Manipulation via Capacities Revisited


Autoria(s): Ehlers, Lars
Data(s)

20/03/2009

20/03/2009

01/03/2009

Resumo

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2740

Idioma(s)

en

Publicador

Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques

Relação

Cahier de recherche #2009-03

Palavras-Chave #Two-Sided Matching #Stability #Manipulation #Capacities #C78 #D78 #I20
Tipo

Article