Variants of temporal defeasible logics for modelling norm modifications

This paper proposes some variants of Temporal Defeasible Logic (TDL) to reason about normative modifications. These variants make it possible to differentiate cases in which, for example, modifications at some time change legal rules but their conclusions persist afterwards from cases where also their conclusions are blocked.

Strategic argumentation: A game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far.

Analyse de la structure logique des inférences légales et modélisation du discours juridique

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Normative Practical Reasoning via Argumentation and Dialogue

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BDI reasoning with normative considerations

F. Meneguzzi thanks Fundaç ao de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (FAPERGS, Brazil) for the financial support through the ACI program (Grant ref. 3541-2551/12-0) and the ARD program (Grant ref. 12/0808-5), as well as Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) through the Universal Call (Grant ref. 482156/2013-9) and PQ fellowship (Grant ref. 306864/2013-4). N. Oren and W.W. Vasconcelos acknowledge the support of the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC, UK) within the research project “Scrutable Autonomous Systems” (SAsSY11, Grant ref. EP/J012084/1).

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Liberties and constraints of the normative approach to evaluation and decision in forensic science: a discussion towards overcoming some common misconceptions

At a time when disciplined inference and decision making under uncertainty represent common aims to participants in legal proceedings, the scientific community is remarkably heterogenous in its attitudes as to how these goals ought to be achieved. Probability and decision theory exert a considerable influence, and we think by all reason rightly do so, but they go against a mainstream of thinking that does not embrace-or is not aware of-the 'normative' character of this body of theory. It is normative, in the sense understood in this article, in that it prescribes particular properties, typically (logical) coherence, to which reasoning and decision making ought to conform. Disregarding these properties can result in diverging views which are occasionally used as an argument against the theory, or as a pretext for not following it. Typical examples are objections according to which people, both in everyday life but also individuals involved at various levels in the judicial process, find the theory difficult to understand and to apply. A further objection is that the theory does not reflect how people actually behave. This article aims to point out in what sense these examples misinterpret the analytical framework in its normative perspective. Through examples borrowed mostly from forensic science contexts, it is argued that so-called intuitive scientific attitudes are particularly liable to such misconceptions. These attitudes are contrasted with a statement of the actual liberties and constraints of probability and decision theory and the view according to which this theory is normative.

Deliberative Democracy and Precautionary Public Reasoning : Exploratory Thoughts

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Interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents. A formalization in temporal modal defeasible logic and its implementation

Sustainable computer systems require some flexibility to adapt to environmental unpredictable changes. A solution lies in autonomous software agents which can adapt autonomously to their environments. Though autonomy allows agents to decide which behavior to adopt, a disadvantage is a lack of control, and as a side effect even untrustworthiness: we want to keep some control over such autonomous agents. How to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy? A solution is to regulate agents’ behavior by norms. The normative paradigm makes it possible to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy, limiting untrustworthiness and augmenting system compliance. It can also facilitate the design of the system, for example, by regulating the coordination among agents. However, an autonomous agent will follow norms or violate them in some conditions. What are the conditions in which a norm is binding upon an agent? While autonomy is regarded as the driving force behind the normative paradigm, cognitive agents provide a basis for modeling the bindingness of norms. In order to cope with the complexity of the modeling of cognitive agents and normative bindingness, we adopt an intentional stance. Since agents are embedded into a dynamic environment, things may not pass at the same instant. Accordingly, our cognitive model is extended to account for some temporal aspects. Special attention is given to the temporal peculiarities of the legal domain such as, among others, the time in force and the time in efficacy of provisions. Some types of normative modifications are also discussed in the framework. It is noteworthy that our temporal account of legal reasoning is integrated to our commonsense temporal account of cognition. As our intention is to build sustainable reasoning systems running unpredictable environment, we adopt a declarative representation of knowledge. A declarative representation of norms will make it easier to update their system representation, thus facilitating system maintenance; and to improve system transparency, thus easing system governance. Since agents are bounded and are embedded into unpredictable environments, and since conflicts may appear amongst mental states and norms, agent reasoning has to be defeasible, i.e. new pieces of information can invalidate formerly derivable conclusions. In this dissertation, our model is formalized into a non-monotonic logic, namely into a temporal modal defeasible logic, in order to account for the interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents.

Logic of Violations: A gentzen systems for reasoning with contrary-to-duty obligations

In this paper we present a Gentzen system for reasoning with contrary-to-duty obligations. The intuition behind the system is that a contrary-to-duty is a special kind of normative exception. The logical machinery to formalise this idea is taken from substructural logics and it is based on the definition of a new non-classical connective capturing the notion of reparational obligation. Then the system is tested against well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes.

Weak reasoning argumentative theory. A dialogical approach for the discovery of philosophy in high schools

In the literature on philosophical practices, despite the crucial role that argumentation plays in these activities, no specific argumentative theories have ever been proposed to assist the figure of the facilitator in conducting philosophical dialogue and to enhance student’s critical thinking skills. The dissertation starts from a cognitive perspective that challenges the classic Cartesian notion of rationality by focusing on limits and biases of human reasoning. An argumentative model (WRAT – Weak Reasoning Argumentative Theory) is then outlined in order to respond to the needs of philosophical dialogue. After justifying the claim that this learning activity, among other inductive methodologies, is the most suitable for critical thinking education, I inquired into the specific goal of ‘arguing’ within this context by means of the tools provided by Speech Act Theory: the speaker’s intention is to construct new knowledge by questioning her own and other’s beliefs. The model proposed has been theorized on this assumption, starting from which the goals, and, in turn, the related norms, have been pinpointed. In order to include all the epistemic attitudes required to accomplish the complex task of arguing in philosophical dialogue, I needed to integrate two opposed cognitive accounts, Dual Process Theory and Evolutionary Approach, that, although they provide incompatible descriptions of reasoning, can be integrated to provide a normative account of argumentation. The model, apart from offering a theoretical contribution to argumentation studies, is designed to be applied to the Italian educational system, in particular to classes in technical and professional high schools belonging to the newly created network Inventio. This initiative is one of the outcomes of the research project by the same name, which also includes an original Syllabus, research seminars, a monitoring action and publications focused on introducing philosophy, in the form of workshop activities, into technical and professional schools.

Improving Critical Thinking and Clinical Reasoning With a Continuing Education Course

Background: Continuing education courses related to critical thinking and clinical reasoning are needed to improve the accuracy of diagnosis. Method: This study evaluated a 4-day, 16-hour continuing education course conducted in Brazil. Thirty-nine nurses completed a pretest and a posttest consisting of two written case studies designed to measure the accuracy of nurses` diagnoses. Results: There were significant differences in accuracy from pretest to posttest for case 1 (p = .008) and case 2 (p = .042) and overall (p = .001). Conclusion: Continuing education courses should be implemented to improve the accuracy of nurses` diagnoses. J Contin Educ Nurs 2009;40(3):121-127.

Interaction between Normative Systems and Cognitive Agents in Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic

While some recent frameworks on cognitive agents addressed the combination of mental attitudes with deontic concepts, they commonly ignore the representation of time. An exception is [1]that manages also some temporal aspects both with respect to cognition and normative provisions. We propose in this paper an extension of the logic presented in [1]with temporal intervals.

Equational Reasoning as a Tool for Data Analysis

A combination of deductive reasoning, clustering, and inductive learning is given as an example of a hybrid system for exploratory data analysis. Visualization is replaced by a dialogue with the data.