Matching occupation and self: Does matching theory adequately model children's thinking?

The present exploratory-descriptive cross-national study focused on the career development of 11- to 14-yr.-old children, in particular whether they can match their personal characteristics with their occupational aspirations. Further, the study explored whether their matching may be explained in terms of a fit between person and environment using Holland's theory as an example. Participants included 511 South African and 372 Australian children. Findings relate to two items of the Revised Career Awareness Survey that require children to relate personal-social knowledge to their favorite occupation. Data were analyzed in three stages using descriptive statistics, i.e., mean scores, frequencies, and percentage agreement. The study indicated that children perceived their personal characteristics to be related to their occupational aspirations. However, how this matching takes place is not adequately accounted for in terms of a career theory such as that of Holland.

Matching theory based travel plan aware charging algorithms in V2G smart grid networks

The frequency, time and places of charging have large impact on the Quality of Experience (QoE) of EV drivers. It is critical to design effective EV charging scheduling system to improve the QoE of EV drivers. In order to improve EV charging QoE and utilization of CSs, we develop an innovative travel plan aware charging scheduling scheme for moving EVs to be charged at Charging Stations (CS). In the design of the proposed charging scheduling scheme for moving EVs, the travel routes of EVs and the utility of CSs are taken into consideration. The assignment of EVs to CSs is modeled as a two-sided many-to-one matching game with the objective of maximizing the system utility which reflects the satisfactory degrees of EVs and the profits of CSs. A Stable Matching Algorithm (SMA) is proposed to seek stable matching between charging EVs and CSs. Furthermore, an improved Learning based On-LiNe scheduling Algorithm (LONA) is proposed to be executed by each CS in a distributed manner. The performance gain of the average system utility by the SMA is up to 38.2% comparing to the Random Charging Scheduling (RCS) algorithm, and 4.67% comparing to Only utility of Electric Vehicle Concerned (OEVC) scheme. The effectiveness of the proposed SMA and LONA is also demonstrated by simulations in terms of the satisfactory ratio of charging EVs and the the convergence speed of iteration.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

An NP-complete matching problem /

"UILU-ENG 79-1713."

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.

Ranking Sets of Objects

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces

Assuming at least three individuals and some regularity conditions, we construct a set S* of Pareto surfaces which is an ordinal basis of the set S of all surfaces: every surface in S is ordinally equivalent to some surface in S* and all surfaces in S* are ordinally distinct.

Effect of fatigue on consumers' advertising processing

Huge advertising budgets are invested by firms to reach and convince potential consumers to buy their products. To optimize these investments, it is fundamental not only to ensure that appropriate consumers will be reached, but also that they will be in appropriate reception conditions. Marketing research has focused on the way consumers react to advertising, as well as on some individual and contextual factors that could mediate or moderate the ad impact on consumers (e.g. motivation and ability to process information or attitudes toward advertising). Nevertheless, a factor that potentially influences consumers’ advertising reactions has not yet been studied in marketing research: fatigue. Fatigue can yet impact key variables of advertising processing, such as cognitive resources availability (Lieury 2004). Fatigue is felt when the body warns to stop an activity (or inactivity) to have some rest, allowing the individual to compensate for fatigue effects. Dittner et al. (2004) defines it as “the state of weariness following a period of exertion, mental or physical, characterized by a decreased capacity for work and reduced efficiency to respond to stimuli.’’ It signals that resources will lack if we continue with the ongoing activity. According to Schmidtke (1969), fatigue leads to troubles in information reception, in perception, in coordination, in attention getting, in concentration and in thinking. In addition, for Markle (1984) fatigue generates a decrease in memory, and in communication ability, whereas it increases time reaction, and number of errors. Thus, fatigue may have large effects on advertising processing. We suggest that fatigue determines the level of available resources. Some research about consumer responses to advertising claim that complexity is a fundamental element to take into consideration. Complexity determines the cognitive efforts the consumer must provide to understand the message (Putrevu et al. 2004). Thus, we suggest that complexity determines the level of required resources. To study this complex question about need and provision of cognitive resources, we draw upon Resource Matching Theory. Anand and Sternthal (1989, 1990) are the first to state the Resource Matching principle, saying that an ad is most persuasive when the resources required to process it match the resources the viewer is willing and able to provide. They show that when the required resources exceed those available, the message is not entirely processed by the consumer. And when there are too many available resources comparing to those required, the viewer elaborates critical or unrelated thoughts. According to the Resource Matching theory, the level of resource demanded by an ad can be high or low, and is mostly determined by the ad’s layout (Peracchio and Myers-Levy, 1997). We manipulate the level of required resources using three levels of ad complexity (low – high – extremely high). On the other side, the resource availability of an ad viewer is determined by lots of contextual and individual variables. We manipulate the level of available resources using two levels of fatigue (low – high). Tired viewers want to limit the processing effort to minimal resource requirements by making heuristics, forming overall impression at first glance. It will be easier for them to decode the message when ads are very simple. On the contrary, the most effective ads for viewers who are not tired are complex enough to draw their attention and fully use their resources. They will use more analytical strategies, looking at the details of the ad. However, if ads are too complex, they will be too difficult to understand. The viewer will be discouraged to process information and will overlook the ad. The objective of our research is to study fatigue as a moderating variable of advertising information processing. We run two experimental studies to assess the effect of fatigue on visual strategies, comprehension, persuasion and memorization. In study 1, thirty-five undergraduate students enrolled in a marketing research course participated in the experiment. The experimental design is 2 (tiredness level: between subjects) x 3 (ad complexity level: within subjects). Participants were randomly assigned a schedule time (morning: 8-10 am or evening: 10-12 pm) to perform the experiment. We chose to test subjects at various moments of the day to obtain maximum variance in their fatigue level. We use Morningness / Eveningness tendency of participants (Horne & Ostberg, 1976) as a control variable. We assess fatigue level using subjective measures - questionnaire with fatigue scales - and objective measures - reaction time and number of errors. Regarding complexity levels, we have designed our own ads in order to keep aspects other than complexity equal. We ran a pretest using the Resource Demands scale (Keller and Bloch 1997) and by rating them on complexity like Morrison and Dainoff (1972) to check for our complexity manipulation. We found three significantly different levels. After having completed the fatigue scales, participants are asked to view the ads on a screen, while their eye movements are recorded by the eye-tracker. Eye-tracking allows us to find out patterns of visual attention (Pieters and Warlop 1999). We are then able to infer specific respondents’ visual strategies according to their level of fatigue. Comprehension is assessed with a comprehension test. We collect measures of attitude change for persuasion and measures of recall and recognition at various points of time for memorization. Once the effect of fatigue will be determined across the student population, it is interesting to account for individual differences in fatigue severity and perception. Therefore, we run study 2, which is similar to the previous one except for the design: time of day is now within-subjects and complexity becomes between-subjects

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''