Manipulation via Capacities Revisited
Data(s) |
20/03/2009
20/03/2009
01/03/2009
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Resumo |
This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Publicador |
Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques |
Relação |
Cahier de recherche #2009-03 |
Palavras-Chave | #Two-Sided Matching #Stability #Manipulation #Capacities #C78 #D78 #I20 |
Tipo |
Article |