Lobbying the auditing practices board : analysis of responses to the expanded audit report

In 1993 the Auditing Practice Board (APB) in the United Kingdom issued Statement of Auditing Standard 600, Auditors’ Reports on Financial Statements. The new expanded audit report was issued in an attempt to reduce the audit expectations gap. Prior to the issuing of this standard the APB issued a Consultative Document in 1991 and an Exposure Draft in 1992. In this paper we investigate the comments made to the APB by respondents to these two documents. We found that a number of respondents doubted whether the new standard was of itself sufficient to reduce the expectations gap. In addition, we found that where respondents made substantive suggestions for changes to the proposed standard these generally were not implemented by the APB.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy

Climate change has been recognised as one of the greatest challenges of the 21st Century. Its impacts, and they way that we choose to deal with them will profoundly affect how business and society operates. This report focuses on European Union (EU) climate policy – the governance structures, rules and regulations that have been put in place at the EU level to attempt to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, it focuses on how trade associations representing industrial sectors or broader business interest have lobbied on EU climate policy, and the impact that they have had on the policymaking process. The report then goes on to discuss whether the impacts of this lobbying align with the stated policies of the companies that are members of these trade associations.

On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

Du recrutement au lobbying: une étude de l'utilisation du marketing politique par les groupes d'intérêt au Québec

L’objectif de ce mémoire est double. D’une part, il vise à proposer un cadre d’analyse novateur permettant d’étendre le modèle du marketing politique, traditionnellement limité au cas des partis politiques, en l’appliquant aux stratégies de recrutement (en amont) et de lobbying (en aval) des groupes d’intérêt. D’autre part, il a pour but de donner un nouveau souffle à l’étude des groupes d’intérêt en tant que sous-champ de la science politique en situant leur action dans une perspective dynamique et stratégique. De façon plus spécifique, cette recherche vise à évaluer, à l’aide de deux hypothèses, le degré de déploiement global de l’approche marketing chez les groupes d’intérêt au Québec et à comparer son niveau de pénétration spécifique au sein des différentes organisations. La première hypothèse avance que le degré de déploiement global du marketing politique auprès des groupes d’intérêt québécois s’avère relativement faible en raison d’un certain nombre de facteurs contextuels qui ont historiquement limité son intégration au sein de leurs stratégies de recrutement et de lobbying. La seconde hypothèse affirme pour sa part que le niveau de pénétration spécifique de l’approche marketing est limité à certaines organisations et varie en fonction de certains facteurs qui peuvent s’avérer contradictoires. Les données recueillies lors d’entrevues menées auprès de douze des principaux groupes d’intérêt actifs à l’échelle du Québec tendent à confirmer les deux hypothèses.

Désunis dans l'adversité : le lobbying des consommateurs américains pendant le conflit du bois d'oeuvre

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Setting UK standards on the concept of control: an analysis of lobbying behaviour

The present study aims to contribute to an understanding of the complexity of lobbying activities within the accounting standard-setting process in the UK. The paper reports detailed content analysis of submission letters to four related exposure drafts. These preceded two accounting standards that set out the concept of control used to determine the scope of consolidation in the UK, except for reporting under international standards. Regulation on the concept of control provides rich patterns of lobbying behaviour due to its controversial nature and its significance to financial reporting. Our examination is conducted by dividing lobbyists into two categories, corporate and non-corporate, which are hypothesised (and demonstrated) to lobby differently. In order to test the significance of these differences we apply ANOVA techniques and univariate regression analysis. Corporate respondents are found to devote more attention to issues of specific applicability of the concept of control, whereas non-corporate respondents tend to devote more attention to issues of general applicability of this concept. A strong association between the issues raised by corporate respondents and their line of business is revealed. Both categories of lobbyists are found to advance conceptually-based arguments more often than economic consequences-based or combined arguments. However, when economic consequences-based arguments are used, they come exclusively from the corporate category of respondents.

Preparers’ and non-preparers’ lobbying on the proposed prohibition of goodwill amortisation in ED3 ‘business combinations’

In this paper preparers’ and non-preparers’ positions regarding accounting for goodwill are examined through studying submitted comment letters on ED3 ‘Business Combinations’. Preparers have, because of economic consequences, incentives to lobby for the non-amortisation approach and non-preparers for the amortisation approach. As hypothesised, non-preparers are found to support amortisation of goodwill to a greater extent than do preparers. Moreover, the two groups’ supportive arguments, i.e. how they argue for or against the non-amortisation or amortisation approach, are studied. Again, as hypothesised, the results show that the two groups use the same type of ‘sophisticated’ framework based arguments instead of economic consequences arguments. Taken together the examination of the comment letters thus indicates that both preparers and non-preparers point at conceptual strengths and weaknesses, instead of pointing at the real cause of the lobbying activities, i.e. perceived economic consequences, when they try to affect the final outcome of the standard. These findings confirm earlier research which has suggested that self-interested lobbyists use accounting theories and concepts as useful justifications.

Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

El cabildeo para el comercio internacional de América Latina y el Caribe en Washington, DC = Latin America and Caribbean lobbying for international trade in Washington, DC

Incluye Bibliografía

Dinamica, dimensione e strutture di rete dell'attività di lobbying negli Stati Uniti

Studio e analisi dell'evoluzione, dinamica e strutture di rete dell'attività di lobbying negli Stati Uniti