Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A case of cognitive convergence

The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is an exceedingly rare capacity in the animal kingdom. To date, only humans and great apes have shown convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition. Two dolphins were exposed to reflective surfaces, and both demonstrated responses consistent with the use of the mirror to investigate marked parts of the body. This ability to use a mirror to inspect parts of the body is a striking example of evolutionary convergence with great apes and humans.

A longitudinal investigation of self-other discrimination and the emergence of mirror self-recognition

The aim in this study was to investigate the association between infants' developing interest in their self-image and the onset of mirror self-recognition (MSR). A longitudinal study was conducted with 98 infants who were seen at intervals of 3 months from 9-24 months of age. At each session, the infants were administered a preferential-looking test whereby they were presented with a video image of themselves alongside a video image of a same-aged peer in two conditions, unmarked and marked. From the 12-month session onwards, the infants were also administered a version of the standard mark test of MSR. The infants showed a significant preference for looking at images of themselves in both conditions coincident with the onset of MSR. This result indicates that developing an interest in the self-image is an important component in the development of MSR. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

Pretend play, mirror self-recognition and imitation: A longitudinal investigation through the second year

The aim in the current study was to investigate the emergence of pretend play, mirror self-recognition, synchronic imitation and deferred imitation in normally developing human infants. A longitudinal study was conducted with 98 infants seen at three-monthly intervals from 12 through to 24 months of age. At each session the infants were tested on a range of tasks assessing the four target skills. Deferred imitation was found to emerge prior to synchronic imitation, pretend play and mirror self-recognition. In contrast, the latter three skills emerged between 18 and 21 months and followed similar developmental trajectories. Deferred imitation was found to hold a prerequisite relation with these three skills. Synchronic imitation, pretend play and mirror self-recognition were not closely associated and no prerequisite relations were found between these skills. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories regarding the development of pretend play, mirror self-recognition, synchronic imitation and deferred imitation in the second year. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Mirror self-recognition beyond the face

Three studies (N=144) investigated how toddlers aged 18 and 24 months pass the surprise-mark test of self-recognition. In Study 1, toddlers were surreptitiously marked in successive conditions on their legs and faces with stickers visible only in a mirror. Rates of sticker touching did not differ significantly between conditions. In Study 2, toddlers failed to touch a sticker on their legs that had been disguised before being marked. In Study 3, having been given 30-s exposure to their disguised legs before testing, toddlers touched the stickers on their legs and faces at equivalent levels. These results suggest that toddlers pass the mark test based on expectations about what they look like, expectations that are not restricted to the face.

Mirror self-recognition in a gorilla (gorilla gorilla gorilla)

Psychologists have studied self-recognition in human infants as an indication of self-knowledge (Amsterdam, 1972) and the development of abstract thought processes. Gallup (1970) modified the mark test used in human infant work to examine if nonhuman primates showed similar evidence of mirror self-recognition. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmnaeus) pass the mirror self-recognition test with limited mirror training or exposure. Other species of primates, such as gorillas and monkeys, have not passed the mirror test, despite extensive mirror exposure and training (Gallup, 1979). This project examined a gorilla (G. gorilla gorilla) named Otto in the traditional mark test. Using the modified mark-test, there were more incidents of touching the marked area while Otto was in front of the mirror than when he was not in front of the mirror. These results indicated that Otto was able to show some evidence of selfawareness.

Self-recognition in live videos by young children : does video training help?

The overall aim of the experiment reported here was to establish whether self-recognition in live video can be facilitated when live video training is provided to children aged 2-2.5 years. While the majority of children failed the test of live self-recognition prior to video training, more than half exhibited live self-recognition post video training. Children who failed the live video self-recognition tasks passed the test of mirror self-recognition. The findings are discussed in light of a video deficit and the potential role of pre-test training in facilitating self-recognition in live video by young children.

The development of self-recognition in mirrors and live videos

By 24-months of age most children show mirror self-recognition. When surreptitiously marked on their forehead and then presented with a mirror, they explore their own head for the unexpected mark. Here we demonstrate that self-recognition in mirrors does not generalize to other visual feedback. We tested 80 children on mirror and live video versions of the task. Whereas 90% of 24-month olds passed the mirror version, only 35% passed the video version. Seventy percent of 30-month olds showed video selfrecognition and only by age 36-months did the pass rate on the video version reach 90%. It remains to be y 24-months of age most children show mirror self-recognition. When surreptitiously marked on their forehead and then presented with a mirror, they explore their own head for the unexpected mark. Here we demonstrate that self-recognition in mirrors does not generalize to other visual feedback. We tested 80 children on mirror and live video versions of the task. Whereas 90% of 24-month olds passed the mirror version, only 35% passed the video version. Seventy percent of 30-month olds showed video selfrecognition and only by age 36-months did the pass rate on the video version reach 90%. It remains to be

Self-recognition and abstraction abilities in the common chimpanzee studied with distorting mirrors.

The reactions of chimpanzees to regular mirrors and the results of the standard Gallup mark test have been well documented. In addition to using the mark test to demonstrate self-recognition in a regular mirror, we exposed six female chimpanzees to mirrors that produced distorted or multiplied self-images. Their reactions to their self-images, in terms of mirror-guided self-referenced behaviors, indicated that correct assessment of the source of the mirror image was made by each subject in each of the mirrors. Recognition of a distorted self-image implies an ability for abstraction in the subjects in that the distortion must be rationalized before self-recognition occurs. The implications of these results in terms of illuminating the relative importance of feature and contingency of movement cues to self-recognition are discussed.

Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features.

Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.

Augmenting an artificial immune network using ordering, self-recognition and histo-compatibility operators.

Timmis J Neal M J and Hunt J. Augmenting an artificial immune network using ordering, self-recognition and histo-compatibility operators. In Proceedings of IEEE international conference of systems, man and cybernetics, pages 3821-3826, San Diego, 1998. IEEE.

Idiotypic networks and self-recognition in the immune system.

Journal Article

Empowering the Shamed Self: Recognition and Critical Social Work

Summary: This article provides a review of the contribution of Axel Honneth’s model of recognition for critical social work. While Honneth’s tripartite conceptualisation of optimal identity-formation is positively appraised, his analysis of the link between misrecognition, the experience of shame and eventual sense of moral outrage, is contested. Drawing on a range of sources, including the sociology of shame, Honneth’s ideas about the emotional antecedents of emancipatory action are revised to guide critical social work with misrecognised service users.

Findings: The intellectual background to Honneth’s recognition model, emanating from leading German philosophers, is described and its application to social work set out. Even so, Honneth’s model is found to be deficient in one primary regard: its assumption about the emotional antecedents to quests for withheld recognition is misapprehended. In particular, the argument in this article is that the ubiquitous emotion of shame, which Honneth argues flows from misrecognition, must be carefully addressed through the medium of relationship, otherwise it might lead to repressed shame and frustrated attempts at social struggle. To this end, a social work process is delineated for dealing with shame, following episodes of misrecognition.

Applications: Honneth’s model of recognition, along with revised ideas about how to recognise and manage shame, is incorporated into a conceptual framework for critical social work practice. With this renewed understanding of the impact of shame, following misrecognition, social workers should be better equipped conceptually to enable service users to take action for empowerment.

Is it me? Self-recognition bias across sensory modalities and its relationship to autistic traits

Background Atypical self-processing is an emerging theme in autism research, suggested by lower self-reference effect in memory, and atypical neural responses to visual self-representations. Most research on physical self-processing in autism uses visual stimuli. However, the self is a multimodal construct, and therefore, it is essential to test self-recognition in other sensory modalities as well. Self-recognition in the auditory modality remains relatively unexplored and has not been tested in relation to autism and related traits. This study investigates self-recognition in auditory and visual domain in the general population and tests if it is associated with autistic traits. Methods Thirty-nine neurotypical adults participated in a two-part study. In the first session, individual participant’s voice was recorded and face was photographed and morphed respectively with voices and faces from unfamiliar identities. In the second session, participants performed a ‘self-identification’ task, classifying each morph as ‘self’ voice (or face) or an ‘other’ voice (or face). All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). For each sensory modality, slope of the self-recognition curve was used as individual self-recognition metric. These two self-recognition metrics were tested for association between each other, and with autistic traits. Results Fifty percent ‘self’ response was reached for a higher percentage of self in the auditory domain compared to the visual domain (t = 3.142; P < 0.01). No significant correlation was noted between self-recognition bias across sensory modalities (τ = −0.165, P = 0.204). Higher recognition bias for self-voice was observed in individuals higher in autistic traits (τ AQ = 0.301, P = 0.008). No such correlation was observed between recognition bias for self-face and autistic traits (τ AQ = −0.020, P = 0.438). Conclusions Our data shows that recognition bias for physical self-representation is not related across sensory modalities. Further, individuals with higher autistic traits were better able to discriminate self from other voices, but this relation was not observed with self-face. A narrow self-other overlap in the auditory domain seen in individuals with high autistic traits could arise due to enhanced perceptual processing of auditory stimuli often observed in individuals with autism.

Copying actions and copying outcomes: Social learning through the second year

The present work documents how the logic of a model's demonstration and the communicative cues that the model provides interact with age to influence how children engage in social learning. Children at ages 12, 18, and 24 months (n = 204) watched a model open a series of boxes. Twelve-month-old subjects only copied the specific actions of the model when they were given a logical reason to do so- otherwise, they focused on reproducing the outcome of the demonstrated actions. Eighteen-month-old subjects focused on copying the outcome when the model was aloof. When the model acted socially, the subjects were as likely to focus on copying actions as outcomes, irrespective of the apparent logic of the model's behavior. Finally, 24-month-old subjects predominantly focused on copying the model's specific actions. However, they were less likely to produce the modeled outcome when the model acted nonsocially.