hemos examinado gran cantidad de fuentes originales de la época. Entre ellas, a) la totalidad de los artículos publicados en los diarios La Prensa y La Nación durante el período 1870–1888; b) las Cartas remitidas por el Obispo de Buenos Aires, Monseñor Aneiros y por el Obispo de Córdoba, Fray Reginaldo al Senado de la Nación; c) Actas de las Sesiones de las Cámaras de Diputados y Senadores y d) las tesis doctorales de Francisco Barroetaveña, Daniel Goytia, Julio Sánchez Viamonte, Leopoldo Tahiér, Federico Valdez, Alejandro González Vélez y Alejandro Garramuño.

Ciência e ética: alguns aspectos

A discussão sobre ciência e ética, se colocada em nível radical, necessita previamente passar pela concepção filosófica de 'ser humano', 'ética' e 'ciência'. Na perspectiva existencialista, o homem é um ser capaz de autodeterminação, ou seja, ser sujeito do conhecimento e da ação. em conseqüência, no campo ético, tudo aquilo que tira ou diminui essa dimensão de sujeito é considerado violência. Por sua vez, a ciência moderna ocidental contém em si um amplo projeto de dominação: da natureza, de si mesmo e do outro. Portanto, uma ciência ética só é possível a partir de uma nova postura diante da própria ciência e dos valores da sociedade construída sob seu signo.

Fernando de Azevedo: na batalha do humanismo

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

O processo civilizador e o estudo do humanismo como objetivos contemporâneos

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

Plato's Cretan Colony: Theology and Religion in the Political Philosophy of the Laws

The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime.

I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.

Acessibilidade e usabilidade em curso online : um desafio para as escolas de governo

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Educação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação, 2016.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

On the applicability of mathematics : philosophical and historical perspectives

The present thesis is a contribution to the debate on the applicability of mathematics; it examines the interplay between mathematics and the world, using historical case studies. The first part of the thesis consists of four small case studies. In chapter 1, I criticize "ante rem structuralism", proposed by Stewart Shapiro, by showing that his so-called "finite cardinal structures" are in conflict with mathematical practice. In chapter 2, I discuss Leonhard Euler's solution to the Königsberg bridges problem. I propose interpreting Euler's solution both as an explanation within mathematics and as a scientific explanation. I put the insights from the historical case to work against recent philosophical accounts of the Königsberg case. In chapter 3, I analyze the predator-prey model, proposed by Lotka and Volterra. I extract some interesting philosophical lessons from Volterra's original account of the model, such as: Volterra's remarks on mathematical methodology; the relation between mathematics and idealization in the construction of the model; some relevant details in the derivation of the Third Law, and; notions of intervention that are motivated by one of Volterra's main mathematical tools, phase spaces. In chapter 4, I discuss scientific and mathematical attempts to explain the structure of the bee's honeycomb. In the first part, I discuss a candidate explanation, based on the mathematical Honeycomb Conjecture, presented in Lyon and Colyvan (2008). I argue that this explanation is not scientifically adequate. In the second part, I discuss other mathematical, physical and biological studies that could contribute to an explanation of the bee's honeycomb. The upshot is that most of the relevant mathematics is not yet sufficiently understood, and there is also an ongoing debate as to the biological details of the construction of the bee's honeycomb. The second part of the thesis is a bigger case study from physics: the genesis of GR. Chapter 5 is a short introduction to the history, physics and mathematics that is relevant to the genesis of general relativity (GR). Chapter 6 discusses the historical question as to what Marcel Grossmann contributed to the genesis of GR. I will examine the so-called "Entwurf" paper, an important joint publication by Einstein and Grossmann, containing the first tensorial formulation of GR. By comparing Grossmann's part with the mathematical theories he used, we can gain a better understanding of what is involved in the first steps of assimilating a mathematical theory to a physical question. In chapter 7, I introduce, and discuss, a recent account of the applicability of mathematics to the world, the Inferential Conception (IC), proposed by Bueno and Colyvan (2011). I give a short exposition of the IC, offer some critical remarks on the account, discuss potential philosophical objections, and I propose some extensions of the IC. In chapter 8, I put the Inferential Conception (IC) to work in the historical case study: the genesis of GR. I analyze three historical episodes, using the conceptual apparatus provided by the IC. In episode one, I investigate how the starting point of the application process, the "assumed structure", is chosen. Then I analyze two small application cycles that led to revisions of the initial assumed structure. In episode two, I examine how the application of "new" mathematics - the application of the Absolute Differential Calculus (ADC) to gravitational theory - meshes with the IC. In episode three, I take a closer look at two of Einstein's failed attempts to find a suitable differential operator for the field equations, and apply the conceptual tools provided by the IC so as to better understand why he erroneously rejected both the Ricci tensor and the November tensor in the Zurich Notebook.

Controlling the philosophical imaginary: reading Pierre Hadot with Luiz Costa Lima

This essay proffers a critical complement to Luiz Costa Lima's claims concerning the nature, history, and control of the imagination in Western culture. Accepting the wide scope of Costa Lima's critical claim about the socio-political control of imaginative literature in Western history, we claim that Pierre Hadot's work on philosophy as a bios in the ancient West cautions us lest we position philosophy in this history as always and necessarily an agency of control. At different times, philosophy has rather stood as an ally in practicing and promoting forms of criticity, and the playful, creative, and transformative envisaging of alternative ways of experiencing the world Costa Lima theoretically celebrates in literary fiction. Any critique of philosophy as always opposed to the critical imagination can only stand, we have argued, relative to philosophy as conceived on what Hadot suggests is but one, albeit the now hegemonic model: namely, as a body of systematic rational discourses, including discourses about the literary, poetics, and imaginary. What this vision of philosophy misses, Hadot shows, is how the ancient conception of philosophy (which survives in figures like Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Goethe) as a way of life promoted distinctly literary, aesthetic, and imaginative practices; first, to assist in the existential internalisation of the schools' ideas; secondly, to envisage in the sage and utopias edifying counterfactuals to help students critically reimagine accepted norms; and thirdly, in the conception of a transformed way of living and perceiving ‘according to nature’, whose parameters of autonomy and pleasurable contemplation of the singularity of the present experiences anticipate the experiences delineated in modern aesthetic theory.

Description and chemical composition of the fossil manganese nodules of the Cambrian manganese deposits of Conception and Trinity bays, Newfoundland

This paper is based upon data collected during the summers of 1912 and 1913. Mr. A. O. Hayes and Prof. van Ingen of Princeton University, while making a study of the general geology, stratigraphy, and palaeontology of the shores of Conception Bay, Newfoundland, came upon the manganiferous rocks of the Lower Cambrian exposed at Manuels, Topsail, Brigus, and other places. The following summer, of 1913, the writer as a member of the Princeton Newfoundland Expedition undertook a more detailed study of these deposits. In this paper therefore there has been an attempt to present as comprehensive a study of the manganese of southeastern Newfoundland. It is primarily chemical in its nature and the analyses herewith presented are from samples taken from the principal manganese-bearing beds.