Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A case of cognitive convergence

The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is an exceedingly rare capacity in the animal kingdom. To date, only humans and great apes have shown convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition. Two dolphins were exposed to reflective surfaces, and both demonstrated responses consistent with the use of the mirror to investigate marked parts of the body. This ability to use a mirror to inspect parts of the body is a striking example of evolutionary convergence with great apes and humans.

A longitudinal investigation of self-other discrimination and the emergence of mirror self-recognition

The aim in this study was to investigate the association between infants' developing interest in their self-image and the onset of mirror self-recognition (MSR). A longitudinal study was conducted with 98 infants who were seen at intervals of 3 months from 9-24 months of age. At each session, the infants were administered a preferential-looking test whereby they were presented with a video image of themselves alongside a video image of a same-aged peer in two conditions, unmarked and marked. From the 12-month session onwards, the infants were also administered a version of the standard mark test of MSR. The infants showed a significant preference for looking at images of themselves in both conditions coincident with the onset of MSR. This result indicates that developing an interest in the self-image is an important component in the development of MSR. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

Pretend play, mirror self-recognition and imitation: A longitudinal investigation through the second year

The aim in the current study was to investigate the emergence of pretend play, mirror self-recognition, synchronic imitation and deferred imitation in normally developing human infants. A longitudinal study was conducted with 98 infants seen at three-monthly intervals from 12 through to 24 months of age. At each session the infants were tested on a range of tasks assessing the four target skills. Deferred imitation was found to emerge prior to synchronic imitation, pretend play and mirror self-recognition. In contrast, the latter three skills emerged between 18 and 21 months and followed similar developmental trajectories. Deferred imitation was found to hold a prerequisite relation with these three skills. Synchronic imitation, pretend play and mirror self-recognition were not closely associated and no prerequisite relations were found between these skills. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories regarding the development of pretend play, mirror self-recognition, synchronic imitation and deferred imitation in the second year. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Mirror self-recognition beyond the face

Three studies (N=144) investigated how toddlers aged 18 and 24 months pass the surprise-mark test of self-recognition. In Study 1, toddlers were surreptitiously marked in successive conditions on their legs and faces with stickers visible only in a mirror. Rates of sticker touching did not differ significantly between conditions. In Study 2, toddlers failed to touch a sticker on their legs that had been disguised before being marked. In Study 3, having been given 30-s exposure to their disguised legs before testing, toddlers touched the stickers on their legs and faces at equivalent levels. These results suggest that toddlers pass the mark test based on expectations about what they look like, expectations that are not restricted to the face.

Mirror self-recognition in a gorilla (gorilla gorilla gorilla)

Psychologists have studied self-recognition in human infants as an indication of self-knowledge (Amsterdam, 1972) and the development of abstract thought processes. Gallup (1970) modified the mark test used in human infant work to examine if nonhuman primates showed similar evidence of mirror self-recognition. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmnaeus) pass the mirror self-recognition test with limited mirror training or exposure. Other species of primates, such as gorillas and monkeys, have not passed the mirror test, despite extensive mirror exposure and training (Gallup, 1979). This project examined a gorilla (G. gorilla gorilla) named Otto in the traditional mark test. Using the modified mark-test, there were more incidents of touching the marked area while Otto was in front of the mirror than when he was not in front of the mirror. These results indicated that Otto was able to show some evidence of selfawareness.

The nature of early self-recognition

In studies of mirror-self-recognition subjects are usually surreptitiously marked on their head, and then presented with a mirror. Scores of studies have established that by 18 to 24 months, children investigate their own head upon seeing the mark in the mirror. Scores of papers have debated what this means. Suggestions range from rich interpretations (e.g., the development of self-awareness) to lean accounts (e.g., the development of proprioceptivevisual matching), and include numerous more moderate proposals (e.g., the development of a concept of one's face). In Study 1, 18-24-monthold toddlers were given the standard test and a novel task in which they were marked on their legs rather than on their face. Toddlers performed equivalently on both tasks, suggesting that passing the test does not rely on information specific to facial features. In Study 2, toddlers were surreptitiously slipped into trouser legs that were prefixed to a highchair. Toddlers failed to retrieve the sticker now that their legs looked different from expectations. This finding, together with the findings from a third study which showed that self-recognition in live video feedback develops later than mirror selfrecognition, suggests that performance is not solely the result of proprioceptive-visual matching.

The development of self-recognition in mirrors and live videos

By 24-months of age most children show mirror self-recognition. When surreptitiously marked on their forehead and then presented with a mirror, they explore their own head for the unexpected mark. Here we demonstrate that self-recognition in mirrors does not generalize to other visual feedback. We tested 80 children on mirror and live video versions of the task. Whereas 90% of 24-month olds passed the mirror version, only 35% passed the video version. Seventy percent of 30-month olds showed video selfrecognition and only by age 36-months did the pass rate on the video version reach 90%. It remains to be y 24-months of age most children show mirror self-recognition. When surreptitiously marked on their forehead and then presented with a mirror, they explore their own head for the unexpected mark. Here we demonstrate that self-recognition in mirrors does not generalize to other visual feedback. We tested 80 children on mirror and live video versions of the task. Whereas 90% of 24-month olds passed the mirror version, only 35% passed the video version. Seventy percent of 30-month olds showed video selfrecognition and only by age 36-months did the pass rate on the video version reach 90%. It remains to be

Self-recognition and abstraction abilities in the common chimpanzee studied with distorting mirrors.

The reactions of chimpanzees to regular mirrors and the results of the standard Gallup mark test have been well documented. In addition to using the mark test to demonstrate self-recognition in a regular mirror, we exposed six female chimpanzees to mirrors that produced distorted or multiplied self-images. Their reactions to their self-images, in terms of mirror-guided self-referenced behaviors, indicated that correct assessment of the source of the mirror image was made by each subject in each of the mirrors. Recognition of a distorted self-image implies an ability for abstraction in the subjects in that the distortion must be rationalized before self-recognition occurs. The implications of these results in terms of illuminating the relative importance of feature and contingency of movement cues to self-recognition are discussed.

Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features.

Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.

Natural killer cell mediated missing-self recognition can protect mice from primary chronic myeloid leukemia in vivo.

Background: Natural Killer (NK) cells are thought to protect from residual leukemic cells in patients receiving stem cell transplantation. However, multiple retrospective analyses of patient data have yielded conflicting conclusions regarding a putative role of NK cells and the essential NK cell recognition events mediating a protective effect against leukemia. Further, a NK cell mediated protective effect against primary leukemia in vivo has not been shown directly.Methodology/Principal Findings: Here we addressed whether NK cells have the potential to control chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) arising based on the transplantation of BCR-ABL1 oncogene expressing primary bone marrow precursor cells into lethally irradiated recipient mice. These analyses identified missing-self recognition as the only NK cell-mediated recognition strategy, which is able to significantly protect from the development of CML disease in vivo.Conclusion: Our data provide a proof of principle that NK cells can control primary leukemic cells in vivo. Since the presence of NK cells reduced the abundance of leukemia propagating cancer stem cells, the data raise the possibility that NK cell recognition has the potential to cure CML, which may be difficult using small molecule BCR-ABL1 inhibitors. Finally, our findings validate approaches to treat leukemia using antibody-based blockade of self-specific inhibitory MHC class I receptors.

Cre recombinase-mediated inactivation of H-2Dd transgene expression: evidence for partial missing self-recognition by Ly49A NK cells.

We have established H-2D(d)-transgenic (Tg) mice, in which H-2D(d) expression can be extinguished by Cre recombinase-mediated deletion of an essential portion of the transgene (Tg). NK cells adapted to the expression of the H-2D(d) Tg in H-2(b) mice and acquired reactivity to cells lacking H-2D(d), both in vivo and in vitro. H-2D(d)-Tg mice crossed to mice harboring an Mx-Cre Tg resulted in mosaic H-2D(d) expression. That abrogated NK cell reactivity to cells lacking D(d). In D(d) single Tg mice it is the Ly49A+ NK cell subset that reacts to cells lacking D(d), because the inhibitory Ly49A receptor is no longer engaged by its D(d) ligand. In contrast, Ly49A+ NK cells from D(d) x MxCre double Tg mice were unable to react to D(d)-negative cells. These Ly49A+ NK cells retained reactivity to target cells that were completely devoid of MHC class I molecules, suggesting that they were not anergic. Variegated D(d) expression thus impacts specifically missing D(d) but not globally missing class I reactivity by Ly49A+ NK cells. We propose that the absence of D(d) from some host cells results in the acquisition of only partial missing self-reactivity.

Is it me? Self-recognition bias across sensory modalities and its relationship to autistic traits

Background Atypical self-processing is an emerging theme in autism research, suggested by lower self-reference effect in memory, and atypical neural responses to visual self-representations. Most research on physical self-processing in autism uses visual stimuli. However, the self is a multimodal construct, and therefore, it is essential to test self-recognition in other sensory modalities as well. Self-recognition in the auditory modality remains relatively unexplored and has not been tested in relation to autism and related traits. This study investigates self-recognition in auditory and visual domain in the general population and tests if it is associated with autistic traits. Methods Thirty-nine neurotypical adults participated in a two-part study. In the first session, individual participant’s voice was recorded and face was photographed and morphed respectively with voices and faces from unfamiliar identities. In the second session, participants performed a ‘self-identification’ task, classifying each morph as ‘self’ voice (or face) or an ‘other’ voice (or face). All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). For each sensory modality, slope of the self-recognition curve was used as individual self-recognition metric. These two self-recognition metrics were tested for association between each other, and with autistic traits. Results Fifty percent ‘self’ response was reached for a higher percentage of self in the auditory domain compared to the visual domain (t = 3.142; P < 0.01). No significant correlation was noted between self-recognition bias across sensory modalities (τ = −0.165, P = 0.204). Higher recognition bias for self-voice was observed in individuals higher in autistic traits (τ AQ = 0.301, P = 0.008). No such correlation was observed between recognition bias for self-face and autistic traits (τ AQ = −0.020, P = 0.438). Conclusions Our data shows that recognition bias for physical self-representation is not related across sensory modalities. Further, individuals with higher autistic traits were better able to discriminate self from other voices, but this relation was not observed with self-face. A narrow self-other overlap in the auditory domain seen in individuals with high autistic traits could arise due to enhanced perceptual processing of auditory stimuli often observed in individuals with autism.

Mental evolution and development: Evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes, and other animals

Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals, According to J, Perrier (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of mind and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research.

Relación entre tiempo de atención al espejo y conductas indicadoras de autorreconocimiento en orangutanes (Pongo pygmaeus ) y siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus)

Para medir la capacidad de autorreconocimiento en el espejo en primates no humanos, el procedimiento usualmente utilizado consiste en registrar la frecuencia de comportamientos autodirigidos y autorreferidos. Los resultados obtenidos muestran una alta variabilidad entre sujetos pertenecientes a la misma especie. Este tipo de diferencias individuales no han podido ser explicadas. La hipótesis de trabajo establecer si pueden ser consecuencia de diferencias en el tiempo de atención al espejo. En la primera parte, se registró la cantidad de tiempo que los sujetos prestan atención al espejo y la cantidad de indicadores de autorreconocimiento que muestran. Los individuos que muestran mayores tiempos de atención también muestran frecuencias más altas de indicadores de autorreconocimiento, de acuerdo con una relación lineal entre ambas variables. En la segunda parte, se enriqueció el espejo para provocar un incremento del tiempo de atención en todos los sujetos. La frecuencia de indicadores de autorreconocimiento crece en comparación con una condición control. Los resultados demuestran que la frecuencia absoluta de indicadores de autorreconocimiento está fuertemente afectada por el tiempo de atención al espejo en sujetos de las mismas especies. Un análisis ad hoc. de los datos revela que la frecuencia relativa de conductas de autorreconocimiento sobre el número total de conductas está sólo ligeramente influida por el tiempo de atención y es independiente del nivel de actividad global y, por tanto, podría ser una medida más robusta de autorreconocimiento. De acuerdo a los resultados, los cambios en el tiempo de atención podrían explicar parte de la variabilidad intraespecífica hallada en los estudios de autorreconocimiento en el espejo. Las posibles implicaciones para las diferencias interespecíficas han de ser exploradas en diferentes estudios. Los experimentos han sido realizados en el Parque Zoológico de Barcelona de Febrero de 2007 a Julio de 2007. El proyecto ha tenido una duración global de 14 meses.