Kinematic Manipulability of Robotic Systems

Many tasks involving manipulation require cooperation between robots. Meanwhile, it is necessary to determine the adequate values for the robot parameters to obtain a good performence. This paper discusses several aspects related with the manipulability of two co-operative robots when handling objects with different lengths and orientations. In this line of thought, a numerical tool is developed for the calculation and the graphical visualization of the manipulability measure.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

Analysis of Two Arms Working in Cooperation

This paper analyzes the performance of two cooperative robot manipulators. In order to capture the working performancewe formulated several performance indices that measure the manipulability, the effort reduction and the equilibrium between the two robots. In this perspective the proposed indices we determined the optimal values for the system parameters. Furthermore, it is studied the implementation of fractional-order algorithms in the position/force control of two cooperative robotic manipulators holding an object.

Chaotic Phenomena and Performance Optimization in the Trajectory Control of Redundant Manipulators

Redundant manipulators have some advantages when compared with classical arms because they allow the trajectory optimization, both on the free space and on the presence of abstacles, and the resolution of singularities. For this type of manipulators, several kinetic algorithms adopt generalized inverse matrices. In this line of thought, the generalized inverse control scheme is tested through several experiments that reveal the difficulties that often arise. Motivated by theseproblems this paper presents a new method that ptimizes the manipulability through a least squre polynomialapproximation to determine the joints positions. Moreover, the article studies influence on the dynamics, when controlling redundant and hyper-redundant manipulators. The experiment confirm the superior performance of the proposed algorithm for redundant and hyper-redundant manipulators, revealing several fundamental properties of the chaotic phenomena, and gives a deeper insight towards the future development of superior trajectory control algorithms.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Manipulation via Capacities Revisited

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.

Analysis and Control of Robot Manipulators with Kinematic Redundancy

A closed-form solution formula for the kinematic control of manipulators with redundancy is derived, using the Lagrangian multiplier method. Differential relationship equivalent to the Resolved Motion Method has been also derived. The proposed method is proved to provide with the exact equilibrium state for the Resolved Motion Method. This exactness in the proposed method fixes the repeatability problem in the Resolved Motion Method, and establishes a fixed transformation from workspace to the joint space. Also the method, owing to the exactness, is demonstrated to give more accurate trajectories than the Resolved Motion Method. In addition, a new performance measure for redundancy control has been developed. This measure, if used with kinematic control methods, helps achieve dexterous movements including singularity avoidance. Compared to other measures such as the manipulability measure and the condition number, this measure tends to give superior performances in terms of preserving the repeatability property and providing with smoother joint velocity trajectories. Using the fixed transformation property, Taylor's Bounded Deviation Paths Algorithm has been extended to the redundant manipulators.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

A further note on the college admission game

When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had in explaining empirical economic phenomena.

Tris(trimethylsilyl)silyl substituted alkali- and transition metal guaiazulenides

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein prochirales, aus natürlichen Resourcen gewonnenes Azulen, das Guajazulen genutzt, um neuartige chirale Cyclopentadienyl-Systeme aufzubauen. Mit Alkalimetallhypersilaniden als starke und sperrige Nukleophile gelingt es hypersilylsubstituierte Gujazulenide zu synthetisieren. Diese wurden mittels Elementaranalyse, NMR-Spektroskopie und Röntgendiffraktometrie charakterisiert. Durch nachfolgende Metathesen mit Übergangsmetallhalogeniden konnten in vielen Fällen die entsprechenden Metallocene erhalten werden. Die Experimente enthüllen eine ausgeprägte Regioselektivität der Addition des sperrigen Hypersilyanions an das Guajazulen, die durch das eingesetzte Lösungsmittel graduell verändert werden kann. In nicht-koordinierenden Lösungsmitteln findet man ausschließlich eine Addition an der 6-Position, die 6-Hypersilyl-2,6-dihydroguajazulenide (6-Hyp-Hgual) (M=Li 1, K 2, Cs 4) in ausgezeichneten Ausbeuten liefert. In polaren Solventien erhält man hingegen Mischungen der 6- und 8-Regioisomeren: 2 bzw. (8-Hyp-Hgual) (3). 2 bleibt aber hierbei das Hauptprodukt. Röntgenbeugungsexperimente zeigen, dass 1 im Kristall als dimerer Sandwich-Komplex, meso-[Li2(6-Hyp-Hgual)2], und die THF-Solvate (thf)4K(6-Hyp-Hgual) (2a) sowie (thf)4K(8-Hyp-Hgual) (3a) jeweils als Halb-Sandwich-Komplexe in einer racemischen Mischung vorliegen. Die Verbindungen 1, 2, 3 and 4 eignen sich sehr gut dazu, in Metathesereaktionen als Precursor für neuartige chirale Metallozen-Komplexe eingesetzt zu werden. Insbesondere das Kaliumderivat 2 besticht durch die einfache und relativ preiswerte Synthese, die erzielten hohen Ausbeuten (>80%) und seine leichte Handhabbarkeit. In THF als Solvent wurden die Metallocene 5:5-M’(6-Hyp-Hgual)2 (M’ = Mn 5, Fe 6, Ni 8) und 5:5-Fe(8-Hyp-Hgual)2 (7) erhalten. Bei Verwendung einiger redox-aktiver Metallhalogenide beobachtet man jedoch die Zersetzung der Metallocene unter Bildung des oxidativen Kopplungsproduktes (3-Hyp-6-Hgual)2 (9) sowie der Ausscheidung von Metall. Die Umsetzung von Halogeniden der Gruppe 4 (TiCl3 and M’’Cl4 (M’’ = Ti, Zr, Hf)) mit 2 liefert in THF ausschließlich die Metallozendichloride M’’(6-Hyp-Hgual)2Cl2 (M’’ = Ti (10), Zr (11), Hf (12)). Die erhaltenen Metallozenderivate fallen als Diastereomeren-Gemische an, die sich durch fraktionierende Kristallisation teilweise oder vollständig in ihre Bestandteile, das jeweilige R,R-Racemat und das R,S-meso-Diastereomer auftrennen lassen. Die Strukturen der rac-Diastereomere konnten durch Beugungsexperimente aufgeklärt werden. Durch eine Metathese von 2 mit Hyp-Cl kann eine zweite Hypersilylgruppe in die 2-Position des Guajazulen-Gerüstes eingeführt werden. Das entstehende 2,6-bis(Hyp)-H2gua (14) kann anschließend mit nBuLi in das extrem luft- und feuchtigkeitsempfindliche Li[2,6-bis(Hyp)-Hgual] (15) überführt werden, dass wie 1 eine dimere Sandwich-Struktur aufweist. Durch Einführung des zweiten Hypersilylrestes werden die chemischen Eigenschaften des Azulenids dramatisch verändert. Während Verbindung 1 sich als guter Precursor für Metallocene erwies, gelang es uns bislang nicht, entsprechende Derivate der Verbindung 15 zu isolieren.

Mechanical design optimization for multi-finger haptic devices applied to virtual grasping manipulation

This paper describes the design of a modular multi-finger haptic device for virtual object manipulation. Mechanical structures are based on one module per finger and can be scaled up to three fingers. Mechanical configurations for two and three fingers are based on the use of one and two redundant axes, respectively. As demonstrated, redundant axes significantly increase workspace and prevent link collisions, which is their main asset with respect to other multi-finger haptic devices. The location of redundant axes and link dimensions have been optimized in order to guarantee a proper workspace, manipulability, force capability, and inertia for the device. The mechanical haptic device design and a thimble adaptable to different finger sizes have also been developed for virtual object manipulation.