Quantificadores no contexto lógico: 'muitos' e 'poucos'

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Methods for Solving Necessary Equivalences

Nonmonotonic Logics such as Autoepistemic Logic, Reflective Logic, and Default Logic, are usually defined in terms of set-theoretic fixed-point equations defined over deductively closed sets of sentences of First Order Logic. Such systems may also be represented as necessary equivalences in a Modal Logic stronger than S5 with the added advantage that such representations may be generalized to allow quantified variables crossing modal scopes resulting in a Quantified Autoepistemic Logic, a Quantified Autoepistemic Kernel, a Quantified Reflective Logic, and a Quantified Default Logic. Quantifiers in all these generalizations obey all the normal laws of logic including both the Barcan formula and its converse. Herein, we address the problem of solving some necessary equivalences containing universal quantifiers over modal scopes. Solutions obtained by these methods are then compared to related results obtained in the literature by Circumscription in Second Order Logic since the disjunction of all the solutions of a necessary equivalence containing just normal defaults in these Quantified Logics, is equivalent to that system.

Representing Reflective Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Reflective Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Reflective Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Reflective Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since all the laws of First Order Logic hold and since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

Representing Default Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Default Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Default Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Default Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

On the Relationship between Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic

Reflective Logic and Default Logic are both generalized so as to allow universally quantified variables to cross modal scopes whereby the Barcan formula and its converse hold. This is done by representing both the fixed-point equation for Reflective Logic and the fixed-point equation for Default both as necessary equivalences in the Modal Quantificational Logic Z. and then inserting universal quantifiers before the defaults. The two resulting systems, called Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic, are then compared by deriving metatheorems of Z that express their relationships. The main result is to show that every solution to the equivalence for Quantified Default Logic is a strongly grounded solution to the equivalence for Quantified Reflective Logic. It is further shown that Quantified Reflective Logic and Quantified Default Logic have exactly the same solutions when no default has an entailment condition.

Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meaning of that initial set of sentences. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and unlike the original Autoepistemic Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of modal expressions thus allowing the derivation of quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan formula and its converse hold.

The logic of ADHD : a brief review of fallacious reasoning

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.

Some applications of logic to feasibility in higher types

While it is commonly accepted that computability on a Turing machine in polynomial time represents a correct formalization of the notion of a feasibly computable function, there is no similar agreement on how to extend this notion on functionals, that is, what functionals should be considered feasible. One possible paradigm was introduced by Mehlhorn, who extended Cobham's definition of feasible functions to type 2 functionals. Subsequently, this class of functionals (with inessential changes of the definition) was studied by Townsend who calls this class POLY, and by Kapron and Cook who call the same class basic feasible functionals. Kapron and Cook gave an oracle Turing machine model characterisation of this class. In this article, we demonstrate that the class of basic feasible functionals has recursion theoretic properties which naturally generalise the corresponding properties of the class of feasible functions, thus giving further evidence that the notion of feasibility of functionals mentioned above is correctly chosen. We also improve the Kapron and Cook result on machine representation.Our proofs are based on essential applications of logic. We introduce a weak fragment of second order arithmetic with second order variables ranging over functions from NN which suitably characterises basic feasible functionals, and show that it is a useful tool for investigating the properties of basic feasible functionals. In particular, we provide an example how one can extract feasible programs from mathematical proofs that use nonfeasible functions.

Mind change complexity of learning logic programs

The present paper motivates the study of mind change complexity for learning minimal models of length-bounded logic programs. It establishes ordinal mind change complexity bounds for learnability of these classes both from positive facts and from positive and negative facts. Building on Angluin’s notion of finite thickness and Wright’s work on finite elasticity, Shinohara defined the property of bounded finite thickness to give a sufficient condition for learnability of indexed families of computable languages from positive data. This paper shows that an effective version of Shinohara’s notion of bounded finite thickness gives sufficient conditions for learnability with ordinal mind change bound, both in the context of learnability from positive data and for learnability from complete (both positive and negative) data. Let Omega be a notation for the first limit ordinal. Then, it is shown that if a language defining framework yields a uniformly decidable family of languages and has effective bounded finite thickness, then for each natural number m >0, the class of languages defined by formal systems of length <= m: • is identifiable in the limit from positive data with a mind change bound of Omega (power)m; • is identifiable in the limit from both positive and negative data with an ordinal mind change bound of Omega × m. The above sufficient conditions are employed to give an ordinal mind change bound for learnability of minimal models of various classes of length-bounded Prolog programs, including Shapiro’s linear programs, Arimura and Shinohara’s depth-bounded linearly covering programs, and Krishna Rao’s depth-bounded linearly moded programs. It is also noted that the bound for learning from positive data is tight for the example classes considered.