Experimental evidence that partner choice is a driving force in the payoff distribution among cooperators or mutualists: the cleaner fish case

Supply and demand largely determine the price of goods on human markets. It has been proposed that in animals, similar forces influence the payoff distribution between trading partners in Sexual selection, intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism. Here we present the first experimental evidence supporting biological market theory in it study on cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus. Cleaners interact with two classes of clients: choosy client species with access to several cleaners usually do not queue for service and do not return if ignored, while resident client species with access to only one cleaning station do queue or return. We used plexiglas plates with equal amounts of food to stimulate these behaviours of the two client classes. Cleaners soon inspected 'choosy' plates before 'resident' plates. This supports previous field observations that suggest that client species with access to several cleaners exert choice to receive better(immediate) service.

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Dominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria.

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Rationing problems with payoff thresholds

An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identi fied by their respective claims over some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some payoff thresholds. These thresholds introduce exogenous differences among agents (full or partial priority, past allocations, past debts, ...) that may influence the final distribution. Within this framework we provide generalizations of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that these generalized rules are dual from each other. We characterize the generalization of the equal awards rule by using the properties of consistency, path-independence and compensated exemption. Finally, we use the duality between rules to characterize the generalization of the equal losses solution.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

Which Combinations Of New Venture Firms Resources Payoff? A Configurational Perspective

Baldauf, Artur; Schweiger, Simone A.; Wuethrich, Adrian

Inconclusive proofs of payoff in driver education and other crash prevention measures.

Mode of access: Internet.

A preliminary sketch for the property of Mr. Payoff Tinkoff

Yellow, brown, red, blue, black ink on heavy paper; unsigned. 95 x 85 cm. Scale: 1" = 10' [from photographic copy by Lance Burgharrdt]

Multicriteria analysis in decision making under information uncertainty

This paper presents results of research related to multicriteria decision making under information uncertainty. The Bell-man-Zadeh approach to decision making in a fuzzy environment is utilized for analyzing multicriteria optimization models (< X, M > models) under deterministic information. Its application conforms to the principle of guaranteed result and provides constructive lines in obtaining harmonious solutions on the basis of analyzing associated maxmin problems. This circumstance permits one to generalize the classic approach to considering the uncertainty of quantitative information (based on constructing and analyzing payoff matrices reflecting effects which can be obtained for different combinations of solution alternatives and the so-called states of nature) in monocriteria decision making to multicriteria problems. Considering that the uncertainty of information can produce considerable decision uncertainty regions, the resolving capacity of this generalization does not always permit one to obtain unique solutions. Taking this into account, a proposed general scheme of multicriteria decision making under information uncertainty also includes the construction and analysis of the so-called < X, R > models (which contain fuzzy preference relations as criteria of optimality) as a means for the subsequent contraction of the decision uncertainty regions. The paper results are of a universal character and are illustrated by a simple example. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Sampled Control for Mean-Variance Hedging in a Jump Diffusion Financial Market

In this technical note we consider the mean-variance hedging problem of a jump diffusion continuous state space financial model with the re-balancing strategies for the hedging portfolio taken at discrete times, a situation that more closely reflects real market conditions. A direct expression based on some change of measures, not depending on any recursions, is derived for the optimal hedging strategy as well as for the ""fair hedging price"" considering any given payoff. For the case of a European call option these expressions can be evaluated in a closed form.

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.