On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
| Data(s) |
04/02/2008
04/02/2008
01/10/2006
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose. |
| Formato |
168420 bytes application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
en |
| Publicador |
Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques |
| Relação |
Cahier de recherche #2006-19 |
| Palavras-Chave | #lobbying #referendum #parametrized complexity #D72 |
| Tipo |
Article |
