Battles of America by sea and land : with biographies of naval and military commanders /

Includes indexes.

Eminent British military commanders ...

Added t.-p., engr.: Lives of the most eminent British military commanders. By ... G.R. Gleig.

The war with the South, a history of the late rebellion, with biographical sketches of leading statesmen and distinguished naval and military commanders, etc.

Illustrated by Darley and others.

Identifying and implementing adaptive strategy in the U.S. military

Changes in the environment, including increased environmental complexity, require military supply units to employ a more adaptive strategy in order to enhance military agility. We extend the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model and develop propositions that explore the interrelationships between/amongst entrepreneurial orientation (EO); opportunity recognition, evaluation and exploitation; environmental and organizational factors; and organizational performance. We propose that the innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking dimensions of EO are of primary importance in identifying adaptive solutions and that these relationships are moderated by environmental factors. The autonomy and competitive aggressiveness dimensions of EO are important in implementing solutions as adaptive strategies, especially in a military context, and these relationships are moderated by organizational factors. This chapter extends existing theory developed primarily for the civilian sector to the military. Military organizations are more rigid hierarchical structures, and have different measures of performance. At an applied level, this research provides insights for military commanders that can potentially enhance agility and adaptability.

El proceso de paz: una interpretación desde la mirada de los altos mandos militares en Colombia

A pesar de la normatividad que establece el carácter apolítico de los miembros de las Fuerzas Militares es posible afirmar que los militares en Colombia cuentan con un pensamiento político debido a procesos sociológicos e históricos que datan de mediados del siglo XX. En el caso puntual del proceso de paz actual, iniciado en Agosto del 2012, entre el Estado Colombiano y el grupo guerrillero FARC se concluye que aunque los militares están a favor de la paz existen multiples factores que generan preocupación e incertidumbre al respecto, lo que se explica a partir de los procesos mencionados.

Estudo comparativo ortográfico: uma análise descritivo-comparativa em documentos históricos do século XIX em São Luís do Maranhão

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

"Es preciso, pues, regimentar" : La organización de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Buenos Aires, 1852-1862

En este trabajo estudiamos la organización de la Guardia Nacional en la campaña y la frontera bonaerense, durante los diez años que siguieron a su creación (1852-1862). En ese proceso se destacan dos períodos bien definidos. El primero, 1852-1857, se caracterizó por el predominio de los jueces de paz en el manejo de la institución. El segundo, 1857-1862, se definió por una mayor presencia de los jefes de los regimientos. Nos centraremos en el rol que tuvieron las autoridades civiles y militares que protagonizaron el "arreglo" de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Procuraremos complejizar la percepción que existe sobre las relaciones de poder que se establecieron entre las jurisdicciones civil y militar, al mismo tiempo entre esta última.

"Es preciso, pues, regimentar" : La organización de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Buenos Aires, 1852-1862

En este trabajo estudiamos la organización de la Guardia Nacional en la campaña y la frontera bonaerense, durante los diez años que siguieron a su creación (1852-1862). En ese proceso se destacan dos períodos bien definidos. El primero, 1852-1857, se caracterizó por el predominio de los jueces de paz en el manejo de la institución. El segundo, 1857-1862, se definió por una mayor presencia de los jefes de los regimientos. Nos centraremos en el rol que tuvieron las autoridades civiles y militares que protagonizaron el "arreglo" de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Procuraremos complejizar la percepción que existe sobre las relaciones de poder que se establecieron entre las jurisdicciones civil y militar, al mismo tiempo entre esta última.

"Es preciso, pues, regimentar" : La organización de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Buenos Aires, 1852-1862

En este trabajo estudiamos la organización de la Guardia Nacional en la campaña y la frontera bonaerense, durante los diez años que siguieron a su creación (1852-1862). En ese proceso se destacan dos períodos bien definidos. El primero, 1852-1857, se caracterizó por el predominio de los jueces de paz en el manejo de la institución. El segundo, 1857-1862, se definió por una mayor presencia de los jefes de los regimientos. Nos centraremos en el rol que tuvieron las autoridades civiles y militares que protagonizaron el "arreglo" de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Procuraremos complejizar la percepción que existe sobre las relaciones de poder que se establecieron entre las jurisdicciones civil y militar, al mismo tiempo entre esta última.

"Es preciso, pues, regimentar" : La organización de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Buenos Aires, 1852-1862

En este trabajo estudiamos la organización de la Guardia Nacional en la campaña y la frontera bonaerense, durante los diez años que siguieron a su creación (1852-1862). En ese proceso se destacan dos períodos bien definidos. El primero, 1852-1857, se caracterizó por el predominio de los jueces de paz en el manejo de la institución. El segundo, 1857-1862, se definió por una mayor presencia de los jefes de los regimientos. Nos centraremos en el rol que tuvieron las autoridades civiles y militares que protagonizaron el "arreglo" de la Guardia Nacional de campaña. Procuraremos complejizar la percepción que existe sobre las relaciones de poder que se establecieron entre las jurisdicciones civil y militar, al mismo tiempo entre esta última.

Apoio geoespacial a uma operação NEO

No âmbito das obrigações que o Estado Português tem em garantir a segurança dos seus cidadãos, é efetuada, em países ou regiões onde há comunidades nacionais, uma avaliação quanto ao risco de vida para os cidadãos nacionais que aí residam ou aí se encontrem, entendendo-se, à luz do direito internacional consuetudinário, que é legítima a eventual execução de intervenção militar de extração de nacionais não combatentes dessas zonas de risco. Este trabalho pretende contribuir para uma reflexão sobre o apoio geoespacial a uma operação de extração de cidadãos nacionais não combatentes, que se denomina NEO (non-combatant evacuation operation). Dada a importância do conhecimento holístico do ambiente operacional para os comandantes militares, os Sistemas de Informação Geográfica desempenham um papel fundamental em termos da análise, contextualização e visualização da informação geoespacial, sendo um precioso sistema de apoio à decisão. A tomada de decisão é efetuada com os contributos de várias áreas de conhecimento, sendo fundamental que o planeamento seja efetuado com base na mesma informação geoespacial, evitando a existência de uma multitude de dados geoespaciais nem sempre coerentes, atualizados e acessíveis a todos os que deles necessitam, pretendendo-se com este trabalho fornecer um contributo para resolver este problema. Aborda-se também a escassez dos dados geográficos nas zonas em que este tipo de operações se poderá desenrolar, a pertinência e a adequabilidade de utilização de dados espaciais abertos, os modelos de dados, bem como a forma como a informação pode ser disponibilizada.

The Union army : a history of military affairs in the loyal states, 1861-65 -- records of the regiments in the Union army -- cyclopedia of battles -- memoirs of commanders and soldiers.

v. 1-4. States and regiments.-- v. 5-6 Cyclopedia of battles.-- v. 7 The navy.-- v. 8. Biographical.

The history, civil, political and military, of the southern rebellion, from its incipient stages to its close. Comprehending, also, all important state papers, ordinances of secession, proclamations, proceedings of Congress, official reports of commanders, etc., etc.

Added t.-p. engraved, with vignette, in each volume.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.