Essays in economics of information

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre.

Opportunistic Scheduling in Cellular Systems in the Presence of Noncooperative Mobiles

A central scheduling problem in wireless communications is that of allocating resources to one of many mobile stations that have a common radio channel. Much attention has been given to the design of efficient and fair scheduling schemes that are centrally controlled by a base station (BS) whose decisions depend on the channel conditions reported by each mobile. The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework. The decisions are based on the reports of mobiles on their radio channel conditions. In this paper, we study the scheduling problem from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative or strategic, and may not necessarily report their true channel conditions. We model this situation as a signaling game and study its equilibria. We demonstrate that the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the signaling game are of the babbling type: the noncooperative mobiles send signals independent of their channel states, the BS simply ignores them, and allocates channels based only on the prior information on the channel statistics. We then propose various approaches to enforce truthful signaling of the radio channel conditions: a pricing approach, an approach based on some knowledge of the mobiles' policies, and an approach that replaces this knowledge by a stochastic approximations approach that combines estimation and control. We further identify other equilibria that involve non-truthful signaling.

Experimental implementation of a three qubit quantum game with corrupt source using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor

In a three player quantum `Dilemma' game each player takes independent decisions to maximize his/her individual gain. The optimal strategy in the quantum version of this game has a higher payoff compared to its classical counterpart. However, this advantage is lost if the initial qubits provided to the players are from a noisy source. We have experimentally implemented the three player quantum version of the `Dilemma' game as described by Johnson, [N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. A 63 (2001) 020302(R)] using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor and have experimentally verified that the payoff of the quantum game for various levels of corruption matches the theoretical payoff. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.

Optimization of quantum states for signaling across an arbitrary qubit noise channel with minimum-error detection

International audience

Meaning in movement : a gestural design game

This paper describes a design game that we called 'Meaning in Movement'. The purpose was to explore notions of professional dental practice with dental practioners in terms of gestures, actions and movements. The game represents a first step towards involving gestures, actions and movements in a design dialog with practioners for the purpose of designing future interactive systems which are more appropriate to the type of skilful actions and richly structured environments of dentists and dental assistants.

Talking about watching : using the video card game and wiki-web technology to engage IT students in developing observational skills.

Designers need to develop good observational skills in order to conduct user studies that reveal the subtleties of human interactions and adequately inform design activity. In this paper we describe a game format that we have used in concert with wiki-web technology, to engage our IT and Information Environments students in developing much sharper observational skills. The Video Card Game is a method of video analysis that is suited to design practitioners as well as to researchers. It uses the familiar format of a card game similar to "Happy Families,, to help students develop themes of interactions from watching video clips. Students then post their interaction themes on wiki-web pages, which allows the teaching team and other students to edit and comment on them. We found that the tangible (cards), game, role playing and sharing aspects of this method led to a much larger amount of interaction and discussion between student groups and between students and the teaching team, than we have achieved using our traditional teaching methods, while taking no more time on the part of the teaching staff. The quality of the resulting interaction themes indicates that this method fosters development of observational skills.In the paper we describe the motivations, method and results in full. We also describe the research context in which we collected the videotape data, and how this method relates to state of the art research methods in interaction design for ubiquitous computing technology.

A collaborative digestion and design game for community and technology exploration

In this paper, we present interim results from the Communities and Place project, which is exploring methods for understanding communities in a variety of contexts, and how to inform the design of technology to support them. We report on our experience with adapting an existing game-based approach for working with video as a resource in participatory design processes. Our adaptations allow the approach to be used with diverse data arising out of the different communities we are engaged with, and different design traditions we approach the problem from, leading to the formation of common design themes to inform our future work on this project.

Lesser-known worlds : bridging the telematic flows with located human experience through game design

This paper represents a new theorization of the role of location-based games (LBGs) as potentially playing specific roles in peoples’ access to the culture of cities [22]. A LBG is a game that employs mobile technologies as tools for game play in real world environments. We argue that as a new genre in the field of mobile entertainment, research in this area tends to be preoccupied with the newness of the technology and its commercial possibilities. However, this overlooks its potential to contribute to cultural production. We argue that the potential to contribute to cultural production lies in the capacity of these experiences to enhance relationships between specific groups and new urban spaces. Given that developers can design LBGs to be played with everyday devices in everyday environments, what new creative opportunities are available to everyday people?

Now everything looks like a game : Mobile phones and location-based games.

This paper explores how we may transform peoples’ perceived access to cultural participation by exploiting the possible relationships between place, play and mobile devices. It presents SCOOT; a location-based game in order to investigate how aspects of game-play can be employed to evoke at once playful and culturally meaningful experiences of place. In particular this paper is concerned with how the portable, communicative and social affordances of mobile phones are integral to making a “now everything looks like a game” experience.